Scoping sheet, read 16 November 2026
Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing
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Free to reuse under CC BY 4.0. Open the scoping sheet to print it.
How do I use this scoping sheet?
Fill it in with your sponsor and white cell before a provider starts. Each of the 50 questions has a blank answer column, a reason it matters and the source it comes from, with the date the source was read. Print this page, or download the sheet as Word, CSV or JSON.
The sheet follows the order a scoping meeting takes: objectives, crown jewels, threat profile, scope and exclusions, rules of engagement, emergency stop, legal authorization, timing, white cell contacts, and reporting and retest. How the sheet was made lists the sources.
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Word (.docx, 10 KB): download. Data: CSV and JSON, CC BY 4.0.
Cite this
Red Team vs Blue Team, "Engagement Scoping Sheet", edition 16 November 2026, https://redteamvsblueteam.com/scoping-sheet/. Data: CSV and JSON.
1. Objectives
State what the engagement is meant to teach you before any scope is drawn.
| No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | What do you want to learn from this engagement, in one sentence? | TIBER-EU says the outcome is not a pass or fail. The test is meant to show strengths and weaknesses and to produce learning, so the goal is a question your team wants answered. | ECB, What is TIBER-EU?, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 2 | Which capabilities are being tested: prevention, detection, response, or all three? | TIBER-EU describes intelligence-led red team testing as a way to test protection, detection and response capabilities. Naming which ones you want tested decides who must stay unaware and who can be told. | ECB, TIBER-EU Framework, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 3 | Is this a covert red team test, a purple team exercise, or an assumed breach start? | The Singapore AASE guidelines separate covert red team exercises from purple team exercises, in which red and blue work together to improve detection. The choice changes who is told and when. | ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 4 | Do the testers start with some knowledge of your environment, or none? | Mandiant says its Red Team Assessment begins by jointly deciding whether the red team should have some or no knowledge of the environment. The NCSC lists open box and closed box as ways to set the starting knowledge. | Mandiant, Red Team Assessment datasheet, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 5 | Who is the executive sponsor and who owns the engagement day to day? | CBEST names an executive sponsor accountable for delivery and a control group coordinator for day-to-day work. Without both, decisions stall during the test. | Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, read 16 Nov 2026 |
2. Crown jewels and critical functions
Name the business functions an attacker would want, and the systems, people and processes behind them.
| No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | Which critical functions or business services are in scope, and why were they chosen? | The TIBER-EU scope document must list all critical or important functions the entity identified and explain why each is in or out of scope. | ECB, TIBER-EU scope specification guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 7 | Which systems, people and processes support each function? | TIBER-EU requires the identified ICT systems that support each function. The framework tests people, processes and technology, not only machines. | ECB, TIBER-EU scope specification guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 8 | Which of those systems are outsourced, to whom, and in which countries are they used? | The TIBER-EU scope document asks, for each system, whether it is outsourced, the name of the third-party provider and the jurisdictions in which it is used. | ECB, TIBER-EU scope specification guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 9 | Which functions are left out of scope, and for what reason? | Where a function is not tested, the TIBER-EU scope document requires the reasons to be written down. A recorded reason keeps later readers from assuming the function was covered. | ECB, TIBER-EU scope specification guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 10 | What are the flags: the specific targets the testers must reach, such as a data set or a control? | TIBER-EU defines flags as the objectives to be reached, each tied to confidentiality, integrity or availability. The Singapore guidelines use a concrete goal such as a large unauthorized funds transfer as an example. | ECB, TIBER-EU scope specification guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 11 | What must happen for each flag to count as reached? | The TIBER-EU scope guidance asks for the testing activity that demonstrates compromise. A flag with no stated proof is argued about at the end. | ECB, TIBER-EU scope specification guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 |
3. Threat profile
Say who would attack you and how, so the scenarios are not guesses.
| No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | Which threat actors are most likely to target you, and what evidence supports that? | CBEST asks the threat intelligence provider for evidentially supported profiles of actors that could reasonably be expected to target the firm. CORIE asks the provider to identify the primary adversaries. | Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 13 | Who will supply the threat intelligence, from which sources, and who is kept separate from the red team? | TIBER-EU and the EU technical standards require the threat intelligence staff to be separate from, and not report to, the staff of the same provider who act as red team testers. | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 14 | How many attack scenarios will be run, and what does each simulate? | The EU technical standards for threat-led penetration testing require the control team lead to select at least three scenarios, and allow at most one of them to be non-threat-led. Other programs set their own numbers. | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 15 | Is a malicious insider, a privileged account or a supplier compromise part of any scenario? | The Bank of England says CBEST results show the value of simulating highly privileged internal attackers, such as malicious insiders and supply chain attacks, because they test controls inside the network rather than at the perimeter. | Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, read 16 Nov 2026 |
4. Scope and exclusions
Draw the boundary of what testers may touch, and list what they may not.
| No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16 | Will testing run on live production systems, or on a replica? | The Singapore guidelines say the exercise should run against the live environment, and that a non-production run should be an exception that is documented with reasons in the report. | ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 17 | Which networks, sites, cloud tenants, applications and address ranges are in scope? | The NIST SP 800-115 rules of engagement template asks for the systems and networks to be tested, with authorized and unauthorized addresses where appropriate. | NIST SP 800-115, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 18 | Which systems are on the exclude list, including any "no-fly zones"? | NIST SP 800-115 calls the list of systems not authorized for testing the exclude list. The Singapore guidelines give no-fly zones as areas designated off limits because the risk of testing them is too high. | NIST SP 800-115, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 19 | Is social engineering allowed, against whom, and with what ethical limits? | The TIBER-EU red team test plan must set ethical boundaries for social engineering and say how the privacy of the people involved is safeguarded. | ECB, TIBER-EU red team test plan guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 20 | Is physical access testing in scope, and what proof will guards or police be shown? | NIST SP 800-115 says guards should be made aware of how to verify tester activity, and the rules of engagement should include a signed form that testers can show to onsite security or law enforcement. | NIST SP 800-115, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 21 | Which tactics, tools and malware are allowed, and which are banned? | The TIBER-EU red team test plan lists the tactics, techniques and procedures allowed and not allowed. NIST SP 800-115 asks for allowable and unallowable activities and any files authorized to be installed. | ECB, TIBER-EU red team test plan guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 22 | What data may testers see, copy and keep, and how is it destroyed? | The Singapore guidelines ask for data handling rules before the exercise: limited access, a redacted sample to prove a goal was reached, and secure disposal afterward. NIST SP 800-115 says test results are sensitive. | ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 23 | Which leg-ups or concessions will your team provide if testers stall, and by when? | TIBER-EU defines a leg-up as assistance or information the control team gives so an attack path can continue. The plan states the leg-ups and their deadlines, and each one used is logged. | ECB, TIBER-EU red team test plan guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 |
5. Rules of engagement
Set the limits, channels and approvals for the testing period.
| No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 24 | Who may approve a change to scope, timeline, target systems or flags during the test? | The EU technical standards require the control team lead and the test managers to approve any change to the red team test plan after it is approved. | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 25 | Which secure channels will be used, and what is the test code name? | The EU technical standards ask for the communication channels and a code name for the test. TIBER-EU says participants should refer to the test by code name only, to limit harm if a message leaks. | ECB, TIBER-EU red team test plan guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 26 | How often will testers report progress, and to whom? | The EU technical standards require the testers to report at least weekly to the control team and test managers during active testing. | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 27 | Which actions need prior consent because the risk is high? | The Singapore guidelines say the provider should ask for consent before any action with a high potential risk and consequence, and should report signs of a real attack that is happening at the same time. | ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024, read 16 Nov 2026 |
6. Emergency stop
Decide in advance who can halt the test and what happens when something goes wrong.
| No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 28 | Who can suspend or halt the test, and on what trigger? | TIBER-EU says the control team may at any time order a temporary or complete halt if there are concerns about damage to a system. The Singapore guidelines give the exercise director the power to proceed, pause or end. | ECB, TIBER-EU Framework, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 29 | What happens if testers find a serious vulnerability or evidence that someone else is already inside? | The Singapore guidelines say a high-risk finding goes to the working group at once, and evidence of a prior compromise should be handled as a real incident before the exercise continues. | ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 30 | What happens when your blue team detects the testers? | The EU technical standards ask the control team to propose measures that let the test continue while keeping it secret. | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 31 | Who is on the emergency call tree, and at what hours can they be reached? | NIST SP 800-115 asks for criteria for halting the test and the organization's incident response call tree in a quick-reference format, plus a process for resuming testing. | NIST SP 800-115, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 32 | How will the environment be returned to a clean state when testing ends? | The EU technical standards list restoration steps for testers: deactivate command and control, set scope and date kill switches, remove backdoors and malware, and securely delete compromised credentials. | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 |
7. Legal authorization
Put the permission in writing and check the law before testers start.
| No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33 | Who signs the authorization, and what does the letter say? | The Singapore guidelines describe a letter of engagement signed by the sponsoring executive or senior management. NIST SP 800-115 expects the test team lead and senior management to sign the rules of engagement. | ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 34 | Can the letter prove who the testers are if staff or police stop them? | The Singapore guidelines say the letter should explain how to authenticate the testers, so they can show their intent if security staff apprehend them. | ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 35 | Which third parties (cloud, managed services, software vendors) must consent or take part? | CBEST says third parties may need to join the control group where important systems are outsourced. Under DORA, the financial entity keeps full responsibility when providers are in scope. | Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 36 | Which laws apply in each country where you test, and has counsel reviewed the planned activities? | TIBER-EU lists activities such as gathering employee account data and using ruses, and says a thorough legal analysis should be done with legal expertise. Contractual consent mitigates many concerns but not all. | ECB, TIBER-EU Framework, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 37 | What do the contract, liability cover, confidentiality terms and background checks say? | TIBER-EU requires professional indemnity insurance for the provider. The Singapore guidelines add criminal background checks for consultants, a confidentiality agreement and legal liability stated in the scope of work. | ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024, read 16 Nov 2026 |
8. Timing
Fix the duration, the blackout dates and the repeat cycle.
| No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 38 | How long will active testing run? | The EU technical standards set at least 12 weeks of active red team testing for threat-led penetration testing. CBEST gives about 14 weeks for its penetration testing phase, and the Singapore guidelines give 4 to 6 months for complex scenarios at a large firm. | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 39 | Which dates and hours are off limits because of change freezes or peak business periods? | The Singapore guidelines advise reviewing planned system changes with change management, because major changes raise the risk of unforeseen impact. NIST SP 800-115 notes testing may be better at off-peak hours. | ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 40 | When will you run the next engagement? | TIBER-EU says three-year intervals are the norm. DORA requires threat-led penetration testing at least every three years for entities identified under it. The Singapore guidelines recommend at least every 24 months. | ECB, TIBER-EU Framework, read 16 Nov 2026 |
9. White cell contacts
Name the small group that knows about the test and runs it from your side.
| No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 41 | Who is the control team lead (white cell lead), and who is the deputy? | The EU technical standards require a control team lead responsible for day-to-day management. NIST calls the group that referees an engagement the white team. | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 42 | Who else is in the white cell, and what is the need-to-know rule? | TIBER-EU says the control team should be as small as possible, with skills, business knowledge and authority. The EU technical standards limit information about the test to a need-to-know basis. | ECB, TIBER-EU control team guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 43 | Does anyone in the blue team know about the test, and who decided? | The EU technical standards require the control team to consult the test managers before involving any blue team member. CORIE allows a senior blue team manager in the control group if separation is guaranteed. | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 44 | Who is the provider's red team manager and deputy, and how can each be reached at any hour? | The TIBER-EU test plan guidance says a red team manager and a deputy are always appointed, that the manager is the single point of contact, and that contact details for all testers are disclosed. | ECB, TIBER-EU red team test plan guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 |
10. Reporting and retest
Agree the reports, the replay and the way fixes are checked.
| No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 45 | Which reports will be delivered, by whom and by when? | Under the EU technical standards the testers deliver a red team test report within 4 weeks of the end of active testing, and the blue team delivers its report within 10 weeks. | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 46 | What must the red team report contain? | The TIBER-EU red team report must cover flags reached and not reached, attack paths, techniques used, deviations from the plan, leg-ups granted, blue team actions the testers know of, findings and remediation priority. | ECB, TIBER-EU red team test report guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 47 | Will there be a plain-language summary for senior management or the board? | The TIBER-EU red team report guidance asks for a short narrative in lay terms for senior management and governance bodies such as a board of directors. | ECB, TIBER-EU red team test report guidance, read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 48 | When will the red and blue teams replay the engagement together? | The EU technical standards require a replay of the offensive and defensive actions, and a purple teaming exercise, no later than 10 weeks after active testing ends. | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 49 | Who owns each fix, and by what date? | The EU technical standards require a remediation plan with, for each finding, the measures, their priority and expected completion, a root cause analysis, and the staff or functions responsible. | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 | |
| 50 | How will you check later that a fix worked? | None of the sources read for this sheet sets a retest step, so this field asks you to decide one. CBEST has the regulator supervise execution of the remediation plan, which is one way to keep a check in place. | Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, read 16 Nov 2026 |
Related pages
- Scoping a red team engagement: ten decisions to make before the start
- Red team rules of engagement: what they cover and a template
- White team or white cell: who they are and what they do
- Emergency stop and deconfliction in a red team test
- Red team legal authorization: the letter and the law
- What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why
Sources
- European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?, read 16 November 2026
- European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025, read 16 November 2026
- Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024, read 16 November 2026
- Mandiant, Red Team Assessment datasheet (the firm's own document), read 16 November 2026
- Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition, read 16 November 2026
- European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Scope Specification Document Guidance, January 2025, read 16 November 2026
- EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 November 2026
- NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008, read 16 November 2026
- European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Plan Guidance, 2025, read 16 November 2026
- European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Control Team Guidance, 2025, read 16 November 2026
- European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Report Guidance, 2025, read 16 November 2026
Last reviewed 16 November 2026.