Skip to content

Frameworks table, read 16 November 2026

Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE

Read how it was madeDownload the data (CSV, JSON)

Filter both tables

Pick a region or a sector; the rows that do not match are hidden in both tables.

All 7 rows shown in both tables.

Download the templates

Free to reuse under CC BY 4.0. Open the scoping sheet to print it.

Which regulators publish red team frameworks?

Central banks and financial regulators in the EU, the UK, Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia publish them. The European Central Bank publishes TIBER-EU, the European Union sets threat-led penetration testing rules in DORA and its technical standards, the Bank of England runs CBEST, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority sets iCAST, Singapore has the AASE guidelines, and the Australian Council of Financial Regulators runs CORIE.

The first table shows who each framework is for. The second shows how it runs. Names link to a page on each framework where one exists.

Who each framework applies to
FrameworkOwner or regulatorRegion and sectorYearStatusWho must do it
TIBER-EUEuropean Central Bank, with the national central banks of the EUEuropean Union; Financial entities providing core financial infrastructure; usable in all critical sectorsPublished May 2018; updated 2024; current framework document dated January 2025Adoption by authorities is voluntary; the framework can also serve as operational guidance for DORA threat-led penetration testingEntities invited by the national or European TIBER authority, taking voluntary interest into account
DORA threat-led penetration testing (TLPT)European Union: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190European Union; Financial entities identified by the authorities, other than microenterprisesRegulation of 14 December 2022; technical standards of 13 February 2025Mandatory for identified entitiesFinancial entities identified by the TLPT authority using size, interconnection, criticality and ICT risk criteria; significant credit institutions must use external testers
CBESTBank of England, with the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct AuthorityUnited Kingdom; Firms and financial market infrastructuresIn use since 2014; implementation guide 2024 editionRegulator-led; run when requested in the supervisory cycle, when a firm asks, or after an incidentFirms and market infrastructures selected by the PRA and FCA, or those that ask with the regulator's agreement
iCAST (Intelligence-led Cyber Attack Simulation Testing), part of C-RAF 2.0Hong Kong Monetary AuthorityHong Kong; Authorized institutions (banks)Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative launched 2016; version 2.0 effective 1 January 2021Set out in a circular to all authorized institutions with an implementation timelineAuthorized institutions whose inherent risk level is assessed as medium or high
AASE (Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercises)Association of Banks in Singapore (industry guidelines); referred to by the Monetary Authority of Singapore in its Technology Risk Management GuidelinesSingapore; Financial institutionsIndustry guidelines version 1 November 2018; current edition September 2024; MAS guidelines January 2021MAS guidelines say a financial institution should perform an adversarial attack simulation exercise; the detailed method is an industry guidelineFinancial institutions, who choose the frequency by risk
CORIE (Cyber Operational Resilience Intelligence-led Exercises)Council of Financial Regulators (APRA, ASIC, Reserve Bank of Australia, Treasury)Australia; Financial institutions, including financial market infrastructureLaunched December 2020; version 2.0 July 2022Program run in rounds; participants invited by the regulatorsFinancial institutions invited by the Council of Financial Regulators in each round, chosen on a risk basis
United States: no single regulator-published equivalent found in the sources readNot applicableUnited States; Not applicableNIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (control CA-8(2)); CISA advisory of 28 February 2023The sources read describe a federal security control and an agency service, not a sector-wide programNIST SP 800-53 lets the organization define its red team exercises. CISA says it ran its red team assessment at the request of a critical infrastructure organization
How each framework runs
FrameworkThreat intelligence provider rulesRed team provider rulesPhasesTiming and frequencySource and read date
TIBER-EUAt least one threat intelligence manager (5 years of experience) and one more team member (2 years); 3 references; indemnity insurance; no conflict of interest; separate from the red team staffA red team test manager (5 years of experience) and at least two testers (2 years each); 5 references; indemnity insurance; combined participation in at least 5 prior assignmentsPreparation, testing (threat intelligence, then red team testing) and closureActive red team testing at least 12 weeks; closure in parts of up to 10 and 8 weeks plus the authority's assessment time; three-year intervals are the normECB, What is TIBER-EU?, read 16 Nov 2026
DORA threat-led penetration testingManager with 5 years in threat intelligence and one more member with 2 years; 3 references; CVs and certifications; indemnity insurance; no blue team or conflicting workExternal testers: manager with 5 years and two testers with 2 years each; 5 references; indemnity insurance; internal testers allowed under set conditions, with external testers every third testPreparation, testing (threat intelligence, then red team test), closure, remediation plan and attestationAt least every 3 years (the authority may raise or lower it); active red team testing at least 12 weeks; red team report within 4 weeks; blue team report and replay within 10 weeksEU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 Nov 2026
CBESTIndependent company accredited for CBEST; manager holding CREST Certified Threat Intelligence ManagerIndependent company accredited for CBEST; manager holding CREST Certified Red Team Manager or Cyber Scheme Red Team ManagerInitiation, threat intelligence, penetration testing, closureAbout 9 to 12 months in all; indicative phases of 6, 10, 14 and 4 weeksBank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, read 16 Nov 2026
iCASTNot stated in the pages readNot stated in the pages readNot stated in the pages readiCAST completion deadlines by group: end-June 2022 (Group 1), end-March 2023 (Group 2), end-December 2023 (Group 3)HKMA circular, CFI 2.0, read 16 Nov 2026
AASENot stated in the pages readSeek assurance on methodology, data handling, criminal background checks, insurance and indemnity; consider reputation, references and recognized accreditationsPlanning, attack preparation, attack execution, exercise closure, post-exercise actionsRecommended at least every 24 months; large firms may run a 4 to 6 month cycle for complex scenariosABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024, read 16 Nov 2026
CORIELead with CREST CCTIM or GIAC GCTI and 3 years of experience; analyst with 1 year; legal and ethical intelligence gathering, including from the dark webRed team lead with 7 years of red teaming or penetration testing and set certifications; team of at least a lead, a specialist and an exploit development specialistPreparation, test and closure (six stages), then a replay (purple) exerciseClosure phase typically 5 weeks; overall length depends on the number of scenariosCFR, CORIE Framework v2.0, read 16 Nov 2026
United States: no single regulator-published equivalent found in the sources readNot stated in the pages readNot stated in the pages readCISA describes Phase I (gain and keep persistent access while avoiding detection) and Phase II (try to trigger a security response)Not stated in the pages readCISA advisory AA23-059A, read 16 Nov 2026

What is iCAST in Hong Kong?

iCAST is the Intelligence-led Cyber Attack Simulation Testing part of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority's Cyber Resilience Assessment Framework, itself one pillar of the Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative launched in 2016. The HKMA circular of 3 November 2020 introduced version 2.0, effective 1 January 2021.

The circular applies iCAST to authorized institutions whose inherent risk level is assessed as medium or high, and sets completion dates by group: end-June 2022 for Group 1, end-March 2023 for Group 2 and end-December 2023 for Group 3. The pages read do not state provider rules or phases, so those cells say so. The HKMA press release says all the banks that responded found iCAST helpful in preparing for cyber attacks.

Is there a United States equivalent?

The sources read for this table show no single regulator-published equivalent in the United States. They do show two items: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 lists red team exercises as a control enhancement (CA-8(2)) that an organization defines for itself, and CISA's advisory AA23-059A reports a red team assessment CISA ran at the request of a critical infrastructure organization.

This is a statement about the pages read on 16 November 2026, not a survey of every U.S. regulator.

Which frameworks could not be read?

FEER (Financial Entities Ethical Red-Teaming Framework), Saudi Central Bank: The Saudi Central Bank address for the framework document returned an error page on 16 November 2026, so no field was read and no row is given. It is left out of the table until a source can be read.

How do these frameworks fit together?

For the process common to these frameworks see the red team process. For what to ask providers see what to ask a red team provider.

Cite this

Red Team vs Blue Team, "Red Team Frameworks by Regulator", edition 16 November 2026, https://redteamvsblueteam.com/frameworks/. Data: CSV and JSON.

Sources

  1. European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?, read 16 November 2026
  2. European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025, read 16 November 2026
  3. European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025, read 16 November 2026
  4. EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), read 16 November 2026
  5. EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards), read 16 November 2026
  6. Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition, read 16 November 2026
  7. Hong Kong Monetary Authority, circular "Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative 2.0", 3 November 2020, read 16 November 2026
  8. Hong Kong Monetary Authority, press release "HKMA launches Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative 2.0", 3 November 2020, read 16 November 2026
  9. Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024, read 16 November 2026
  10. Monetary Authority of Singapore, Technology Risk Management Guidelines, January 2021, read 16 November 2026
  11. Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022, read 16 November 2026
  12. Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Appendix B: Provider Guide, version 2.0, read 16 November 2026
  13. Council of Financial Regulators, media release "Revised CORIE framework and rollout", 29 July 2022, read 16 November 2026
  14. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, control CA-8 Penetration Testing, read 16 November 2026
  15. CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023, read 16 November 2026

Last reviewed 16 November 2026.