Frameworks table, read 16 November 2026
Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE
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Which regulators publish red team frameworks?
Central banks and financial regulators in the EU, the UK, Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia publish them. The European Central Bank publishes TIBER-EU, the European Union sets threat-led penetration testing rules in DORA and its technical standards, the Bank of England runs CBEST, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority sets iCAST, Singapore has the AASE guidelines, and the Australian Council of Financial Regulators runs CORIE.
The first table shows who each framework is for. The second shows how it runs. Names link to a page on each framework where one exists.
| Framework | Owner or regulator | Region and sector | Year | Status | Who must do it |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TIBER-EU | European Central Bank, with the national central banks of the EU | European Union; Financial entities providing core financial infrastructure; usable in all critical sectors | Published May 2018; updated 2024; current framework document dated January 2025 | Adoption by authorities is voluntary; the framework can also serve as operational guidance for DORA threat-led penetration testing | Entities invited by the national or European TIBER authority, taking voluntary interest into account |
| DORA threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) | European Union: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 | European Union; Financial entities identified by the authorities, other than microenterprises | Regulation of 14 December 2022; technical standards of 13 February 2025 | Mandatory for identified entities | Financial entities identified by the TLPT authority using size, interconnection, criticality and ICT risk criteria; significant credit institutions must use external testers |
| CBEST | Bank of England, with the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority | United Kingdom; Firms and financial market infrastructures | In use since 2014; implementation guide 2024 edition | Regulator-led; run when requested in the supervisory cycle, when a firm asks, or after an incident | Firms and market infrastructures selected by the PRA and FCA, or those that ask with the regulator's agreement |
| iCAST (Intelligence-led Cyber Attack Simulation Testing), part of C-RAF 2.0 | Hong Kong Monetary Authority | Hong Kong; Authorized institutions (banks) | Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative launched 2016; version 2.0 effective 1 January 2021 | Set out in a circular to all authorized institutions with an implementation timeline | Authorized institutions whose inherent risk level is assessed as medium or high |
| AASE (Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercises) | Association of Banks in Singapore (industry guidelines); referred to by the Monetary Authority of Singapore in its Technology Risk Management Guidelines | Singapore; Financial institutions | Industry guidelines version 1 November 2018; current edition September 2024; MAS guidelines January 2021 | MAS guidelines say a financial institution should perform an adversarial attack simulation exercise; the detailed method is an industry guideline | Financial institutions, who choose the frequency by risk |
| CORIE (Cyber Operational Resilience Intelligence-led Exercises) | Council of Financial Regulators (APRA, ASIC, Reserve Bank of Australia, Treasury) | Australia; Financial institutions, including financial market infrastructure | Launched December 2020; version 2.0 July 2022 | Program run in rounds; participants invited by the regulators | Financial institutions invited by the Council of Financial Regulators in each round, chosen on a risk basis |
| United States: no single regulator-published equivalent found in the sources read | Not applicable | United States; Not applicable | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (control CA-8(2)); CISA advisory of 28 February 2023 | The sources read describe a federal security control and an agency service, not a sector-wide program | NIST SP 800-53 lets the organization define its red team exercises. CISA says it ran its red team assessment at the request of a critical infrastructure organization |
| Framework | Threat intelligence provider rules | Red team provider rules | Phases | Timing and frequency | Source and read date |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TIBER-EU | At least one threat intelligence manager (5 years of experience) and one more team member (2 years); 3 references; indemnity insurance; no conflict of interest; separate from the red team staff | A red team test manager (5 years of experience) and at least two testers (2 years each); 5 references; indemnity insurance; combined participation in at least 5 prior assignments | Preparation, testing (threat intelligence, then red team testing) and closure | Active red team testing at least 12 weeks; closure in parts of up to 10 and 8 weeks plus the authority's assessment time; three-year intervals are the norm | ECB, What is TIBER-EU?, read 16 Nov 2026 |
| DORA threat-led penetration testing | Manager with 5 years in threat intelligence and one more member with 2 years; 3 references; CVs and certifications; indemnity insurance; no blue team or conflicting work | External testers: manager with 5 years and two testers with 2 years each; 5 references; indemnity insurance; internal testers allowed under set conditions, with external testers every third test | Preparation, testing (threat intelligence, then red team test), closure, remediation plan and attestation | At least every 3 years (the authority may raise or lower it); active red team testing at least 12 weeks; red team report within 4 weeks; blue team report and replay within 10 weeks | EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026 |
| CBEST | Independent company accredited for CBEST; manager holding CREST Certified Threat Intelligence Manager | Independent company accredited for CBEST; manager holding CREST Certified Red Team Manager or Cyber Scheme Red Team Manager | Initiation, threat intelligence, penetration testing, closure | About 9 to 12 months in all; indicative phases of 6, 10, 14 and 4 weeks | Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, read 16 Nov 2026 |
| iCAST | Not stated in the pages read | Not stated in the pages read | Not stated in the pages read | iCAST completion deadlines by group: end-June 2022 (Group 1), end-March 2023 (Group 2), end-December 2023 (Group 3) | HKMA circular, CFI 2.0, read 16 Nov 2026 |
| AASE | Not stated in the pages read | Seek assurance on methodology, data handling, criminal background checks, insurance and indemnity; consider reputation, references and recognized accreditations | Planning, attack preparation, attack execution, exercise closure, post-exercise actions | Recommended at least every 24 months; large firms may run a 4 to 6 month cycle for complex scenarios | ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024, read 16 Nov 2026 |
| CORIE | Lead with CREST CCTIM or GIAC GCTI and 3 years of experience; analyst with 1 year; legal and ethical intelligence gathering, including from the dark web | Red team lead with 7 years of red teaming or penetration testing and set certifications; team of at least a lead, a specialist and an exploit development specialist | Preparation, test and closure (six stages), then a replay (purple) exercise | Closure phase typically 5 weeks; overall length depends on the number of scenarios | CFR, CORIE Framework v2.0, read 16 Nov 2026 |
| United States: no single regulator-published equivalent found in the sources read | Not stated in the pages read | Not stated in the pages read | CISA describes Phase I (gain and keep persistent access while avoiding detection) and Phase II (try to trigger a security response) | Not stated in the pages read | CISA advisory AA23-059A, read 16 Nov 2026 |
What is iCAST in Hong Kong?
iCAST is the Intelligence-led Cyber Attack Simulation Testing part of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority's Cyber Resilience Assessment Framework, itself one pillar of the Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative launched in 2016. The HKMA circular of 3 November 2020 introduced version 2.0, effective 1 January 2021.
The circular applies iCAST to authorized institutions whose inherent risk level is assessed as medium or high, and sets completion dates by group: end-June 2022 for Group 1, end-March 2023 for Group 2 and end-December 2023 for Group 3. The pages read do not state provider rules or phases, so those cells say so. The HKMA press release says all the banks that responded found iCAST helpful in preparing for cyber attacks.
Is there a United States equivalent?
The sources read for this table show no single regulator-published equivalent in the United States. They do show two items: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 lists red team exercises as a control enhancement (CA-8(2)) that an organization defines for itself, and CISA's advisory AA23-059A reports a red team assessment CISA ran at the request of a critical infrastructure organization.
This is a statement about the pages read on 16 November 2026, not a survey of every U.S. regulator.
Which frameworks could not be read?
FEER (Financial Entities Ethical Red-Teaming Framework), Saudi Central Bank: The Saudi Central Bank address for the framework document returned an error page on 16 November 2026, so no field was read and no row is given. It is left out of the table until a source can be read.
How do these frameworks fit together?
For the process common to these frameworks see the red team process. For what to ask providers see what to ask a red team provider.
Cite this
Red Team vs Blue Team, "Red Team Frameworks by Regulator", edition 16 November 2026, https://redteamvsblueteam.com/frameworks/. Data: CSV and JSON.
Related pages
- Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team
- Red team process: the phases of an engagement
- What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why
- 8 dated items on red team frameworks and guidance
- Purple team: what it is and who is in the room
- White team or white cell: who they are and what they do
Sources
- European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?, read 16 November 2026
- European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025, read 16 November 2026
- European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025, read 16 November 2026
- EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), read 16 November 2026
- EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 November 2026
- Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition, read 16 November 2026
- Hong Kong Monetary Authority, circular "Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative 2.0", 3 November 2020, read 16 November 2026
- Hong Kong Monetary Authority, press release "HKMA launches Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative 2.0", 3 November 2020, read 16 November 2026
- Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024, read 16 November 2026
- Monetary Authority of Singapore, Technology Risk Management Guidelines, January 2021, read 16 November 2026
- Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022, read 16 November 2026
- Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Appendix B: Provider Guide, version 2.0, read 16 November 2026
- Council of Financial Regulators, media release "Revised CORIE framework and rollout", 29 July 2022, read 16 November 2026
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, control CA-8 Penetration Testing, read 16 November 2026
- CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023, read 16 November 2026
Last reviewed 16 November 2026.