# Red Team vs Blue Team: every page as markdown An explainer on red, blue and purple teams: what each does, how an engagement runs, how a red team differs from a penetration test, how to scope one and what to ask a provider, with a scoping sheet and a table of regulator frameworks, each fact sourced and dated. --- # Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A red team is a group authorized to act as an attacker against an organization and show what an attack could do. NIST defines it as a group authorized and organized to emulate a potential adversary's attack against an enterprise's security posture, so the enterprise can see the impact and learn what works for its defenders. ## What is a red team? A red team is a group of people authorized to emulate an adversary's attack against an organization. The NIST glossary, citing CNSSI 4009-2022, adds that the aim is to improve security by demonstrating the impacts of successful attacks and by demonstrating what works for the defenders, the blue team. The Singapore bank guidelines call the same group the attacker, sometimes referred to as the red team, and say its skills should match those of real adversaries as closely as possible. The team can be internal or hired from a provider. ## What is red teaming in cyber security? Red teaming in cyber security is the practice of running a controlled, goal-driven attack on an organization's people, processes and technology. It differs from a vulnerability scan or a penetration test because it follows an attacker's objective, not a list of assets. The Council of Financial Regulators in Australia says red team exercises mimic the tactics, techniques and procedures of real adversaries and measure how well an organization can detect, respond, withstand, repel and recover. Security work on the target is judged against that goal. ## What does a red team deliver? A red team delivers evidence and a report, not a pass or fail. TIBER-EU says the outcome is intended to show strengths and weaknesses, with a focus on the learning effect, and the red team report records attack paths, techniques used, flags reached and findings. CISA published the results of one of its own red team assessments in 2023. In that case the team gained persistent access and moved across multiple sites, and the organization did not detect the activity. See [the worked example](/engagement/red-team-example/). ## How does a red team relate to the other teams? A red team attacks, a blue team defends, a white team referees and a purple exercise joins red and blue. The table sets the four side by side, using the wording of the sources. | Team | Role in an engagement | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | Red team | Emulates an adversary's attack against the organization to show impact and what works for defenders. | [NIST glossary](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/red_team) | | Blue team | Defends the organization's systems; in a covert test its prevention, detection and response are being tested without its foreknowledge. | [NIST glossary](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/blue_team) and [ECB](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html) | | White team | A small group that knows about the test, observes it and keeps scope within agreed limits. | [NIST glossary](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/white_team) | | Purple exercise | Red and blue work together to test detections and improve them. | [Singapore guidelines](https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf) | Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers ## Related pages - [What does a red team do?](/red-team/what-does-a-red-team-do/) - [Blue team: what a blue team does and how it is tested](/blue-team/) - [Purple team: what it is and who is in the room](/purple-team/) - [Red team vs blue team: roles, goals and how they meet](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team/) - [Red team vs penetration testing: goals, scope and secrecy](/compare/red-team-vs-penetration-testing/) - [Red team process: the phases of an engagement](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [Purple team exercise: how it runs, step by step](/purple-team/purple-team-exercise/) ## Sources - NIST CSRC Glossary, red team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/red_team (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Report Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_report_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026) - NIST CSRC Glossary, blue team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/blue_team (read 16 November 2026) - NIST CSRC Glossary, white team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/white_team (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/red-team/ --- # What does a red team do? Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A red team plans and runs a simulated attack, then reports what it found. In the EU threat-led testing rules the testers work through reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, movement and actions on target, report at least weekly, and deliver a written report within 4 weeks of the end of testing. Read 16 November 2026. ## What does a red team do during an engagement? A red team follows an attack plan built from threat intelligence and tries to reach agreed targets, called flags, on live systems. The recital to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 lists the techniques it should use as appropriate: reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, control and movement, and actions on target. The TIBER-EU test plan splits each scenario into three phases: entering the systems, moving through them to act on the objective, and leaving them. The testers also report progress at least weekly. - Reconnaissance: collect as much information as possible on the target. - Weaponization: analyze the infrastructure, facilities and employees and prepare operations specific to the target. - Delivery: launch the operation on the target. - Exploitation: compromise servers and networks and exploit staff through social engineering. - Control and movement: move from compromised systems to more valuable ones. - Actions on target: gain further access and reach the objective. ## What does a red team do after the test ends? After the test the red team writes a report, then replays its actions with the blue team. Under the EU rules the testers deliver the red team test report within 4 weeks of the end of active testing, and the replay and purple teaming exercise take place within 10 weeks. The testers also clean up. They deactivate command and control, set scope and date kill switches, remove backdoors and malware, and securely delete compromised credentials. ## Which skills does a red team need? The EU rules list the skills the testers need as a group: knowledge of the entity's business, reconnaissance, risk management, exploit development, physical penetration, social engineering, vulnerability analysis, and the communication skill to report clearly. No one person needs all of them. See [who red teamers are](/red-team/who-are-red-teamers/) for the experience that frameworks require. ## What does a real red team engagement look like? CISA ran a red team assessment in 2022 at the request of a large critical infrastructure organization and published the results in February 2023. In its first phase the team tried to gain and keep persistent access while avoiding detection, and in its second it tried to trigger a security response. The team gained initial access to two workstations at separate sites through spearphishing and moved across sites. The case is described on the [worked example page](/engagement/red-team-example/). ## Related pages - [Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers](/red-team/) - [Who are red teamers, and how do you become one?](/red-team/who-are-red-teamers/) - [Red team process: the phases of an engagement](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [Red team example: the CISA red team assessment of 2022](/engagement/red-team-example/) - [Blue team: what a blue team does and how it is tested](/blue-team/) - [Red team report: what it must contain, with a template](/engagement/red-team-report/) ## Sources - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Plan Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_plan_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/red-team/what-does-a-red-team-do/ --- # Who are red teamers, and how do you become one? Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Red teamers are experienced offensive security specialists, usually from penetration testing, working as a small team. Under the EU rules a red team has a manager with 5 years of experience and at least two testers with 2 years each. Australia's CORIE asks for a lead with 7 years. Read 16 November 2026. ## Who are red teamers? Red teamers are specialists in offensive security who work as a team, each with a different skill. The EU technical standards require, for external testers, a manager with at least 5 years of experience in penetration testing and red team testing and at least two other testers, each with at least 2 years. CORIE in Australia names roles instead: a red team lead, a red team specialist and an exploit development specialist, with optional members. ## How are red teamers vetted? Buyers check red teamers by documents and background. The EU rules ask for a detailed CV and certifications for each tester, indemnity insurance that covers misconduct and negligence, and five references from prior assignments in penetration testing and red team testing. The Singapore guidelines add criminal record and other background checks for every consultant, and training in the regulations that apply. ## How do you become a red teamer? The sources describe experience, not a single path. CORIE's provider guide requires 3 years of penetration testing for a red team member, 5 years of red teaming or penetration testing for a specialist, and 7 years for a lead. An exploit development specialist needs 3 years of exploit development and publicly attributed CVEs. The same guide lists certifications and courses by role, including CREST, GIAC, Offensive Security, SANS and SpecterOps. A certificate shows study; the experience requirement shows the path. | CORIE role | Required experience | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | Red team lead | 7 years of red teaming or penetration testing | [CORIE provider guide](https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-guide-providers.pdf) | | Red team specialist | 5 years of red teaming or penetration testing | Same guide | | Exploit development specialist | 3 years of exploit development, plus public attributed CVEs | Same guide | | Red team member | 3 years of penetration testing | Same guide | Table for: How do you become a red teamer ## Why must red teamers be kept apart from other work? Conflicts of interest are limited by rule. The EU standards say red team staff must not work for, or provide services to, a threat intelligence provider that is doing blue team tasks for anyone involved in the test, and must be separate from the threat intelligence staff of the same provider. The reason is trust: testers see sensitive data and attack live systems, and the defenders must be able to rely on a fair result. ## Related pages - [Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers](/red-team/) - [What does a red team do?](/red-team/what-does-a-red-team-do/) - [Building an internal red team: build or buy](/services/building-an-internal-red-team/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [CORIE: Australia's Cyber Operational Resilience Intelligence-led Exercises](/frameworks/corie/) - [Red team, defined](/glossary/red-team/) - [Blue team: what a blue team does and how it is tested](/blue-team/) ## Sources - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_service_provider_procurement_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Appendix B: Provider Guide, version 2.0: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-guide-providers.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/red-team/who-are-red-teamers/ --- # Blue team: what a blue team does and how it is tested Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A blue team is the group that defends an organization's systems and responds when they are attacked. The NIST glossary describes it as the group responsible for defending against a group of mock attackers, the red team, and the Singapore bank guidelines place the security operations center and incident response team inside it. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is a blue team in cyber security? A blue team is the group responsible for defending an enterprise's use of information systems by maintaining its security posture. The NIST glossary, citing CNSSI 4009-2022, adds that it defends against real or simulated attacks over a significant period, in a representative operational context. The Singapore guidelines describe it as made up of resources from the security operations center, the incident response teams and other supporting teams, employed or contracted to detect or prevent an attack and respond to it. ## What does a blue team do? A blue team prevents, detects and responds. The Singapore guidelines list baseline activities: establish a security operations center, internal or external, an incident response plan and an incident response team. Additional activities are threat hunting, incident response and digital forensics. Because the exercise tests incident and crisis response, the blue team needs an incident response playbook to respond to attacks and remediate incidents. ## How is a blue team tested? A blue team is tested by an attack it does not know about. In a TIBER-EU test the blue team's prevention, detection and response are tested without foreknowledge, and only the control team knows. Afterward the blue team writes its own report. The blue team report lists the detected attack actions for each red team step, the log entries, a timeline, the artifacts it found, its root cause analysis and lessons learned. See the [blue team report template](/blue-team/blue-team-report-template/). ## What do outside providers offer to a blue team? Several firms sell blue team coaching and joint exercises. Mandiant lists a Purple Team Assessment, Cisco Talos describes its own blue team sitting beside the customer's defenders, and Sygnia describes guided investigation training during live attack scenarios. The [services directory](/services/who-offers-red-team-services/) lists each firm's own wording. ## Related pages - [Blue team report template and what it must contain](/blue-team/blue-team-report-template/) - [Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers](/red-team/) - [Purple team: what it is and who is in the room](/purple-team/) - [Red team vs blue team: roles, goals and how they meet](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team/) - [Who offers red team services?](/services/who-offers-red-team-services/) - [Red team debrief: how to turn findings into fixes](/engagement/red-team-debrief/) - [Who are red teamers, and how do you become one?](/red-team/who-are-red-teamers/) ## Sources - NIST CSRC Glossary, blue team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/blue_team (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Blue Team Test Report Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_blue_team_test_report_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Mandiant, Red Team Assessment datasheet (the firm's own document): https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/ds-red-team-operations-en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Cisco Talos Incident Response, Purple Team page (the firm's own page): https://talosintelligence.com/incident_response/purple_team (read 16 November 2026) - Sygnia, Purple Teaming page (the firm's own page): https://www.sygnia.co/solutions/purple-teaming/ (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/blue-team/ --- # Blue team report template and what it must contain Template, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A blue team report records what the defenders saw during a red team test. The TIBER-EU guidance requires a list of detected attack actions for each red team step, log entries, a timeline of both sides, found artifacts, root causes, lessons learned and topics for the purple session. Read 16 November 2026. ## What goes in a blue team report? A blue team report answers one question: what did the defenders see, and when? TIBER-EU requires, for each attack step described by the red team, a list of detected actions, threat hunting activity and configuration changes, log entries, and a timeline mapped to both teams' actions. It also requires the red team artifacts the blue team found, an assessment of the red team findings, the evidence collected, a root cause analysis of successful attacks, lessons learned and topics for the purple teaming exercise. ## When is the blue team report written? The blue team report is written after the test, once the blue team has at least a draft of the red team report and before the replay and purple teaming sessions. Under the EU rules it is due within 10 weeks of the end of active testing. The guidance recommends an executive summary suitable for senior management and a board. ## Template: fields to fill in Copy the fields below into your own document. Fields follow the TIBER-EU required content and the context items the guidance suggests. | Section | Fields to fill in | | --- | --- | | 1. Executive summary | What was tested, headline result, main lessons, for senior management. | | 2. Blue team context | Structure and size of the blue team, levels of responsibility (for example level 1, 2, 3), outsourced duties and providers, sources of information such as log types. | | 3. Timeline of events | One timeline mapping red team actions (from the red team report) to blue team actions. | | 4. Detections per attack step | For each red team step: detected or not, time, alert or log entry, who acted. | | 5. Threat hunting and changes | Hunting performed and configuration changes (firewall rules, detection rules, hardening) during or after active testing. | | 6. Artifacts found | Remaining red team artifacts, where and when found, whether the red team told the blue team. | | 7. Assessment of red team findings | Agree or dispute each finding and recommendation, with evidence. | | 8. Root cause analysis | Why each successful attack worked. | | 9. Lessons learned | Strengths, gaps and potential for improvement. | | 10. Purple session topics | Topics to examine together with the red team in the replay and purple session. | Blue team report template and what it must contain ## Related pages - [Blue team: what a blue team does and how it is tested](/blue-team/) - [Red team report: what it must contain, with a template](/engagement/red-team-report/) - [Red team debrief: how to turn findings into fixes](/engagement/red-team-debrief/) - [Purple team exercise: how it runs, step by step](/purple-team/purple-team-exercise/) - [Replay exercise, defined](/glossary/replay-exercise/) - [Red team vs blue team: roles, goals and how they meet](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team/) - [Purple team: what it is and who is in the room](/purple-team/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Blue Team Test Report Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_blue_team_test_report_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/blue-team/blue-team-report-template/ --- # Purple team: what it is and who is in the room Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A purple team is not a separate group of staff. It is a collaborative exercise that brings the red team and blue team together to test detections and improve them. The Singapore bank guidelines describe it as a structured assessment in which both sides work closely together. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is a purple team in cyber security? A purple team is a way of working, not a department. The Singapore guidelines define a purple team exercise as a collaborative and structured assessment that brings the defensive and offensive elements together to improve overall posture through testing of detection capabilities. The red and blue teams can be internal or external. The red side runs attacker techniques and the blue side focuses on detecting them and improving its response. ## Who is in the room for a purple team exercise? The room holds the people who run the attacks and the people who watch for them. In a purple session after a TIBER-EU test, the blue team is fully aware of the activity and may cooperate with the red team testers while they work. Vendors describe the same mix. Sygnia's red teamers run scenarios while the customer's staff act as the blue team, guided by Sygnia incident response experts, and Unit 42 pairs offensive operators and incident responders with the customer's SOC. ## What does a purple team produce? A purple exercise produces fixes while it runs. The Singapore guidelines list the benefits as addressing security gaps, helping the blue team understand the attack lifecycle and learn from attacks, and fostering collaboration between the two teams. The Australian CORIE framework calls its version a replay adversary attack simulation and says it should systematically replay tactics, techniques and procedures so defenses improve, and exchange knowledge between the offensive and defensive teams. ## Is purple teaming part of a red team test? It can be. In TIBER-EU and the EU rules purple teaming appears at two points only: limited purple teaming during testing, as a last resort when a test cannot otherwise continue, and a purple teaming exercise in the closure phase. See [how an exercise runs](/purple-team/purple-team-exercise/) for the closure-phase exercise. ## Related pages - [Purple team exercise: how it runs, step by step](/purple-team/purple-team-exercise/) - [Red team vs blue team vs purple team: a three-way table](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team-vs-purple-team/) - [Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers](/red-team/) - [Blue team: what a blue team does and how it is tested](/blue-team/) - [Purple team, defined](/glossary/purple-team/) - [Who offers red team services?](/services/who-offers-red-team-services/) - [Blue team report template and what it must contain](/blue-team/blue-team-report-template/) ## Sources - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Purple Teaming Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_purple_best_practices_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Sygnia, Purple Teaming page (the firm's own page): https://www.sygnia.co/solutions/purple-teaming/ (read 16 November 2026) - Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Offensive Security page (the firm's own page): https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42/strengthen-your-defenses/offensive-security-services (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/purple-team/ --- # Purple team exercise: how it runs, step by step Process, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A purple team exercise is a planned, open session in which red team testers and blue team defenders replay selected attacks together. In TIBER-EU and the EU rules the exercise follows the replay, must finish within 10 weeks of the end of testing, and covers topics both sides choose. Read 16 November 2026. ## How does a purple team exercise run? A purple team exercise runs in an agreed sequence with both teams present. TIBER-EU requires the stakeholders to define the scope, goals, objectives, timing and rules of engagement for the purple activities, and to review risk controls, before any technique is run. The steps below follow the TIBER-EU guidance and the EU technical standards. 1. Agree scope, goals and rules of engagement for the session. 2. Choose topics together: vulnerabilities found, issues the testers could not test during active testing, other steps the testers could have taken, alternative scenarios, proofs of concept, anticipated remediation and business continuity exercises. 3. Replay the engagement using the red team and blue team reports, so each side explains what it did and saw. 4. Run the chosen techniques while the blue team watches, tunes and responds. 5. Record detections added, gaps found and open items, and feed them into the remediation plan. ## How long does a purple team exercise take? The sources fix the deadline, not the length. In a TIBER-EU test the purple teaming exercise in the closure phase must take place no later than 10 weeks after the end of active red team testing. The sources read for this page do not set a number of days for the session itself; that is a scoping choice. The [scoping sheet](/scoping-sheet/) has a field for it. ## What is limited purple teaming? Limited purple teaming is a narrow, collaborative step inside active testing. The EU technical standards allow it only as a last resort, in exceptional circumstances, when the test cannot otherwise continue and the control team lead has suspended the test. They name three methods: catch-and-release, where testers continue, get detected and then resume; war gaming for strategic decisions; and collaborative proof of concept, where testers and blue team members validate a measure together. ## Related pages - [Purple team: what it is and who is in the room](/purple-team/) - [Red team debrief: how to turn findings into fixes](/engagement/red-team-debrief/) - [Blue team report template and what it must contain](/blue-team/blue-team-report-template/) - [Catch-and-release, defined](/glossary/catch-and-release/) - [Replay exercise, defined](/glossary/replay-exercise/) - [Red team vs blue team vs purple team: a three-way table](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team-vs-purple-team/) - [Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers](/red-team/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Purple Teaming Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_purple_best_practices_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/purple-team/purple-team-exercise/ --- # Red team vs blue team: roles, goals and how they meet Comparison, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The red team plays the attacker and the blue team defends. In a covert test only a small control team knows, so the blue team reacts as it would to a real attack. Afterward both write reports and replay the test together. NIST, the ECB and the Singapore guidelines define the roles. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is the difference between a red team and a blue team? A red team attacks and a blue team defends. NIST defines the red team as a group authorized to emulate an adversary's attack, and the blue team as the group defending against mock attackers. The test measures the blue team; the red team is the instrument. The table compares the two on the points the frameworks address. | Point | Red team | Blue team | | --- | --- | --- | | Purpose in a test | Emulate an adversary to show impact and what works for defenders (NIST). | Defend against real or simulated attacks over a significant period (NIST). | | Who they are | Internal or hired testers, often a provider's team with a manager, testers and sometimes an exploit developer. | The organization's security operations center, incident response and support teams (Singapore guidelines). | | Knowledge of the test | Know the plan and the scope. | Tested without foreknowledge in a covert test; only the control team knows (ECB). | | Main report | Red team test report: flags reached, attack paths, techniques, leg-ups, findings, within 4 weeks of testing (EU rules). | Blue team test report: detections per step, timeline, artifacts found, lessons, within 10 weeks (EU rules). | | What is measured | Whether objectives were reached and by which path. | Whether the attack was prevented, detected and handled. | Table for: What is the difference between a red team and a blue team ## How do the red team and blue team meet? They meet after the test, at a replay. Under the EU technical standards the blue team and the testers replay the offensive and defensive actions no later than 10 weeks after active testing, then hold a purple teaming exercise on topics they choose together. In between, the white team, called the control team in TIBER-EU, knows about the test and keeps it safe. See [the white team page](/engagement/white-team/). ## Which is better, red team or blue team? No source read for this site ranks one above the other. The frameworks treat them as two halves of one test. For a buyer the question is which service to commission. For a career the question is which work suits you. [The three-way comparison](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team-vs-purple-team/) covers the buying choice. ## Which is harder, red team or blue team? The sources do not compare difficulty, so this site does not either. They do show what each side must prove. CORIE asks a red team lead for 7 years of red teaming or penetration testing experience, and the EU rules ask a red team manager for 5. On the blue side the Singapore guidelines expect a security operations center, an incident response plan and a response team before an exercise, with threat hunting and forensics as additional capabilities. ## Related pages - [Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers](/red-team/) - [Blue team: what a blue team does and how it is tested](/blue-team/) - [Purple team: what it is and who is in the room](/purple-team/) - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) - [Red team vs blue team vs purple team: a three-way table](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team-vs-purple-team/) - [Red team debrief: how to turn findings into fixes](/engagement/red-team-debrief/) - [Adversary simulation vs adversary emulation](/compare/adversary-simulation-vs-emulation/) ## Sources - NIST CSRC Glossary, red team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/red_team (read 16 November 2026) - NIST CSRC Glossary, blue team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/blue_team (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Appendix B: Provider Guide, version 2.0: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-guide-providers.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team/ --- # Red team vs blue team vs purple team: a three-way table Comparison, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A red team attacks, a blue team defends and a purple team exercise brings both together to fix detections as techniques run. The first two are groups of people; the third is a way of working. This three-way table uses NIST, the Singapore guidelines and TIBER-EU. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is the difference between red, blue and purple teams? Red and blue are teams, purple is an activity. The red team attacks, the blue team defends, and a purple exercise has both work together in the open. The Singapore guidelines say a purple team could consist of internal or external red and blue teams. The table gives the three side by side. | | Red team | Blue team | Purple team exercise | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | What it is | Group emulating an adversary | Group defending the systems | Collaborative exercise of red and blue | | Secrecy | Covert; defenders unaware | Unaware in a covert test | Open; both sides know | | Main aim | Reach objectives and show impact | Prevent, detect and respond | Test and improve detections together | | Typical output | Red team report | Blue team report | Fixes, new detections and open gaps | | Where TIBER-EU uses it | Active testing phase | Throughout, then its report | Limited form in testing; full exercise in closure | Table for: What is the difference between red, blue and purple teams ## How is a blue team different from a purple team? The blue team is a standing group of defenders; the purple team is a session. The blue team does its work every day. A purple exercise is planned, has a scope and rules of engagement, and ends with recorded fixes. The red team in a purple exercise helps the defenders test detections, as the Singapore guidelines put it, and the blue team works to improve how it responds to the techniques run. ## When should you choose a purple exercise instead of a red team test? Choose a purple exercise when the goal is to improve detections now, and a covert red team test when the goal is to see how the whole organization reacts to an unannounced attack. The frameworks use covert tests to measure and open exercises to teach. CORIE says the efficacy of an adversary simulation improves when the defensive teams have no knowledge of it. Its replay (purple) exercise follows afterward to close the gaps. Firms sell the two separately, as the [services directory](/services/who-offers-red-team-services/) shows. ## What is the difference between a red team and a purple team? A red team works alone and in secret; a purple team works in the open with the defenders. Bishop Fox puts it this way on its site: red teaming emulates adversaries to test defenses without defender involvement, and purple teaming builds on it with collaboration during or after the engagement. ## Related pages - [Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers](/red-team/) - [Blue team: what a blue team does and how it is tested](/blue-team/) - [Purple team: what it is and who is in the room](/purple-team/) - [Red team vs blue team: roles, goals and how they meet](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team/) - [Purple team exercise: how it runs, step by step](/purple-team/purple-team-exercise/) - [Who offers red team services?](/services/who-offers-red-team-services/) - [Red team vs penetration testing: goals, scope and secrecy](/compare/red-team-vs-penetration-testing/) ## Sources - NIST CSRC Glossary, red team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/red_team (read 16 November 2026) - NIST CSRC Glossary, blue team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/blue_team (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Purple Teaming Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_purple_best_practices_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Bishop Fox, Red Team Services page (the firm's own page): https://bishopfox.com/services/red-team (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team-vs-purple-team/ --- # Red team vs penetration testing: goals, scope and secrecy Comparison, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A penetration test looks for as many vulnerabilities as possible in a limited scope. A red team test pursues an objective across people, process and technology, usually in secret. The Singapore guidelines, the ECB and the NCSC set out the difference. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is the difference between red teaming and penetration testing? The difference is the question being asked. A penetration test asks which weaknesses can be exploited in a defined scope. A red team test asks whether an attacker could reach a specific objective and whether the organization would notice and respond. The Singapore guidelines tabulate the contrast, reproduced here in our own words. | Point | Penetration test | Red team (adversarial attack simulation) | | --- | --- | --- | | Primary objective | Find as many vulnerabilities as possible in a limited scope. | Stress and improve the ability to detect and respond to adversaries. | | Scope | Limited, asset-based technical assessment. | Objective-based and open-scoped, targeting people, process and technology. | | Who knows | Made known to all stakeholders. | Covert; only a small working group is aware. | | Social engineering | Not used. | May be used. | | Physical security | Not tested. | May be tested. | | Method | Aligned with industry technical methodologies. | Aligned with the tactics, techniques and procedures of real adversaries. | Table for: What is the difference between red teaming and penetration testing ## Does a penetration test ever include social engineering or physical access? It can. NIST SP 800-115 says penetration testing often includes non-technical methods, such as breaching physical security controls or posing as a help desk agent to obtain a password. The Singapore table shows the typical case, not a rule. What separates the two is then the objective and the secrecy, not the technique list. ## How do the NCSC and the ECB describe the gap? The NCSC treats a penetration test as a way to gain assurance in your vulnerability assessment and management processes, not as the main way to find vulnerabilities. It likens it to a financial audit of your internal team's work. The ECB says penetration tests give a detailed assessment of technical and configuration weaknesses, often within a single system, but do not assess the full scenario of a targeted attack against an entire entity. ## What about VAPT? VAPT is the abbreviation for vulnerability assessment and penetration testing, so it sits on the penetration test side of this comparison. NIST SP 800-115 describes vulnerability analysis as part of the discovery phase of a penetration test, where services and systems are compared against vulnerability databases. A VAPT report lists weaknesses; a red team report tells the story of an attack to an objective. Buyers who use the term should ask which of the two they are buying. See [what to ask a provider](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/). ## Which should you choose? Choose a penetration test when you want a list of exploitable weaknesses on named systems. Choose a red team test when you want to know whether a determined attacker could reach a specific business objective and whether your team would see it. The ECB gives the reason TIBER-EU raises the level of testing: penetration tests do not assess the full scenario of a targeted attack against an entire entity, including its people and processes. ## Related pages - [Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers](/red-team/) - [Adversary simulation vs adversary emulation](/compare/adversary-simulation-vs-emulation/) - [Red team assessment: what it is, how it is done and what you get](/services/red-team-assessment/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [Penetration test, defined](/glossary/penetration-test/) - [Red team process: the phases of an engagement](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [Red team vs blue team vs purple team: a three-way table](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team-vs-purple-team/) ## Sources - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - NCSC (UK), Penetration testing: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/penetration-testing (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/compare/red-team-vs-penetration-testing/ --- # Adversary simulation vs adversary emulation Comparison, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Adversary emulation copies the known behavior of a named threat actor. Adversary simulation, in the frameworks that use the term, is a red team exercise built from threat intelligence about the actors likely to target the organization. The two overlap, and providers often use them interchangeably. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is the difference between adversary simulation and adversary emulation? Emulation copies a named actor; simulation models likely attackers from intelligence. The Center for Threat-Informed Defense says adversary emulation mimics the behavior of real-world threat actors in a safe and repeatable manner, and its plans emulate a specific adversary such as FIN6 from initial access to exfiltration. The Australian CORIE framework defines adversary attack simulation as an exercise that uses threat intelligence to model and execute an attack, also known as a red team exercise. The Singapore guidelines describe the attacker as simulating the techniques of a real-world adversary based on intelligence. | Term | What the source says | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | Adversary emulation | Mimics the behavior of real-world threat actors in a safe and repeatable manner; plans are written for a specific adversary. | MITRE Center for Threat-Informed Defense | | Adversary simulation (adversary attack simulation) | An exercise that uses threat intelligence to model and execute an attack; also called a red team exercise. | CORIE framework, Australia | | Automated attack simulation | Use of automation, typically breach and attack simulation tools, to run and re-run simulated attacks. Tools are outside the scope of this site. | Singapore guidelines | | Adversary emulation (as a red team type) | Defenses against a specific threat group; copies the methods of a named attacker, often mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. | Bishop Fox red team page | Table for: What is the difference between adversary simulation and adversary emulation ## When do the terms mean the same thing? They mean the same when a provider uses either word for an intelligence-led red team exercise. CORIE treats simulation and red team exercise as synonyms, and several firms use simulation, emulation and red team in the same service description. Ask the provider which actor, or which intelligence, the scenarios copy and where it came from. The answer tells you whether you are buying emulation of a named group or a broader simulation. ## How does adversary emulation compare with a red team? An emulation follows a script drawn from reports on one actor; a general red team picks a path to an objective, using any technique that works. The CTID library has full emulation plans, such as for FIN6, and micro plans for single behaviors. In a red team exercise the objective leads. In emulation the actor leads. Either can be run covertly or openly. See [MITRE ATT&CK and emulation plans](/adversary/mitre-attack-and-emulation-plans/). ## Related pages - [MITRE ATT&CK and adversary emulation plans for red teams](/adversary/mitre-attack-and-emulation-plans/) - [Red team vs penetration testing: goals, scope and secrecy](/compare/red-team-vs-penetration-testing/) - [Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers](/red-team/) - [Adversary emulation, defined](/glossary/adversary-emulation/) - [Adversary simulation, defined](/glossary/adversary-simulation/) - [Red team services: kinds, what is included and who delivers](/services/red-team-services/) - [Red team vs blue team: roles, goals and how they meet](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team/) ## Sources - MITRE Center for Threat-Informed Defense, Adversary Emulation Library: https://ctid.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-library/ (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Bishop Fox, Red Team Services page (the firm's own page): https://bishopfox.com/services/red-team (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/compare/adversary-simulation-vs-emulation/ --- # MITRE ATT&CK and adversary emulation plans for red teams Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** MITRE ATT&CK is a public knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques from real-world observation. Red teams use it to plan and report. MITRE and its Center for Threat-Informed Defense publish emulation plans for named actors such as APT29 and FIN6, as read on their pages on 16 November 2026. ## What is MITRE ATT&CK? MITRE ATT&CK is a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. MITRE says it is used as a foundation for threat models and methods in the private sector, in government and in the security product and service community. Red teams plan scenarios with it, and reports map activity to it. The CISA red team advisory of February 2023 maps its team's activity to ATT&CK for Enterprise, and the TIBER-EU report guidance asks for attack scenarios summarized in line with ATT&CK. ## What are MITRE adversary emulation plans? They are prototype documents that show how to use public threat reports and ATT&CK to test defenses. MITRE says the purpose is to let defenders test networks more effectively by enabling red teams to model adversary behavior as ATT&CK describes it. The ATT&CK page offers the APT3 plan and a field manual that breaks the plan into command-by-command actions mapped to ATT&CK and to commands from public and commercial offensive tools. ## What is in the Center for Threat-Informed Defense library? The Center for Threat-Informed Defense, a non-profit consortium operated by MITRE, publishes an adversary emulation library with two kinds of plan. Full plans emulate an adversary from initial access to exfiltration. Micro plans emulate a compound behavior seen across many adversaries. The table lists what its page showed on 16 November 2026. | Type | Plans listed | | --- | --- | | Full emulation plans (11) | APT29, Blind Eagle, Carbanak, FIN6, FIN7, menuPass, OceanLotus, OilRig, Sandworm, Turla, Wizard Spider | | Micro emulation plans (12) | Active Directory Enumeration, Data Exfiltration, DLL Side-loading, File Access and File Modification, Log Clearing, Named Pipes, Process Injection, Reflective Loading, Remote Code Execution, User Execution, Web Shells, Windows Registry | Table for: What is in the Center for Threat-Informed Defense library ## What questions do emulation plans help answer? The Center lists five. How do we build a defense that does not rest on easily evaded indicators? How well do we detect, mitigate, respond to or prevent a given threat actor? Are we collecting the right data and running the right queries to detect a technique? How do we build team experience? How do we tune tools and processes against real threats? These are detection and defense questions, which is why emulation fits purple team exercises well. See [how a purple exercise runs](/purple-team/purple-team-exercise/). ## Related pages - [Adversary simulation vs adversary emulation](/compare/adversary-simulation-vs-emulation/) - [Purple team exercise: how it runs, step by step](/purple-team/purple-team-exercise/) - [What does a red team do?](/red-team/what-does-a-red-team-do/) - [MITRE ATT&CK, defined](/glossary/mitre-attack/) - [Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), defined](/glossary/ttps/) - [Red team example: the CISA red team assessment of 2022](/engagement/red-team-example/) ## Sources - MITRE ATT&CK: https://attack.mitre.org/ (read 16 November 2026) - MITRE ATT&CK, Adversary Emulation Plans: https://attack.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-plans/ (read 16 November 2026) - MITRE Center for Threat-Informed Defense, Adversary Emulation Library: https://ctid.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-library/ (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Report Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_report_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/adversary/mitre-attack-and-emulation-plans/ --- # Red team process: the phases of an engagement Process, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A red team engagement runs in phases: preparation, threat intelligence, active testing and closure. TIBER-EU uses three phases, CBEST four, the Singapore guidelines five, and CORIE three phases in six stages. The table compares them, with durations where the sources give them. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is the red team process? The red team process is the sequence from agreeing scope to fixing findings. Every framework read has the same spine: prepare and scope, gather threat intelligence, attack, then report, replay and fix. They differ in how many phases they count and how long each takes. The table lists each framework's phases and the time its text gives. | Framework | Phases | Time given in the text | | --- | --- | --- | | TIBER-EU (ECB) | Preparation (notification, initiation, procurement and scoping); testing (threat intelligence, then red team test plan and active testing); closure (reports, replay, purple teaming, feedback, attestation). | Active testing at least 12 weeks; closure reports and replay up to 10 weeks, then up to 8 weeks for summary and plan. | | DORA TLPT (EU) | Preparation, testing (threat intelligence, red team test), closure, remediation plan, attestation. | Initiation information due within 3 months of notice; red team report within 4 weeks; blue team report and replay within 10 weeks. | | CBEST (Bank of England) | Initiation; threat intelligence; penetration testing; closure. | About 6, 10, 14 and 4 weeks; 9 to 12 months overall. | | AASE (Singapore) | Planning; attack preparation; attack execution; exercise closure; post-exercise actions. | Large firms may run a 4 to 6 month cycle for complex scenarios. | | CORIE (Australia) | Preparation; test; closure, in six stages ending with a replay attack. | Closure phase typically 5 weeks. | | NIST SP 800-115 (penetration test) | Planning; discovery; attack; reporting. | Not stated. | Table for: What is the red team process ## What happens in each phase? Preparation sets up the engagement. The tested entity forms its control team, appoints providers and writes the scope document with the functions, systems and flags. Under the EU technical standards the scope document goes to the authority for approval before threat intelligence starts. The testing phase starts with a targeted threat intelligence report and ends with active testing, in which the red team works through scenarios on live systems. Closure covers the reports, the replay, the purple teaming exercise, feedback, the remediation plan and the attestation. ## How long does a red team engagement take? The shortest figure in the sources is the 12-week minimum for active testing under TIBER-EU and the EU technical standards. The whole engagement is longer: CBEST regulators find an average project duration of around 9 to 12 months. The Singapore guidelines say large firms typically run a four to six month cycle for complex scenarios, including attack modeling. Duration scales with the number of scenarios and the scope. ## Does a smaller engagement follow the same phases? The phases are the same; the effort is not. The NIST penetration testing model of planning, discovery, attack and reporting is the smaller form. The frameworks above are written for large regulated firms. Buyers outside those regimes use them as a model and scale the effort. See [the step-by-step list](/engagement/red-team-steps/) and [scoping a red team engagement](/services/scoping-a-red-team-engagement/). ## Related pages - [Red team steps: ten steps with the output of each](/engagement/red-team-steps/) - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) - [Scoping a red team engagement: ten decisions to make before the start](/services/scoping-a-red-team-engagement/) - [Red team debrief: how to turn findings into fixes](/engagement/red-team-debrief/) - [What does a red team do?](/red-team/what-does-a-red-team-do/) - [Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing](/scoping-sheet/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/engagement/red-team-process/ --- # Red team steps: ten steps with the output of each Process, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A red team engagement can be run in ten steps, from setting the objective to the remediation plan. Each step below has an output that the next step needs, taken from the TIBER-EU, EU, CBEST and Singapore documents. Read 16 November 2026. ## What are the steps in a red team engagement? There are ten, and each produces something the next one needs. The list follows the order used in TIBER-EU, the EU technical standards, CBEST and the Singapore guidelines, simplified for a buyer who is not in a regulated scheme. 1. Set the objective and name a sponsor. Output: a one-sentence objective. 2. Form the white cell. Output: the control team list, with a lead and deputy. 3. Write the scope document. Output: functions, systems, exclusions and flags. 4. Select providers. Output: contracts, after reference, insurance and conflict checks. 5. Gather threat intelligence and choose scenarios. Output: a targeted intelligence report. 6. Write the test plan and rules of engagement. Output: approved plan and signed rules. 7. Run active testing. Output: attack log and weekly reports. 8. Deliver red and blue team reports. Output: two reports and one timeline. 9. Replay and hold the purple session. Output: lessons and fixes. 10. Agree the remediation plan. Output: owners, dates and a check on fixes. ## Which steps need the regulator or an outside approver? In regulated schemes several steps need approval from the authority. Under the EU technical standards the authority approves the scope document, the targeted threat intelligence report and the red team test plan, and issues an attestation at the end. Outside those schemes the white cell and the sponsor play that role. The [scoping sheet](/scoping-sheet/) covers steps 2, 3, 6 and 10 as fields. ## Which step needs a decision before testing starts? The emergency stop does. TIBER-EU, the EU technical standards and the Singapore guidelines each give the white cell or exercise director power to pause, and CISA's published case reports that its red team received no deconfliction from the organization. See [the emergency stop page](/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/). ## Related pages - [Red team process: the phases of an engagement](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing](/scoping-sheet/) - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) - [Red team rules of engagement: what they cover and a template](/engagement/red-team-rules-of-engagement/) - [Red team debrief: how to turn findings into fixes](/engagement/red-team-debrief/) - [Emergency stop and deconfliction in a red team test](/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_service_provider_procurement_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/engagement/red-team-steps/ --- # Red team rules of engagement: what they cover and a template Template, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Rules of engagement are the written limits and permissions for a test: scope, exclusions, allowed methods, contacts, halt criteria and signatures. NIST SP 800-115 supplies a seven-part template, reproduced below in outline with our own fill-in prompts. Read 16 November 2026. ## What are rules of engagement in a red team test? Rules of engagement are the detailed guidelines and constraints for a security test, set before it starts. NIST says they give the test team authority to conduct defined activities without needing further permission. SP 800-53 adds that all parties agree to the rules before testing starts, that they should be matched to the techniques adversaries are expected to use, and that rules and contracts can set expectations for protecting information the testers may see. ## What goes into a rules of engagement template? A template needs seven parts, following NIST SP 800-115 Appendix B. The table gives each part, what NIST says it holds and a prompt to fill in. Replace the prompts with your answers. | Part | What it holds (NIST SP 800-115) | Fill in | | --- | --- | --- | | 1. Introduction | Purpose, scope, assumptions and limitations, risks, document structure. | Who is tested, who tests, why; boundaries; known risks and how they are reduced. | | 2. Logistics | Personnel with contact points, test schedule, test site, test equipment. | Names and phones; dates and hours; where testers work from; how tester systems are told apart from yours. | | 3. Communication strategy | General communication; incident handling and response with halt criteria and call tree. | Meeting rhythm and channels; who can halt the test; call tree; how testing resumes. | | 4. Target system or network | Systems to be tested, authorized and unauthorized addresses, the exclude list. | Address ranges, hosts, applications; systems that must not be touched. | | 5. Testing execution | Allowed and unallowed activities, non-technical components, technical components, data handling. | Techniques allowed; social engineering limits; physical access rules; files that may be installed; data rules. | | 6. Reporting | Report contents and frequency, with a template as an appendix. | Daily or weekly status; final report layout. | | 7. Signature page | Accountable parties sign; at minimum the test team lead and senior management such as the CISO. | Names, titles, signature, date. | Table for: What goes into a rules of engagement template ## What must the red team test plan add? For threat-led tests the TIBER-EU red team test plan adds scenario details. It must give the communication channels, the tactics, techniques and procedures allowed and not allowed, ethical limits for social engineering and how privacy is safeguarded, and the risk management steps the testers will follow. Each scenario also needs the simulated threat actor and its goals, the target functions and systems, the flags, each attack path with prerequisites and possible leg-ups, the schedule split into in, through and out phases, and any particulars of the infrastructure. ## Who signs the rules of engagement? At a minimum the test team lead and the organization's senior management sign. NIST names the chief security officer, chief information security officer and chief information officer as examples. In TIBER-EU, the control team and the authority approve the test plan, and changes after approval need the control team lead and the test managers. See [legal authorization](/engagement/red-team-legal-authorization/) for the letter that goes with it. ## Related pages - [Red team legal authorization: the letter and the law](/engagement/red-team-legal-authorization/) - [Emergency stop and deconfliction in a red team test](/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/) - [Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing](/scoping-sheet/) - [Scoping a red team engagement: ten decisions to make before the start](/services/scoping-a-red-team-engagement/) - [Rules of engagement, defined](/glossary/rules-of-engagement/) - [Red team steps: ten steps with the output of each](/engagement/red-team-steps/) - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) ## Sources - NIST CSRC Glossary, rules of engagement: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/rules_of_engagement (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, control CA-8 Penetration Testing: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Plan Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_plan_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/engagement/red-team-rules-of-engagement/ --- # White team or white cell: who they are and what they do Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The white team, also called the white cell, is the small group on the tested side that knows about a covert test and referees it. NIST calls it the white team. TIBER-EU calls it the control team, CBEST and CORIE the control group, and the Singapore guidelines the exercise working group. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is a white team in a red team exercise? A white team is the referee. The NIST glossary, citing CNSSI 4009-2022, defines it as a small group with prior knowledge of unannounced red team activities that acts as observers and ensures the scope of testing does not exceed a pre-defined threshold. A second NIST definition adds that it enforces the rules, resolves problems and makes sure the exercise does not cause operational problems for the defender's mission. The word is losing ground. CORIE's glossary lists the control group as formerly the white team. | Framework | Name used | Composition | | --- | --- | --- | | NIST (CNSSI 4009-2022) | White team | A small group with prior knowledge of the unannounced activity. | | TIBER-EU and EU TLPT rules | Control team, led by a control team lead | Staff of the tested entity and, where relevant, of its service providers; as small as possible. | | CBEST | Control group, with a coordinator | A select number of senior people who sit highest in the escalation chain; need-to-know only. | | CORIE | Control group | Senior members with authority to take risk-based decisions. | | Singapore guidelines | Exercise working group, led by an exercise director | Attackers and the exercise director; senior management and risk, legal and other units may be involved. | Table for: What is a white team in a red team exercise ## What does the white cell do? The white cell runs the test from the inside. TIBER-EU lists its duties: execute the test within the framework, ensure risk controls are in place, include the right functions in scope, procure providers, set the communication channels, keep the test within scope, manage escalations from the blue team's actions, and maximize learning through the replay and purple exercises. It also provides help. CORIE says the control group will, when requested, give the red team timely assistance and must see all blue team escalations to keep the exercise secret and sound. ## Who should be in the white cell? As few people as possible. TIBER-EU says the guiding principle is a team that is as small as possible, with the skills to manage an end-to-end test, enough business and operational knowledge, and authority to make critical decisions. Typical members are a lead, subject matter experts, a senior executive and a project manager. CBEST adds that the group should include only those strictly needed, usually one person per tested system, and that third parties may need to join where systems are outsourced. ## Does the blue team ever join the white cell? Rarely and with care. The EU technical standards require the control team to consult the test managers before involving any blue team member. CORIE allows a senior manager of the blue team to sit in the control group if effective separation can be guaranteed. See [the emergency stop page](/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/) for the white cell's power to pause. ## Related pages - [Emergency stop and deconfliction in a red team test](/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/) - [Red team vs blue team: roles, goals and how they meet](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team/) - [Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing](/scoping-sheet/) - [White team, defined](/glossary/white-team/) - [Control team, defined](/glossary/control-team/) - [Red team steps: ten steps with the output of each](/engagement/red-team-steps/) - [Red team rules of engagement: what they cover and a template](/engagement/red-team-rules-of-engagement/) ## Sources - NIST CSRC Glossary, white team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/white_team (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Control Team Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_control_team_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/engagement/white-team/ --- # Emergency stop and deconfliction in a red team test Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A red team test needs a way to stop and a way to tell the test from a real attack. TIBER-EU lets the control team halt the test at any time, and the Singapore guidelines give the exercise director power to proceed, pause or end it. Read 16 November 2026. ## Who can stop a red team test? The tested organization's white cell can. TIBER-EU says the control team may at any time order a temporary or complete halt if concerns are raised over damage or potential damage to a system. The EU technical standards let the control team lead suspend the test in exceptional circumstances that risk data, assets or critical functions. The Singapore guidelines give the exercise director the decision, at every stage, to proceed with an action, pause or terminate the exercise. ## What is deconfliction in a red team test? Deconfliction is separating the test from real events. The sources read here do not define the word, but CISA's red team advisory uses it: it reports that the team received no deconflictions or confirmation that the organization had caught its activity. The practice appears under other names. The Singapore guidelines have the provider set up a direct hotline so the exercise director can validate and attribute observed incident notifications to the attacker, and then intervene to diffuse, delay or alter the response. ## What happens if the blue team detects the red team? The white cell manages the reaction so the test can continue where possible. The EU technical standards ask the control team, with the testers, to propose measures that allow the test to continue while keeping it secret. TIBER-EU gives uncontrolled escalation as a case for intervention, such as the blue team shutting down critical servers, an incident reported to the supervisor, or a police report filed. The control team lead should pause the test and deal with the escalation while disclosing as little as possible. CORIE's control group gives instructions to staff if the red team is detected. ## What if a serious weakness or a real intruder is found? Both go to the white cell at once. The Singapore guidelines say that when the attacker finds a high-risk vulnerability, such as arbitrary code execution on an internet-facing system, it informs the working group immediately, which decides whether to remediate at once even if that compromises secrecy. If the attacker finds evidence of an earlier compromise, the organization should complete the incident response first, even if that means halting or pausing the exercise. ## How is the environment restored after a stop? Testers clean up. The EU technical standards require command and control deactivation, scope and date kill switches, removal of backdoors and other malware, breach notification where needed, and secure deletion of compromised credentials. ## Related pages - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) - [Red team rules of engagement: what they cover and a template](/engagement/red-team-rules-of-engagement/) - [Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing](/scoping-sheet/) - [Red team legal authorization: the letter and the law](/engagement/red-team-legal-authorization/) - [Kill switch, defined](/glossary/kill-switch/) - [Catch-and-release, defined](/glossary/catch-and-release/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Control Team Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_control_team_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/ --- # Red team legal authorization: the letter and the law Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A red team test is lawful only with written authorization from someone entitled to give it. The Singapore guidelines describe a letter of engagement signed by the sponsoring executive. TIBER-EU adds a legal analysis of activities such as gathering employee account data. This page is not legal advice. Read 16 November 2026. ## What authorization does a red team test need? It needs a signed document from senior management that commissions and sanctions the test. The Singapore guidelines call it a letter of engagement and say it should briefly describe the intent of the test, the extent of the testers' involvement and how to authenticate them during a possible investigation. NIST SP 800-115 expects the test team lead and the organization's senior management to sign the rules of engagement, and for physical testing it expects a form with signatures and contacts that testers can show to law enforcement or security staff. ## What does the letter protect against? It protects testers who are stopped mid-test. If staff apprehend a tester, the letter and the named contact prove the test is sanctioned. NIST says guards should be made aware of how to verify tester activity, for example through a point of contact or documentation. The letter does not replace the scope. Activity outside the agreed scope is not covered by the permission given for the scoped test. ## Which laws should counsel review? TIBER-EU lists activities that need legal review: gathering open-source intelligence on the entity, its suppliers, employees and customers; gathering data from other intelligence sources and the dark web; gathering account and password data from employees and providers; placing people into the entity under various guises; and using ruses by email, telephone and in person. The framework says entities should carry out a thorough legal analysis with appropriate legal expertise, and that contractual consent with the full agreement of the entity mitigates many concerns. All parties are prohibited from illegal and unethical actions. ## What about third parties such as cloud and managed service providers? They may need to agree or take part. CBEST says third parties may need to be part of the control group where important systems underpinning a service are outsourced. Under DORA, the financial entity must take the measures to ensure ICT third-party providers in scope take part and keeps full responsibility. The EU rules also let the entity and a provider agree in writing for the provider to contract an external tester directly, where participation could affect the provider's other customers. ## What contract terms matter? Liability, insurance, confidentiality and data. The Singapore guidelines say the provider should be kept legally liable through the scope of work, sign a confidentiality agreement, and hold insurance and indemnity, and that mutual damages and the provider's financial capacity deserve attention. TIBER-EU requires professional indemnity cover that includes misconduct and negligence. ## Related pages - [Red team rules of engagement: what they cover and a template](/engagement/red-team-rules-of-engagement/) - [Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing](/scoping-sheet/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) - [Letter of engagement, defined](/glossary/letter-of-engagement/) - [Scoping a red team engagement: ten decisions to make before the start](/services/scoping-a-red-team-engagement/) - [Emergency stop and deconfliction in a red team test](/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/) - [Assumed breach red team: starting from inside](/engagement/assumed-breach-red-team/) ## Sources - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554 (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_service_provider_procurement_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/engagement/red-team-legal-authorization/ --- # Assumed breach red team: starting from inside Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** An assumed breach red team test starts with the attacker already inside, usually with a workstation or account, and spends its time on movement, privileges and detection. TIBER-EU calls such help leg-ups and the Singapore guidelines call it concessions. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is an assumed breach red team? It is a design in which the attacker starts with internal access already granted. Bishop Fox describes it as focusing on lateral movement, privilege escalation and detection. NetSPI describes it as assuming an attacker has already breached the environment and then outlining the potential scope of a compromise. The Singapore guidelines give the example of providing a laptop up front on the assumption that an endpoint compromise would succeed. ## How is it different from leg-ups and concessions? An assumed breach start is planned from day one; a leg-up is help given when testers stall. TIBER-EU defines a leg-up as assistance or information from the control team that lets the testers continue an attack path they cannot advance on their own, and requires them to be logged. The Singapore guidelines call planned help a concession and give examples: an administrator told to issue accounts on demand, an IT person issuing laptops, information about assets, bypass of a physical access control, or a trusted agent opening a file that gives the first foothold. ## When does an assumed breach start make sense? It makes sense when the entry stage is not the question. The Bank of England says CBEST results show the value of simulating highly privileged internal attackers, such as malicious insiders and supply chain attacks, because these test the controls inside the network rather than at the perimeter. TIBER-EU explains the pressure behind leg-ups: real attackers have more time and fewer legal and ethical limits than a test, so a granted foothold lets the test go on within the legal and ethical limits. ## What should be written down? Every start position and every concession. The TIBER-EU report guidance asks that leg-ups be listed in the report, and the Singapore guidelines say that when concessions run out the organization may let the attacker continue while the blue team watches passively. ## Related pages - [Assumed breach, defined](/glossary/assumed-breach/) - [Leg-up, defined](/glossary/leg-up/) - [Concession, defined](/glossary/concession/) - [Red team rules of engagement: what they cover and a template](/engagement/red-team-rules-of-engagement/) - [Red team services: kinds, what is included and who delivers](/services/red-team-services/) - [Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing](/scoping-sheet/) - [Red team legal authorization: the letter and the law](/engagement/red-team-legal-authorization/) - [Red team report: what it must contain, with a template](/engagement/red-team-report/) ## Sources - Bishop Fox, Red Team Services page (the firm's own page): https://bishopfox.com/services/red-team (read 16 November 2026) - NetSPI, Red Team Operations page (the firm's own page): https://www.netspi.com/netspi-ptaas/red-team-operations/ (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Report Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_report_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/engagement/assumed-breach-red-team/ --- # Red team report: what it must contain, with a template Template, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A red team report records the attack, not only the weaknesses. TIBER-EU requires flags reached and not reached, attack paths, techniques used, deviations from the plan, leg-ups, blue team actions the testers know of, findings with root causes and remediation priority. Read 16 November 2026. ## What should a red team report contain? It should contain the attack story and the findings. TIBER-EU requires: the targeted functions and systems; a summary of each scenario; flags reached and not reached; attack paths followed successfully and unsuccessfully; techniques used successfully and unsuccessfully; deviations from the plan; and leg-ups granted. It also needs the blue team actions the testers are aware of, stealth techniques used and whether detection was adequate, findings categorized by NIST function, criticality and complexity, a provisional root cause analysis, and recommendations for remediation. ## Is a red team test a pass or fail? No. The ECB says a TIBER-EU test does not produce a pass or fail but an insight into strengths and weaknesses and a focus on learning. The report is written to feed the replay, the purple session and the remediation plan. A reader who wants a score should note that the sources read do not define one. ## Who is the report for? Several readers, so it has layers. TIBER-EU asks for a short narrative in lay terms for senior management and governance bodies, covering what was tested, a high-level timeline, the main findings, categories of recommendations and any significant exceptions. A storyline per scenario, in line with MITRE ATT&CK, is for the staff of the tested entity. ## What does a red team report template look like? Use the outline below, based on the TIBER-EU required content. Fields can be adjusted to your scheme. | Section | Fields | | --- | --- | | 1. Management summary | Functions and systems tested; timeline; scenarios; main findings; recommendation categories; exceptions. | | 2. Scope and plan | Functions, systems, flags, deviations from the plan, leg-ups with date and reason. | | 3. Storyline per scenario | Simulated actor; in, through and out phases; techniques mapped to MITRE ATT&CK; flags reached and not reached. | | 4. Attack paths and detection | Successful and unsuccessful paths with techniques; stealth techniques used; whether the entity's detection capability was adequate and, if not, what to improve; the threat actor sophistication actually needed. | | 5. Blue team actions | Defender actions the testers are aware of, with a timeline and logs the blue team can use for its own report. | | 6. Findings | For each: category by NIST function (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover), criticality and complexity, how the entity was compromised and the impact. | | 7. Provisional root causes | Root causes across people, process and technology, rated by criticality, and what further attack was possible with more time. | | 8. Recommendations | Concrete remediations tied to findings, with a priority. | Table for: What does a red team report template look like ## How soon is the report due? Under the EU technical standards the testers deliver the red team test report to the control team within 4 weeks of the end of active testing. CBEST says a draft penetration test report should be issued within a period agreed with the regulator, generally no later than two weeks after testing. ## Related pages - [Blue team report template and what it must contain](/blue-team/blue-team-report-template/) - [Red team example: the CISA red team assessment of 2022](/engagement/red-team-example/) - [Red team debrief: how to turn findings into fixes](/engagement/red-team-debrief/) - [Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing](/scoping-sheet/) - [Red team process: the phases of an engagement](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [Flag, defined](/glossary/flag/) - [Assumed breach red team: starting from inside](/engagement/assumed-breach-red-team/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Report Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_report_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/engagement/red-team-report/ --- # Red team example: the CISA red team assessment of 2022 Case, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** CISA published its own red team assessment in advisory AA23-059A on 28 February 2023. The team gained persistent access to a large critical infrastructure organization, moved between sites and went undetected despite a mature posture. MFA prompts blocked one target. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is an example of a real red team exercise? CISA's advisory AA23-059A is one of the few public accounts. In 2022 CISA conducted a red team assessment at the request of a large critical infrastructure organization with several geographically separated sites. The team gained persistent access, moved laterally across sites and reached systems adjacent to sensitive business systems. MFA prompts stopped the team from reaching one sensitive system, and it could not finish its plan for a second within the assessment period. The organization did not detect the activity at any point. ## How was the exercise run? In two phases. In Phase I the team tried to gain and keep persistent access while avoiding detection. In Phase II it tried to trigger a security response from the organization's people, processes or technology. The team gained initial access to two workstations at separate sites through spearphishing after open-source research on targets, then used directory data to find standard user accounts with administrative access and ran a second phishing campaign against them. ## What did the report find? CISA listed key issues that allowed undetected access. Host and network monitoring was insufficient: most Phase II actions drew no response, and the organization failed to detect lateral movement, persistence and command and control. There was little monitoring of endpoint management systems, which the team used to gain root access across the network. A domain account password had not been changed for over a decade. CISA's actions to take included: establish a baseline of normal network activity and tune tools to detect anomalies, conduct regular assessments of procedures, and enforce phishing-resistant MFA to the greatest extent possible. ## What can a buyer learn from it? Four things stand out. The assessment ran at the organization's request. Its goal was a set of sensitive business systems. It had two phases, one for stealth and one for provoking a response. And the findings map to ATT&CK so defenders can write detections. See [the red team report page](/engagement/red-team-report/) for how a report is organized. ## Related pages - [Red team report: what it must contain, with a template](/engagement/red-team-report/) - [What does a red team do?](/red-team/what-does-a-red-team-do/) - [MITRE ATT&CK and adversary emulation plans for red teams](/adversary/mitre-attack-and-emulation-plans/) - [Emergency stop and deconfliction in a red team test](/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/) - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) - [Blue team: what a blue team does and how it is tested](/blue-team/) - [Red team debrief: how to turn findings into fixes](/engagement/red-team-debrief/) ## Sources - CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/engagement/red-team-example/ --- # Red team debrief: how to turn findings into fixes Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A red team debrief is the closing sequence in which red and blue teams compare notes and the organization decides what to fix. TIBER-EU and the EU rules set a replay and purple exercise within 10 weeks, then feedback, a remediation plan within 8 weeks and an attestation. Read 16 November 2026. ## How do you run a red team debrief? Run it in order: reports, replay, purple session, feedback, remediation plan. Under the EU technical standards the control team lead first tells the blue team that a test took place. The red team report goes to the blue team, which writes its own report within 10 weeks of the end of testing. The red and blue teams then replay the offensive and defensive actions, and the control team holds a purple teaming exercise on topics chosen jointly. Participants then give each other feedback on the process. ## What is a replay? A replay is a walk-through of the engagement by both sides, step by step. TIBER-EU says the red team and blue team jointly go through the actions each took, using the reports and the timeline, and that the findings feed directly into the test summary report. Both reports are shared in advance so each side can prepare. ## How do findings become fixes? Through a remediation plan that names owners and dates. For each finding the EU rules require a description of the shortcoming, the remediation measures with priority and expected completion, a root cause analysis, the staff or functions responsible, and the risks of not acting. The entity delivers the plan within 8 weeks of the authority's notice that the reports are complete. In CBEST the regulator supervises execution of the remediation plan. ## Who is told the results? Under the EU rules the entity submits a summary of findings, the remediation plan and documentation to the authority, which then issues an attestation. The Singapore guidelines also list sharing with a wider audience as part of post-exercise actions. CORIE has the regulators receive provider and institution reports to keep views consistent. ## Related pages - [Purple team exercise: how it runs, step by step](/purple-team/purple-team-exercise/) - [Blue team report template and what it must contain](/blue-team/blue-team-report-template/) - [Red team report: what it must contain, with a template](/engagement/red-team-report/) - [Red team process: the phases of an engagement](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [Remediation plan, defined](/glossary/remediation-plan/) - [Attestation, defined](/glossary/attestation/) - [Red team example: the CISA red team assessment of 2022](/engagement/red-team-example/) ## Sources - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/engagement/red-team-debrief/ --- # Red team services: kinds, what is included and who delivers Buyer guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Red team services are engagements in which a provider attacks your organization under agreed rules to reach an objective, then reports and coaches. Providers sell covert red team tests, purple team exercises, assumed breach tests and intelligence-led tests for regulators. Read 16 November 2026. ## What are red team services? Red team services are paid engagements in which a provider emulates an attacker against your people, processes and technology. Firms describe them in their own words: Mandiant a "no-holds-barred" attack scenario against jointly agreed objectives, Sygnia stealthy attack simulations on the whole organization or chosen domains, and Unit 42 intelligence-driven operations that challenge detection and response. The services directory lists each firm's wording in the same fields. This page sets out the kinds of service and what a buyer should expect to be included. ## What kinds of red team service can you buy? Five kinds appear across the sources and firm pages. The table lists each with where it is described. | Kind | What it is | Where described | | --- | --- | --- | | Covert red team test | Objective-based attack with defenders unaware; reports on detection and response. | Singapore guidelines; TIBER-EU; firm pages | | Intelligence-led test for a regulator | A red team test driven by bespoke threat intelligence, run to a regulator's framework with accredited providers. | [Frameworks table](/frameworks/) | | Purple team exercise | Red and blue work together to test and improve detections. | Sygnia, Mandiant, Cisco Talos, NCC Group, Unit 42, SpecterOps pages | | Assumed breach test | Attacker starts inside; focus on movement, privileges and detection. | Bishop Fox, NetSPI pages | | Scenario-based or modular test | A mix of penetration testing and purple-style operations, or building blocks chosen by the buyer. | NetSPI and Bishop Fox pages | Table for: What kinds of red team service can you buy ## What should be included in a red team engagement? A scope document, a test plan with rules of engagement, an emergency stop, regular status reports, a final report, a replay with the defenders and a remediation plan. The EU and TIBER-EU documents require each of these for regulated tests, and they are a sound checklist for any buyer. Firms describe outputs such as a prioritized findings report and strategic roadmap (Sygnia), fact-based risk analyses and recommendations (Mandiant), and reporting that documents attack paths, techniques and achieved objectives (Bishop Fox). ## Who delivers red team services: your staff or an outside provider? Either, but regulated schemes often require outside testers. CORIE says only the red team exercise requires an external provider, and the purple and crisis exercises can be done with internal resources. Under DORA, a financial entity using internal testers must contract external testers every three tests, and significant credit institutions must use external testers. The Singapore guidelines say larger firms tend to have internal specialist teams, and that outside providers offer an independent view and different techniques. See [building an internal red team](/services/building-an-internal-red-team/). ## Related pages - [Who offers red team services?](/services/who-offers-red-team-services/) - [Red team assessment: what it is, how it is done and what you get](/services/red-team-assessment/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [Scoping a red team engagement: ten decisions to make before the start](/services/scoping-a-red-team-engagement/) - [Red team engagement cost: what drives the price](/services/red-team-engagement-cost/) - [Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing](/scoping-sheet/) - [Building an internal red team: build or buy](/services/building-an-internal-red-team/) ## Sources - Mandiant, Red Team Assessment datasheet (the firm's own document): https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/ds-red-team-operations-en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Sygnia, Red Team Assessment page (the firm's own page): https://www.sygnia.co/solutions/red-teaming/ (read 16 November 2026) - Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Offensive Security page (the firm's own page): https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42/strengthen-your-defenses/offensive-security-services (read 16 November 2026) - Bishop Fox, Red Team Services page (the firm's own page): https://bishopfox.com/services/red-team (read 16 November 2026) - NetSPI, Red Team Operations page (the firm's own page): https://www.netspi.com/netspi-ptaas/red-team-operations/ (read 16 November 2026) - Sygnia, Purple Teaming page (the firm's own page): https://www.sygnia.co/solutions/purple-teaming/ (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554 (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/services/red-team-services/ --- # Red team assessment: what it is, how it is done and what you get Buyer guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A red team assessment is a purchased red team engagement: you set objectives, a provider attacks under agreed rules, and you receive a report. Mandiant, Sygnia and others describe it in near identical terms: an agreed objective, a realistic attack and a findings report mapped to a known framework. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is a red team assessment? It is the buyer's name for a red team engagement delivered by a provider. Mandiant's datasheet describes it as a realistic, "no-holds-barred" attack scenario in which the red team uses any non-destructive methods needed to accomplish jointly agreed mission objectives while simulating attacker behavior. Sygnia says its assessment stress-tests detection and response with stealthy, high-impact simulations and delivers an evidence-based measure of resilience against real-world TTPs. In the TIBER-EU view the result is learning, not a pass or fail. ## What is the methodology of a red team assessment? The method follows an attack lifecycle with an agreed objective. Mandiant's engagements follow the stages of its attack lifecycle: initial reconnaissance, initial compromise, establishing a foothold, escalating privileges, internal reconnaissance, moving laterally, maintaining presence and completing the mission. Regulated schemes add threat intelligence up front. TIBER-EU and the EU rules start with a targeted threat intelligence report and at least three scenarios. Most providers also map results to MITRE ATT&CK; Sygnia, Bishop Fox and NetSPI say so on their pages. ## What sample objectives does a provider use? Objectives are business-level. Mandiant's datasheet gives three samples: steal executive or developer emails, break into a segmented environment that holds business-critical or sensitive data, and take control of an automated device such as an IoT, medical or manufacturing device. The Singapore guidelines give another: an unauthorized large funds transfer for an institution targeted for financial gain. ## What does a red team assessment report contain? It contains the attack story and the findings, not only a list. See [the report page](/engagement/red-team-report/) for the full required contents and a template, and [the CISA example](/engagement/red-team-example/) for a published case. Ask the provider for a sample report before you sign; the [questions to ask](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) include it. ## How is a red team assessment different from a penetration test? A penetration test aims to find many weaknesses in a limited scope; a red team assessment aims to reach an objective and test detection. The [comparison page](/compare/red-team-vs-penetration-testing/) sets them out in a table from the Singapore guidelines. ## Related pages - [Red team services: kinds, what is included and who delivers](/services/red-team-services/) - [Red team report: what it must contain, with a template](/engagement/red-team-report/) - [Red team vs penetration testing: goals, scope and secrecy](/compare/red-team-vs-penetration-testing/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [Red team process: the phases of an engagement](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [Who offers red team services?](/services/who-offers-red-team-services/) - [Scoping a red team engagement: ten decisions to make before the start](/services/scoping-a-red-team-engagement/) ## Sources - Mandiant, Red Team Assessment datasheet (the firm's own document): https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/ds-red-team-operations-en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Sygnia, Red Team Assessment page (the firm's own page): https://www.sygnia.co/solutions/red-teaming/ (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Bishop Fox, Red Team Services page (the firm's own page): https://bishopfox.com/services/red-team (read 16 November 2026) - NetSPI, Red Team Operations page (the firm's own page): https://www.netspi.com/netspi-ptaas/red-team-operations/ (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/services/red-team-assessment/ --- # Scoping a red team engagement: ten decisions to make before the start Buyer guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Scoping a red team engagement means deciding ten things before any testing: objectives, crown jewels, threat profile, scope and exclusions, rules of engagement, emergency stop, legal authorization, timing, white cell contacts, and reporting. A printable sheet with sourced fields is on this site. Read 16 November 2026. ## How do you scope a red team engagement? You answer ten groups of questions in writing, with the white cell and sponsor, before the provider starts. The groups are objectives, crown jewels, threat profile, scope and exclusions, rules of engagement, emergency stop, legal authorization, timing, white cell contacts, and reporting and retest. The [scoping sheet](/scoping-sheet/) holds the 50 questions in full, each with why it matters and its source. It prints on a page and downloads as Word, CSV and JSON. ## What decides the objective? The objective is a question your team wants answered about itself. TIBER-EU says the outcome is learning, not pass or fail. The Singapore guidelines say goals should be based on what real-world adversaries want, such as a large unauthorized funds transfer, and need not change every time unless intelligence or controls change. ## What should the scope exclude? Write down what is off limits and why. NIST SP 800-115 calls the list of systems not authorized for testing the exclude list. The Singapore guidelines give no-fly zones for functions where the risk of testing is excessive, and say that parts of the exercise not run live must be documented with reasons. TIBER-EU requires the scope document to explain the reason each critical function is left out. ## How long should the engagement run? Time follows scope. TIBER-EU and the EU rules set 12 weeks as the minimum for active testing in regulated tests; CBEST allows about 14 weeks for its testing phase. The Singapore guidelines say complex scenarios at large firms often need four to six months in all. Check planned system changes with change management before fixing dates. ## Who should be in the room when you scope? The sponsor, the white cell lead and subject experts for the in-scope systems, and legal. CBEST says the control group usually includes one person per system being tested and must be kept as small as possible. The Singapore guidelines list senior management, risk, business continuity, incident management, information security, system owners, legal and compliance for the working group. ## Related pages - [Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing](/scoping-sheet/) - [How the red team scoping sheet was made](/scoping-sheet/method/) - [Red team rules of engagement: what they cover and a template](/engagement/red-team-rules-of-engagement/) - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [Red team process: the phases of an engagement](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [Red team assessment: what it is, how it is done and what you get](/services/red-team-assessment/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Scope Specification Document Guidance, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_scope_specification_document_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/services/scoping-a-red-team-engagement/ --- # What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why Buyer guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Ask a red team provider for references, named team members with experience, insurance, conflict-of-interest answers, how it gets consent for high-risk actions, how it handles data, and what the report contains. TIBER-EU and the Singapore guidelines supply the checks. Read 16 November 2026. ## What should you ask a red team provider? Ask twelve questions and keep the answers in writing. Each comes from a framework's own checks for providers, so a provider that serves regulated clients will have answers ready. | Question | Why it matters | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | Can you give references from previous red team or penetration test assignments? How many? | TIBER-EU and the EU rules require at least 5 for red team testers and 3 for the threat intelligence provider. | TIBER-EU procurement guidance | | Who exactly will be on my team, and what is each person's experience? | The EU rules ask for a manager with 5 years and testers with 2 years; CORIE asks for a lead with 7 years. | EU technical standards; CORIE | | Will you provide CVs and relevant certifications for each person? | The EU rules require CVs and certifications for each tester. | EU technical standards | | Do you carry professional indemnity insurance covering misconduct and negligence? | Required in TIBER-EU; the Singapore guidelines add indemnity for legal liability. | TIBER-EU; Singapore guidelines | | Do you run background checks on all consultants? | The Singapore guidelines ask for criminal record and other checks. | Singapore guidelines | | Do you do blue team or other work for us that could create a conflict? | TIBER-EU bars current or past services that create a conflict of interest. | TIBER-EU procurement guidance | | Is threat intelligence done by a separate team from the testers? | The EU rules require the two teams to be separate. | EU technical standards | | How do you get consent before high-risk actions? | The Singapore guidelines say the provider should ask for consent first. | Singapore guidelines | | What happens if you find a real attacker or a serious flaw? | Escalation to the working group is expected. | Singapore guidelines | | How do you handle and destroy our data? | Data must be protected at rest and in motion, retained minimally and destroyed. | Singapore guidelines; CORIE | | What is in your report? May we see a sample? | Compare with the [report contents](/engagement/red-team-report/). | TIBER-EU report guidance | | How do you clean up after testing? | Deactivate command and control, remove backdoors, delete credentials. | EU technical standards | Table for: What should you ask a red team provider ## Should the provider be accredited? It depends on the scheme. CBEST requires accredited providers, with threat intelligence and penetration testing managers holding named certifications. CORIE lists certifications by role. Outside those schemes the Singapore guidelines say to consider recognized accreditations and a proven track record. In the UK, NCC Group says it achieved NCSC assurance for its Red Team services under the Cyber Adversary Simulation scheme, which is one example of a scheme-based mark. ## Should you use the same provider every time? The Singapore guidelines give both sides. Keeping a provider across exercises builds a deep understanding of the organization, as a real adversary would over years of breaches. Changing providers can offer different insights and techniques. ## Related pages - [Who offers red team services?](/services/who-offers-red-team-services/) - [Scoping a red team engagement: ten decisions to make before the start](/services/scoping-a-red-team-engagement/) - [Red team legal authorization: the letter and the law](/engagement/red-team-legal-authorization/) - [Red team services: kinds, what is included and who delivers](/services/red-team-services/) - [Who are red teamers, and how do you become one?](/red-team/who-are-red-teamers/) - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) - [Red team engagement cost: what drives the price](/services/red-team-engagement-cost/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_service_provider_procurement_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Appendix B: Provider Guide, version 2.0: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-guide-providers.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Report Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_report_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NCC Group, news item on NCSC CyAS assurance (the firm's own page): https://www.nccgroup.com/newsroom/ncc-group-achieves-ncsc-cyber-adversary-simulation-cyas-assurance-for-red-team-services/ (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/ --- # Red team engagement cost: what drives the price Buyer guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** None of the framework documents or firm pages read for this site publishes a price for a red team engagement, so none is given here. The sources do name the cost drivers: team size, number of scenarios, duration, scope, frequency and the separate cost of threat intelligence. Read 16 November 2026. ## How much does a red team engagement cost? No price appears in the sources read, so this page does not state one. Prices depend on the drivers below and are quoted by providers after scoping. The ECB gives the reason for infrequent testing: because of the resources required and costs incurred, entities are not expected to run a TIBER-EU test too often, with three-year intervals the norm. ## What drives the cost? The sources name seven drivers. The Singapore guidelines tell firms to consider the intended frequency, complexity, size of scope and duration of exercises and the cost of providers when setting a budget. - Team size: TIBER-EU needs a red team of at least three people, a manager and two testers, plus a threat intelligence team of at least two. - Number of scenarios: the EU rules require at least three scenarios for threat-led tests; CORIE ties its suggested timeframes to the number of scenarios. - Duration: at least 12 weeks of active testing for EU tests; 14 weeks for CBEST testing. - Scope: the number of critical functions and systems, and whether physical or social engineering is included. - Starting position: an assumed breach start can spend more of the time after entry. - Frequency: the Singapore guidelines recommend at least every 24 months; DORA at least every three years. - Separate costs: threat intelligence is a separate provider and report under TIBER-EU, CBEST and CORIE; a generic threat landscape report can reduce cost when the authority provides it. ## How can you keep the cost under control? Scale the scope and plan the rounds. CORIE says its suggested timeframes are intended to constrain costs and effort. The ECB says a generic threat landscape report from the authority is a cost-effective common ground for all intelligence providers. Stage the work: the Singapore guidelines say organizations should plan recurrent exercises with higher secrecy in later iterations, and some choose continuous simulation. ## Is an internal team cheaper? The sources do not compare cost. They do say internal testers must meet conditions, such as a test lead and two members employed for the preceding 12 months, and that external testers are still required every third test under DORA. See [building an internal red team](/services/building-an-internal-red-team/). ## Related pages - [Red team services: kinds, what is included and who delivers](/services/red-team-services/) - [Scoping a red team engagement: ten decisions to make before the start](/services/scoping-a-red-team-engagement/) - [Building an internal red team: build or buy](/services/building-an-internal-red-team/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) - [Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing](/scoping-sheet/) - [Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team](/services/red-team-for-financial-services/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_service_provider_procurement_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/services/red-team-engagement-cost/ --- # Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team Buyer guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Financial regulators in the EU, the UK, Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia publish red team frameworks. In the EU, identified financial entities must run threat-led penetration testing at least every three years under DORA. The frameworks table sets them side by side. Read 16 November 2026. ## Do financial firms have to do red team testing? In the EU, identified firms must. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 requires financial entities identified by the authorities to carry out threat-led penetration testing at least every three years, and the technical standards say which firms are required: for example credit institutions identified as systemically important, central securities depositories and central counterparties. Elsewhere the rule varies by regulator. The Bank of England runs CBEST when it requests it, a firm asks, or after an incident. In Australia the regulators invite firms into CORIE rounds. The [frameworks table](/frameworks/) sets out each. ## What do the regulators ask of the red team? They ask for intelligence-led tests on live systems, run by qualified providers under authority oversight. TIBER-EU, DORA and CBEST all require a threat intelligence phase before attack, separate providers and a closure phase with replay or debrief. Provider rules differ: CBEST requires accredited providers with named certifications; the EU rules set experience years, references and insurance; CORIE sets certification and experience by role. ## Is there a United States equivalent? The sources read for this site show no single regulator-published equivalent. They do show two U.S. items: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 includes a red team exercises enhancement in its penetration testing control CA-8, and CISA publishes an account of a red team assessment it ran at the request of a critical infrastructure organization. This is a statement about the pages read, not a survey of all U.S. regulators. See the U.S. row on the [frameworks table](/frameworks/). ## Can one test satisfy several regimes? Sometimes. TIBER-EU is designed for mutual recognition across EU jurisdictions, and the EU rules provide for an attestation. CBEST says it can be run across jurisdictions with other regulators. Firms that serve several regimes, such as NCC Group and NetSPI, name several frameworks on their pages. ## Related pages - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) - [8 dated items on red team frameworks and guidance](/news/) - [TIBER-EU: the European Central Bank's red team framework](/frameworks/tiber-eu/) - [DORA threat-led penetration testing: who must do it and how](/frameworks/dora-tlpt/) - [CBEST: the Bank of England's threat intelligence-led assessment](/frameworks/cbest/) - [CORIE: Australia's Cyber Operational Resilience Intelligence-led Exercises](/frameworks/corie/) - [AASE: adversarial attack simulation exercises in Singapore](/frameworks/aase/) - [Red team engagement cost: what drives the price](/services/red-team-engagement-cost/) - [Building an internal red team: build or buy](/services/building-an-internal-red-team/) ## Sources - EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554 (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, control CA-8 Penetration Testing: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026) - NCC Group, Attack Simulation page (the firm's own page): https://www.nccgroup.com/technical-assurance/attack-simulation/ (read 16 November 2026) - NetSPI, Red Team Operations page (the firm's own page): https://www.netspi.com/netspi-ptaas/red-team-operations/ (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/services/red-team-for-financial-services/ --- # Building an internal red team: build or buy Buyer guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** An internal red team is possible but comes with conditions. Under the EU rules internal testers need a test lead and at least two members employed for 12 months, with a policy on conflicts, and external testers are still needed every third test. Read 16 November 2026. ## Should you build an internal red team or buy from a provider? The sources do not recommend either. They set conditions for each. Larger firms tend to have internal specialist teams, says the Singapore guidelines, and outside providers offer independent views and different techniques; the guidelines suggest using both over time. CORIE notes that only the red team exercise requires an external provider; the purple and tabletop exercises can be done internally. ## What conditions apply to internal testers? In the EU regime, internal testers need a policy and a team. The technical standards require a policy for managing internal testers with criteria on suitability, competence and conflicts of interest, a test lead and at least two additional members who were employed by the entity or an intra-group provider for the preceding 12 months, and training in penetration and red team testing. The entity must also make sure internal testing does not weaken its general defense or resource availability during the test, and must state the use of internal testers in the initiation information and the reports. ## How independent should the red team be? Independent from what it tests. NIST SP 800-53 includes an enhancement calling for an independent penetration testing agent or team and explains that impartiality means freedom from perceived or actual conflicts of interest with the development, operation or management of the targets. The EU rules add that significant credit institutions may only use external testers, and that other entities using internal testers must contract external testers every three tests. ## How big should the team be? The smallest teams in the sources are three people. TIBER-EU requires a red team test manager and at least two testers, and CORIE a lead, a specialist and an exploit development specialist. Both allow extra members. See [who red teamers are](/red-team/who-are-red-teamers/) for the experience those roles need. ## Related pages - [Who are red teamers, and how do you become one?](/red-team/who-are-red-teamers/) - [Red team services: kinds, what is included and who delivers](/services/red-team-services/) - [Red team engagement cost: what drives the price](/services/red-team-engagement-cost/) - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [Blue team: what a blue team does and how it is tested](/blue-team/) - [Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team](/services/red-team-for-financial-services/) ## Sources - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554 (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, control CA-8 Penetration Testing: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_service_provider_procurement_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/services/building-an-internal-red-team/ --- # TIBER-EU: the European Central Bank's red team framework Framework, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** TIBER-EU is the European framework for threat intelligence-based ethical red teaming, published by the European Central Bank in May 2018 and updated in 2024. It sets how authorities, entities, threat intelligence providers and red team testers work together. The framework document read here is dated January 2025. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is TIBER-EU? TIBER-EU is a European framework for threat intelligence-based ethical red teaming. The ECB says it guides authorities, entities, threat intelligence providers and red team testers on carrying out controlled cyberattacks to test and improve the cyber resilience of entities. It was developed by the ECB with the EU national central banks and published in May 2018. It was updated in 2024 to align with the EU technical standards on threat-led penetration testing under DORA. ## Who is TIBER-EU for? It is designed for entities that provide core financial infrastructure and for national and supranational authorities, and it can be used in all critical sectors. Adoption by authorities is voluntary. The ECB lists 22 jurisdictions as having adopted it, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. The national TIBER authority decides which entities to invite and takes into account the voluntary interest entities express. ## What are the TIBER-EU phases? Three mandatory phases: preparation, testing and closure. Preparation covers notification, initiation, procurement and scoping. Testing covers threat intelligence collection and scenarios, the targeted threat intelligence report, the red team test plan and active testing. Closure covers the red and blue team reports, the replay, purple teaming, feedback and an attestation. Active red team testing lasts at least 12 weeks, and three-year intervals between tests are the norm. ## Which participants does TIBER-EU name? Five teams: the blue team, the threat intelligence provider, the red team testers, the control team in the entity, and the TIBER cyber team in the authority. - Blue team: tested without foreknowledge. - Threat intelligence provider: studies threats and does reconnaissance. - Red team testers: carry out the simulated attack. - Control team: the only people in the entity who know about the test. - TIBER cyber team: oversees the test for the authority and enables mutual recognition. ## What rules apply to providers under TIBER-EU? The procurement guidance sets minimums. A threat intelligence team needs a manager with at least five years of experience and a member with two; the provider needs three references. A red team needs a test manager with five years and at least two testers with two years each, and the provider needs five references. Both providers need relevant certifications, professional indemnity insurance covering misconduct and negligence, and no conflicting work for the entity. The two teams must be separate from each other. ## Related pages - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) - [DORA threat-led penetration testing: who must do it and how](/frameworks/dora-tlpt/) - [CBEST: the Bank of England's threat intelligence-led assessment](/frameworks/cbest/) - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) - [Purple team: what it is and who is in the room](/purple-team/) - [Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team](/services/red-team-for-financial-services/) - [CORIE: Australia's Cyber Operational Resilience Intelligence-led Exercises](/frameworks/corie/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_service_provider_procurement_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Purple Teaming Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_purple_best_practices_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Control Team Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_control_team_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/frameworks/tiber-eu/ --- # DORA threat-led penetration testing: who must do it and how Framework, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Under the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act, financial entities identified by the authorities must carry out advanced testing by means of threat-led penetration testing at least every three years. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190, adopted on 13 February 2025, sets the technical standards. Read on EUR-Lex on 16 November 2026. ## What does DORA require for threat-led penetration testing? Article 26 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 requires identified financial entities to carry out advanced testing by means of threat-led penetration testing at least every three years, and lets the competent authority raise or lower the frequency. Each test must cover several or all critical or important functions and run on live production systems. Authorities attest that the test followed the requirements, which allows mutual recognition across authorities. ## Which financial entities must do it? The authorities decide, using size, interconnection, criticality, substitutability, complexity and ICT risk. The technical standards say the authorities shall require credit institutions identified as systemically important (G-SIIs and O-SIIs, or part of such groups), payment institutions above EUR 150 billion of payment transactions in each of two years, certain e-money institutions, central securities depositories, central counterparties, certain trading venues and certain large insurers. This holds unless the assessment shows that impact, financial stability concerns or ICT risk does not justify it. Microenterprises are excluded. ## What is the timeline of a DORA TLPT? The entity must submit initiation information within three months of the authority's notification. The testers then report at least weekly during at least 12 weeks of active red team testing. The red team report is due within four weeks of the end, and the blue team report and the replay and purple session within ten weeks. The entity then has eight weeks to submit its summary report after the authority confirms the reports are complete, and eight weeks from that notice to give its remediation plan. An attestation follows. ## What rules apply to the testers and intelligence providers? The standards set experience and conduct rules. Intelligence staff need a manager with 5 years and a member with 2 years in threat intelligence; external testers need a manager with 5 years and at least two testers with 2 years each. Providers give CVs, certifications, indemnity insurance and 3 and 5 references respectively. Internal testers are allowed on conditions, but the entity must use external testers every third test, and significant credit institutions may only use external testers. At least three scenarios are required, and at most one may be non-threat-led. ## Related pages - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) - [TIBER-EU: the European Central Bank's red team framework](/frameworks/tiber-eu/) - [Building an internal red team: build or buy](/services/building-an-internal-red-team/) - [Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team](/services/red-team-for-financial-services/) - [Red team debrief: how to turn findings into fixes](/engagement/red-team-debrief/) - [Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT), defined](/glossary/threat-led-penetration-testing/) - [CBEST: the Bank of England's threat intelligence-led assessment](/frameworks/cbest/) ## Sources - EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554 (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/frameworks/dora-tlpt/ --- # CBEST: the Bank of England's threat intelligence-led assessment Framework, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** CBEST is a regulator-led, intelligence-led security testing framework run by the Bank of England with the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority. It has been in use since 2014, and the implementation guide read here is the 2024 edition. Projects run about 9 to 12 months. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is CBEST? CBEST is an intelligence-led penetration testing approach that mimics the actions of attackers intent on compromising a firm's important business services. The Bank of England says it has been part of the regulators' supervisory toolkit since 2014. The implementation guide calls CBEST a guiding framework rather than a detailed prescriptive method, and describes a "golden thread" linking the testing to the threats to the firm's activities. ## Who has to do a CBEST assessment? A CBEST should be carried out when one of three conditions holds. The regulator requests it as part of the supervisory cycle, the firm asks to do one within its own program with the regulator's agreement, or an incident has led the regulator to request one for remediation and validation. It applies to firms and financial market infrastructures. ## What are the CBEST phases? Four: initiation, threat intelligence, penetration testing and closure. Indicative durations are about 6, 10, 14 and 4 weeks, and the average project runs 9 to 12 months. Initiation scopes the assessment and procures providers. Threat intelligence produces the profiles and scenarios. Penetration testing runs the scenarios and assesses detection and response. Closure finalizes the remediation plan and debriefs the providers. ## Who does the work, and what rules apply to providers? The firm's control group, a threat intelligence service provider and a penetration testing service provider, with the regulator overseeing. The providers must be independent companies accredited for CBEST through a Bank of England process, and must also be members of CREST. The threat intelligence provider needs a CREST Certified Threat Intelligence Manager and the testing provider a CREST Certified Red Team Manager or a Cyber Scheme Red Team Manager. The control group is a select number of senior people, and its coordinator must obtain the regulator's approval for changes to the list. ## Related pages - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) - [TIBER-EU: the European Central Bank's red team framework](/frameworks/tiber-eu/) - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) - [Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team](/services/red-team-for-financial-services/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [Red team process: the phases of an engagement](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [DORA threat-led penetration testing: who must do it and how](/frameworks/dora-tlpt/) - [AASE: adversarial attack simulation exercises in Singapore](/frameworks/aase/) ## Sources - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/frameworks/cbest/ --- # AASE: adversarial attack simulation exercises in Singapore Framework, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** AASE is the red team method for Singapore's financial industry, set out in guidelines from the Association of Banks in Singapore (version 1 in 2018, current edition September 2024). The Monetary Authority of Singapore's January 2021 guidelines say a firm should perform such an exercise. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is AASE? AASE stands for adversarial attack simulation exercises. The Association of Banks in Singapore guidelines set out the method for the financial industry, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore's Technology Risk Management Guidelines of January 2021 say a financial institution should perform an adversarial attack simulation exercise to test its cyber defense and response plan. The MAS guidelines add that the objectives, scope and rules of engagement should be defined first and the exercise run in a controlled way under close supervision. The detailed method is an industry guideline, not a regulator rule. ## What are the AASE phases? Five: planning, attack preparation, attack execution, exercise closure and post-exercise actions. Planning defines goals, scope and parameters, risk management, provider selection, concessions and communications. Execution uses a test and halt model in which the exercise director can proceed, pause or end. Closure covers clean-up, reconciliation, an attack and defense joint replay and the reports. ## How often and how long? The guidelines recommend an exercise at least once every 24 months, with the option of every 12 months, chosen on risk. A large institution may run a cycle of four to six months for complex scenarios, including attack modeling. Some choose continuous simulation, and exercises can be open-ended until goals are met. ## What does AASE say about providers? Providers should give assurance on methodology, data handling, criminal background checks for consultants, and adequate insurance and indemnity. Reputation, experience, references and recognized accreditations count. The guidelines list technical areas such as cloud, DevOps, Internet of Things and operational technology, and defense evasion. The provider should ask for consent before high-risk actions and report signs of a real attack at the same time. ## Related pages - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) - [Red team vs penetration testing: goals, scope and secrecy](/compare/red-team-vs-penetration-testing/) - [Emergency stop and deconfliction in a red team test](/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [Red team legal authorization: the letter and the law](/engagement/red-team-legal-authorization/) - [Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team](/services/red-team-for-financial-services/) - [CBEST: the Bank of England's threat intelligence-led assessment](/frameworks/cbest/) - [CORIE: Australia's Cyber Operational Resilience Intelligence-led Exercises](/frameworks/corie/) ## Sources - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Monetary Authority of Singapore, Technology Risk Management Guidelines, January 2021: https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/mas/regulations-and-financial-stability/regulatory-and-supervisory-framework/risk-management/trm-guidelines-18-january-2021.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/frameworks/aase/ --- # CORIE: Australia's Cyber Operational Resilience Intelligence-led Exercises Framework, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** CORIE is a program of the Australian Council of Financial Regulators that tests the cyber resilience of financial institutions with threat intelligence-led red team exercises. It was launched in December 2020, and version 2.0 of the framework was released in July 2022. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is CORIE? CORIE is the Cyber Operational Resilience Intelligence-led Exercises framework. The Council of Financial Regulators released it in December 2020 to test and demonstrate the cyber maturity and resilience of institutions in the Australian financial services industry, and updated it to version 2.0 on 29 July 2022 after a pilot. The program includes a red team exercise, a replay (purple) exercise and a tabletop crisis simulation. Only the red team exercise requires an external provider. ## Who takes part in CORIE? Financial institutions, including financial market infrastructure, invited by the regulators. Each round the Council invites a new group, and the choice follows a risk-based approach. Procurement of providers is the institution's own responsibility. ## How is a CORIE red team exercise run? In six stages across three phases. The preparation phase has engagement and scoping, then procurement. The test phase has attack preparation with threat intelligence, then attack execution by the red team. The closure phase has reporting and remediation planning, then replay attacks. The closure phase typically takes five weeks. The control group, formerly called the white team, oversees the exercise, and the blue team is expected to have no prior knowledge. ## What rules apply to CORIE providers? A provider guide sets minimum standards. A threat intelligence lead needs CREST CCTIM or GIAC GCTI and three years of intelligence experience, and an analyst one year. A red team lead needs set certifications and seven years of red teaming or penetration testing; the team needs at least a lead, a specialist and an exploit development specialist. Providers need not be located in Australia, though those with a significant presence there are preferred. ## Related pages - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) - [Purple team: what it is and who is in the room](/purple-team/) - [Who are red teamers, and how do you become one?](/red-team/who-are-red-teamers/) - [Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team](/services/red-team-for-financial-services/) - [TIBER-EU: the European Central Bank's red team framework](/frameworks/tiber-eu/) - [AASE: adversarial attack simulation exercises in Singapore](/frameworks/aase/) ## Sources - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Appendix B: Provider Guide, version 2.0: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-guide-providers.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, media release "Revised CORIE framework and rollout", 29 July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/news/2022/mr-22-03.html (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, Cyber Security: https://www.cfr.gov.au/cfr-program/systemic-risks-and-vulnerabilities/cyber-security.html (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/frameworks/corie/ --- # Red team vs blue team: what each does and how an engagement runs Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A red team plays the attacker, a blue team defends, and a white team referees a covert test. A purple team exercise has red and blue work together to fix detections. This site covers each role, the phases of an engagement, red team versus penetration test, and scoping, with every fact sourced. Read 16 November 2026. ## What is the difference between a red team, a blue team and a purple team? A red team is a group authorized to emulate an attacker against an organization. A blue team is the group that defends it, and a purple team exercise brings the two together so detections are tested and improved as the techniques run. NIST, the ECB and the Singapore bank guidelines are the sources for the definitions. The [three-way comparison](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team-vs-purple-team/) sets them side by side, and the [red team vs penetration testing page](/compare/red-team-vs-penetration-testing/) explains why a red team test is not a longer penetration test. ## Where should you start? Start with the question you have. To commission a test, fill in the [scoping sheet](/scoping-sheet/) and read [what to ask a provider](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/). If a regulator is involved, read the [frameworks table](/frameworks/). To understand the roles, read [the red team page](/red-team/) first. ## Teams - [Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers](/red-team/) - [What does a red team do?](/red-team/what-does-a-red-team-do/) - [Who are red teamers, and how do you become one?](/red-team/who-are-red-teamers/) - [Blue team: what a blue team does and how it is tested](/blue-team/) - [Blue team report template and what it must contain](/blue-team/blue-team-report-template/) - [Purple team: what it is and who is in the room](/purple-team/) - [Purple team exercise: how it runs, step by step](/purple-team/purple-team-exercise/) ## Comparisons - [Red team vs blue team: roles, goals and how they meet](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team/) - [Red team vs blue team vs purple team: a three-way table](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team-vs-purple-team/) - [Red team vs penetration testing: goals, scope and secrecy](/compare/red-team-vs-penetration-testing/) - [Adversary simulation vs adversary emulation](/compare/adversary-simulation-vs-emulation/) - [MITRE ATT&CK and adversary emulation plans for red teams](/adversary/mitre-attack-and-emulation-plans/) ## How an engagement runs - [Red team process: the phases of an engagement](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [Red team steps: ten steps with the output of each](/engagement/red-team-steps/) - [Red team rules of engagement: what they cover and a template](/engagement/red-team-rules-of-engagement/) - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) - [Emergency stop and deconfliction in a red team test](/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/) - [Red team legal authorization: the letter and the law](/engagement/red-team-legal-authorization/) - [Assumed breach red team: starting from inside](/engagement/assumed-breach-red-team/) - [Red team report: what it must contain, with a template](/engagement/red-team-report/) - [Red team example: the CISA red team assessment of 2022](/engagement/red-team-example/) - [Red team debrief: how to turn findings into fixes](/engagement/red-team-debrief/) ## Buying red team services - [Red team services: kinds, what is included and who delivers](/services/red-team-services/) - [Red team assessment: what it is, how it is done and what you get](/services/red-team-assessment/) - [Scoping a red team engagement: ten decisions to make before the start](/services/scoping-a-red-team-engagement/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [Red team engagement cost: what drives the price](/services/red-team-engagement-cost/) - [Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team](/services/red-team-for-financial-services/) - [Building an internal red team: build or buy](/services/building-an-internal-red-team/) - [Who offers red team services?](/services/who-offers-red-team-services/) ## Two original works - [Engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions, printable, Word, CSV and JSON](/scoping-sheet/) - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE, CORIE](/frameworks/) - [Glossary: 25 terms with a sourced example](/glossary/) - [FAQ: 15 questions answered](/faq/) - [Method: how facts are sourced](/method/) ## Sources - NIST CSRC Glossary, red team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/red_team (read 16 November 2026) - NIST CSRC Glossary, blue team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/blue_team (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/ --- # Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing Scoping sheet, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The scoping sheet has 50 questions to answer before a red team or purple team engagement, in ten sections from objectives to reporting and retest. Each has a blank answer column, a reason it matters and a source with its read date. It prints from this page and downloads as Word, CSV and JSON. Edition 16 November 2026. ## How do I use this scoping sheet? Fill it in with your sponsor and white cell before a provider starts. Each of the 50 questions has a blank answer column, a reason it matters and the source it comes from, with the date the source was read. Print this page, or download the sheet as Word, CSV or JSON. The sheet follows the order a scoping meeting takes: objectives, crown jewels, threat profile, scope and exclusions, rules of engagement, emergency stop, legal authorization, timing, white cell contacts, and reporting and retest. [How the sheet was made](/scoping-sheet/method/) lists the sources. ## Downloads Word (.docx, 10 KB): [download](/downloads/red-team-scoping-sheet.docx). Data: [CSV](/datasets/red-team-scoping-sheet.csv) and [JSON](/datasets/red-team-scoping-sheet.json), CC BY 4.0. **Cite this.** Red Team vs Blue Team, "Engagement Scoping Sheet", edition 16 November 2026, https://redteamvsblueteam.com/scoping-sheet/. Data: [CSV](/datasets/red-team-scoping-sheet.csv) and [JSON](/datasets/red-team-scoping-sheet.json). ## 1. Objectives State what the engagement is meant to teach you before any scope is drawn. | No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | What do you want to learn from this engagement, in one sentence? | | TIBER-EU says the outcome is not a pass or fail. The test is meant to show strengths and weaknesses and to produce learning, so the goal is a question your team wants answered. | [ECB, What is TIBER-EU?](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 2 | Which capabilities are being tested: prevention, detection, response, or all three? | | TIBER-EU describes intelligence-led red team testing as a way to test protection, detection and response capabilities. Naming which ones you want tested decides who must stay unaware and who can be told. | [ECB, TIBER-EU Framework](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 3 | Is this a covert red team test, a purple team exercise, or an assumed breach start? | | The Singapore AASE guidelines separate covert red team exercises from purple team exercises, in which red and blue work together to improve detection. The choice changes who is told and when. | [ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024](https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 4 | Do the testers start with some knowledge of your environment, or none? | | Mandiant says its Red Team Assessment begins by jointly deciding whether the red team should have some or no knowledge of the environment. The NCSC lists open box and closed box as ways to set the starting knowledge. | [Mandiant, Red Team Assessment datasheet](https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/ds-red-team-operations-en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 5 | Who is the executive sponsor and who owns the engagement day to day? | | CBEST names an executive sponsor accountable for delivery and a control group coordinator for day-to-day work. Without both, decisions stall during the test. | [Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide), read 16 Nov 2026 | Objectives: fields 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ## 2. Crown jewels and critical functions Name the business functions an attacker would want, and the systems, people and processes behind them. | No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 6 | Which critical functions or business services are in scope, and why were they chosen? | | The TIBER-EU scope document must list all critical or important functions the entity identified and explain why each is in or out of scope. | [ECB, TIBER-EU scope specification guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_scope_specification_document_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 7 | Which systems, people and processes support each function? | | TIBER-EU requires the identified ICT systems that support each function. The framework tests people, processes and technology, not only machines. | [ECB, TIBER-EU scope specification guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_scope_specification_document_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 8 | Which of those systems are outsourced, to whom, and in which countries are they used? | | The TIBER-EU scope document asks, for each system, whether it is outsourced, the name of the third-party provider and the jurisdictions in which it is used. | [ECB, TIBER-EU scope specification guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_scope_specification_document_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 9 | Which functions are left out of scope, and for what reason? | | Where a function is not tested, the TIBER-EU scope document requires the reasons to be written down. A recorded reason keeps later readers from assuming the function was covered. | [ECB, TIBER-EU scope specification guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_scope_specification_document_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 10 | What are the flags: the specific targets the testers must reach, such as a data set or a control? | | TIBER-EU defines flags as the objectives to be reached, each tied to confidentiality, integrity or availability. The Singapore guidelines use a concrete goal such as a large unauthorized funds transfer as an example. | [ECB, TIBER-EU scope specification guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_scope_specification_document_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 11 | What must happen for each flag to count as reached? | | The TIBER-EU scope guidance asks for the testing activity that demonstrates compromise. A flag with no stated proof is argued about at the end. | [ECB, TIBER-EU scope specification guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_scope_specification_document_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | Crown jewels and critical functions: fields 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 ## 3. Threat profile Say who would attack you and how, so the scenarios are not guesses. | No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 12 | Which threat actors are most likely to target you, and what evidence supports that? | | CBEST asks the threat intelligence provider for evidentially supported profiles of actors that could reasonably be expected to target the firm. CORIE asks the provider to identify the primary adversaries. | [Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 13 | Who will supply the threat intelligence, from which sources, and who is kept separate from the red team? | | TIBER-EU and the EU technical standards require the threat intelligence staff to be separate from, and not report to, the staff of the same provider who act as red team testers. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 14 | How many attack scenarios will be run, and what does each simulate? | | The EU technical standards for threat-led penetration testing require the control team lead to select at least three scenarios, and allow at most one of them to be non-threat-led. Other programs set their own numbers. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 15 | Is a malicious insider, a privileged account or a supplier compromise part of any scenario? | | The Bank of England says CBEST results show the value of simulating highly privileged internal attackers, such as malicious insiders and supply chain attacks, because they test controls inside the network rather than at the perimeter. | [Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide), read 16 Nov 2026 | Threat profile: fields 12, 13, 14, 15 ## 4. Scope and exclusions Draw the boundary of what testers may touch, and list what they may not. | No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 16 | Will testing run on live production systems, or on a replica? | | The Singapore guidelines say the exercise should run against the live environment, and that a non-production run should be an exception that is documented with reasons in the report. | [ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024](https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 17 | Which networks, sites, cloud tenants, applications and address ranges are in scope? | | The NIST SP 800-115 rules of engagement template asks for the systems and networks to be tested, with authorized and unauthorized addresses where appropriate. | [NIST SP 800-115](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 18 | Which systems are on the exclude list, including any "no-fly zones"? | | NIST SP 800-115 calls the list of systems not authorized for testing the exclude list. The Singapore guidelines give no-fly zones as areas designated off limits because the risk of testing them is too high. | [NIST SP 800-115](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 19 | Is social engineering allowed, against whom, and with what ethical limits? | | The TIBER-EU red team test plan must set ethical boundaries for social engineering and say how the privacy of the people involved is safeguarded. | [ECB, TIBER-EU red team test plan guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_plan_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 20 | Is physical access testing in scope, and what proof will guards or police be shown? | | NIST SP 800-115 says guards should be made aware of how to verify tester activity, and the rules of engagement should include a signed form that testers can show to onsite security or law enforcement. | [NIST SP 800-115](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 21 | Which tactics, tools and malware are allowed, and which are banned? | | The TIBER-EU red team test plan lists the tactics, techniques and procedures allowed and not allowed. NIST SP 800-115 asks for allowable and unallowable activities and any files authorized to be installed. | [ECB, TIBER-EU red team test plan guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_plan_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 22 | What data may testers see, copy and keep, and how is it destroyed? | | The Singapore guidelines ask for data handling rules before the exercise: limited access, a redacted sample to prove a goal was reached, and secure disposal afterward. NIST SP 800-115 says test results are sensitive. | [ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024](https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 23 | Which leg-ups or concessions will your team provide if testers stall, and by when? | | TIBER-EU defines a leg-up as assistance or information the control team gives so an attack path can continue. The plan states the leg-ups and their deadlines, and each one used is logged. | [ECB, TIBER-EU red team test plan guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_plan_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | Scope and exclusions: fields 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 ## 5. Rules of engagement Set the limits, channels and approvals for the testing period. | No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 24 | Who may approve a change to scope, timeline, target systems or flags during the test? | | The EU technical standards require the control team lead and the test managers to approve any change to the red team test plan after it is approved. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 25 | Which secure channels will be used, and what is the test code name? | | The EU technical standards ask for the communication channels and a code name for the test. TIBER-EU says participants should refer to the test by code name only, to limit harm if a message leaks. | [ECB, TIBER-EU red team test plan guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_plan_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 26 | How often will testers report progress, and to whom? | | The EU technical standards require the testers to report at least weekly to the control team and test managers during active testing. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 27 | Which actions need prior consent because the risk is high? | | The Singapore guidelines say the provider should ask for consent before any action with a high potential risk and consequence, and should report signs of a real attack that is happening at the same time. | [ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024](https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | Rules of engagement: fields 24, 25, 26, 27 ## 6. Emergency stop Decide in advance who can halt the test and what happens when something goes wrong. | No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 28 | Who can suspend or halt the test, and on what trigger? | | TIBER-EU says the control team may at any time order a temporary or complete halt if there are concerns about damage to a system. The Singapore guidelines give the exercise director the power to proceed, pause or end. | [ECB, TIBER-EU Framework](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 29 | What happens if testers find a serious vulnerability or evidence that someone else is already inside? | | The Singapore guidelines say a high-risk finding goes to the working group at once, and evidence of a prior compromise should be handled as a real incident before the exercise continues. | [ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024](https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 30 | What happens when your blue team detects the testers? | | The EU technical standards ask the control team to propose measures that let the test continue while keeping it secret. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 31 | Who is on the emergency call tree, and at what hours can they be reached? | | NIST SP 800-115 asks for criteria for halting the test and the organization's incident response call tree in a quick-reference format, plus a process for resuming testing. | [NIST SP 800-115](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 32 | How will the environment be returned to a clean state when testing ends? | | The EU technical standards list restoration steps for testers: deactivate command and control, set scope and date kill switches, remove backdoors and malware, and securely delete compromised credentials. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | Emergency stop: fields 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 ## 7. Legal authorization Put the permission in writing and check the law before testers start. | No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 33 | Who signs the authorization, and what does the letter say? | | The Singapore guidelines describe a letter of engagement signed by the sponsoring executive or senior management. NIST SP 800-115 expects the test team lead and senior management to sign the rules of engagement. | [ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024](https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 34 | Can the letter prove who the testers are if staff or police stop them? | | The Singapore guidelines say the letter should explain how to authenticate the testers, so they can show their intent if security staff apprehend them. | [ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024](https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 35 | Which third parties (cloud, managed services, software vendors) must consent or take part? | | CBEST says third parties may need to join the control group where important systems are outsourced. Under DORA, the financial entity keeps full responsibility when providers are in scope. | [Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 36 | Which laws apply in each country where you test, and has counsel reviewed the planned activities? | | TIBER-EU lists activities such as gathering employee account data and using ruses, and says a thorough legal analysis should be done with legal expertise. Contractual consent mitigates many concerns but not all. | [ECB, TIBER-EU Framework](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 37 | What do the contract, liability cover, confidentiality terms and background checks say? | | TIBER-EU requires professional indemnity insurance for the provider. The Singapore guidelines add criminal background checks for consultants, a confidentiality agreement and legal liability stated in the scope of work. | [ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024](https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | Legal authorization: fields 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 ## 8. Timing Fix the duration, the blackout dates and the repeat cycle. | No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 38 | How long will active testing run? | | The EU technical standards set at least 12 weeks of active red team testing for threat-led penetration testing. CBEST gives about 14 weeks for its penetration testing phase, and the Singapore guidelines give 4 to 6 months for complex scenarios at a large firm. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 39 | Which dates and hours are off limits because of change freezes or peak business periods? | | The Singapore guidelines advise reviewing planned system changes with change management, because major changes raise the risk of unforeseen impact. NIST SP 800-115 notes testing may be better at off-peak hours. | [ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024](https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 40 | When will you run the next engagement? | | TIBER-EU says three-year intervals are the norm. DORA requires threat-led penetration testing at least every three years for entities identified under it. The Singapore guidelines recommend at least every 24 months. | [ECB, TIBER-EU Framework](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | Timing: fields 38, 39, 40 ## 9. White cell contacts Name the small group that knows about the test and runs it from your side. | No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 41 | Who is the control team lead (white cell lead), and who is the deputy? | | The EU technical standards require a control team lead responsible for day-to-day management. NIST calls the group that referees an engagement the white team. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 42 | Who else is in the white cell, and what is the need-to-know rule? | | TIBER-EU says the control team should be as small as possible, with skills, business knowledge and authority. The EU technical standards limit information about the test to a need-to-know basis. | [ECB, TIBER-EU control team guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_control_team_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 43 | Does anyone in the blue team know about the test, and who decided? | | The EU technical standards require the control team to consult the test managers before involving any blue team member. CORIE allows a senior blue team manager in the control group if separation is guaranteed. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 44 | Who is the provider's red team manager and deputy, and how can each be reached at any hour? | | The TIBER-EU test plan guidance says a red team manager and a deputy are always appointed, that the manager is the single point of contact, and that contact details for all testers are disclosed. | [ECB, TIBER-EU red team test plan guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_plan_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | White cell contacts: fields 41, 42, 43, 44 ## 10. Reporting and retest Agree the reports, the replay and the way fixes are checked. | No. | Question | Your answer | Why it matters | Source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 45 | Which reports will be delivered, by whom and by when? | | Under the EU technical standards the testers deliver a red team test report within 4 weeks of the end of active testing, and the blue team delivers its report within 10 weeks. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 46 | What must the red team report contain? | | The TIBER-EU red team report must cover flags reached and not reached, attack paths, techniques used, deviations from the plan, leg-ups granted, blue team actions the testers know of, findings and remediation priority. | [ECB, TIBER-EU red team test report guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_report_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 47 | Will there be a plain-language summary for senior management or the board? | | The TIBER-EU red team report guidance asks for a short narrative in lay terms for senior management and governance bodies such as a board of directors. | [ECB, TIBER-EU red team test report guidance](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_report_guidance_2025.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 48 | When will the red and blue teams replay the engagement together? | | The EU technical standards require a replay of the offensive and defensive actions, and a purple teaming exercise, no later than 10 weeks after active testing ends. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 49 | Who owns each fix, and by what date? | | The EU technical standards require a remediation plan with, for each finding, the measures, their priority and expected completion, a root cause analysis, and the staff or functions responsible. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 50 | How will you check later that a fix worked? | | None of the sources read for this sheet sets a retest step, so this field asks you to decide one. CBEST has the regulator supervise execution of the remediation plan, which is one way to keep a check in place. | [Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide), read 16 Nov 2026 | Reporting and retest: fields 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 ## Related pages - [Scoping a red team engagement: ten decisions to make before the start](/services/scoping-a-red-team-engagement/) - [Red team rules of engagement: what they cover and a template](/engagement/red-team-rules-of-engagement/) - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) - [Emergency stop and deconfliction in a red team test](/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/) - [Red team legal authorization: the letter and the law](/engagement/red-team-legal-authorization/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Mandiant, Red Team Assessment datasheet (the firm's own document): https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/ds-red-team-operations-en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Scope Specification Document Guidance, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_scope_specification_document_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Plan Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_plan_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Control Team Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_control_team_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Report Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_report_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/scoping-sheet/ --- # How the red team scoping sheet was made Method, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Every question on the scoping sheet comes from a document the editors read: a framework, a regulation or a standard, or a firm page. Each question lists why it matters and the source address with its read date. The Word file is generated from the same data as the page. Edition 16 November 2026. ## How were the scoping questions chosen? The questions were chosen from the documents that tell a tested organization what to decide before testing: the ECB's TIBER-EU scope, test plan and report guidance, the EU technical standards for threat-led penetration testing, the Bank of England's CBEST guide, the Singapore AASE guidelines, NIST SP 800-115 and its rules of engagement template, and the CORIE framework. A question was kept only if a page read names the decision. The result is 50 questions in ten sections: Objectives (5), Crown jewels and critical functions (6), Threat profile (4), Scope and exclusions (8), Rules of engagement (4), Emergency stop (5), Legal authorization (5), Timing (3), White cell contacts (4), Reporting and retest (6). ## How is each question sourced? Each question has one main source, shown in the last column of the sheet with its address and read date. The "why it matters" text is our paraphrase of that source. Where the sources are for regulated tests, such as the 12-week minimum, the text says so, and the buyer outside those schemes may choose differently. ## What is missing from the sheet? The sheet asks how fixes will be checked later, but no source read sets a retest rule, so that field asks the buyer to decide and says why. The sheet does not cover tabletop exercises, cyber ranges or automated attack tools, which this site leaves to other sources. ## How is the Word file made? A small Python script, tools/make_docx.py, reads the same JSON as the page and writes an Office Open XML file with the Python zipfile module. It lays the sheet out in landscape, one table per section, with the answer column blank. The CSV and JSON files are written by the site build from the same rows. **Cite this.** Red Team vs Blue Team, "Engagement Scoping Sheet", edition 16 November 2026. Data: [CSV](/datasets/red-team-scoping-sheet.csv), [JSON](/datasets/red-team-scoping-sheet.json). ## Related pages - [How Red Team vs Blue Team sources and writes its pages](/method/) - [How the red team frameworks table was read](/frameworks/method/) - [Scoping a red team engagement: ten decisions to make before the start](/services/scoping-a-red-team-engagement/) - [25 red team terms, each with a sourced example](/glossary/) - [15 questions about red teams, answered](/faq/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Mandiant, Red Team Assessment datasheet (the firm's own document): https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/ds-red-team-operations-en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Scope Specification Document Guidance, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_scope_specification_document_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Plan Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_plan_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Control Team Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_control_team_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Report Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_report_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/scoping-sheet/method/ --- # Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE Frameworks table, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Regulators in the EU, the UK, Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia publish red team frameworks for financial firms: TIBER-EU, DORA threat-led penetration testing, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE. The tables give who must do each, provider rules, phases, timing, and the source and read date. Where a page did not say, the cell says so. Edition 16 November 2026. ## Which regulators publish red team frameworks? Central banks and financial regulators in the EU, the UK, Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia publish them. The European Central Bank publishes TIBER-EU, the European Union sets threat-led penetration testing rules in DORA and its technical standards, the Bank of England runs CBEST, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority sets iCAST, Singapore has the AASE guidelines, and the Australian Council of Financial Regulators runs CORIE. The first table shows who each framework is for. The second shows how it runs. Names link to a page on each framework where one exists. | Framework | Owner or regulator | Region and sector | Year | Status | Who must do it | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [TIBER-EU](/frameworks/tiber-eu/) | European Central Bank, with the national central banks of the EU | European Union; Financial entities providing core financial infrastructure; usable in all critical sectors | Published May 2018; updated 2024; current framework document dated January 2025 | Adoption by authorities is voluntary; the framework can also serve as operational guidance for DORA threat-led penetration testing | Entities invited by the national or European TIBER authority, taking voluntary interest into account | | [DORA threat-led penetration testing (TLPT)](/frameworks/dora-tlpt/) | European Union: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 | European Union; Financial entities identified by the authorities, other than microenterprises | Regulation of 14 December 2022; technical standards of 13 February 2025 | Mandatory for identified entities | Financial entities identified by the TLPT authority using size, interconnection, criticality and ICT risk criteria; significant credit institutions must use external testers | | [CBEST](/frameworks/cbest/) | Bank of England, with the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority | United Kingdom; Firms and financial market infrastructures | In use since 2014; implementation guide 2024 edition | Regulator-led; run when requested in the supervisory cycle, when a firm asks, or after an incident | Firms and market infrastructures selected by the PRA and FCA, or those that ask with the regulator's agreement | | iCAST (Intelligence-led Cyber Attack Simulation Testing), part of C-RAF 2.0 | Hong Kong Monetary Authority | Hong Kong; Authorized institutions (banks) | Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative launched 2016; version 2.0 effective 1 January 2021 | Set out in a circular to all authorized institutions with an implementation timeline | Authorized institutions whose inherent risk level is assessed as medium or high | | [AASE (Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercises)](/frameworks/aase/) | Association of Banks in Singapore (industry guidelines); referred to by the Monetary Authority of Singapore in its Technology Risk Management Guidelines | Singapore; Financial institutions | Industry guidelines version 1 November 2018; current edition September 2024; MAS guidelines January 2021 | MAS guidelines say a financial institution should perform an adversarial attack simulation exercise; the detailed method is an industry guideline | Financial institutions, who choose the frequency by risk | | [CORIE (Cyber Operational Resilience Intelligence-led Exercises)](/frameworks/corie/) | Council of Financial Regulators (APRA, ASIC, Reserve Bank of Australia, Treasury) | Australia; Financial institutions, including financial market infrastructure | Launched December 2020; version 2.0 July 2022 | Program run in rounds; participants invited by the regulators | Financial institutions invited by the Council of Financial Regulators in each round, chosen on a risk basis | | United States: no single regulator-published equivalent found in the sources read | Not applicable | United States; Not applicable | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (control CA-8(2)); CISA advisory of 28 February 2023 | The sources read describe a federal security control and an agency service, not a sector-wide program | NIST SP 800-53 lets the organization define its red team exercises. CISA says it ran its red team assessment at the request of a critical infrastructure organization | Who each framework applies to | Framework | Threat intelligence provider rules | Red team provider rules | Phases | Timing and frequency | Source and read date | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | TIBER-EU | At least one threat intelligence manager (5 years of experience) and one more team member (2 years); 3 references; indemnity insurance; no conflict of interest; separate from the red team staff | A red team test manager (5 years of experience) and at least two testers (2 years each); 5 references; indemnity insurance; combined participation in at least 5 prior assignments | Preparation, testing (threat intelligence, then red team testing) and closure | Active red team testing at least 12 weeks; closure in parts of up to 10 and 8 weeks plus the authority's assessment time; three-year intervals are the norm | [ECB, What is TIBER-EU?](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html), read 16 Nov 2026 | | DORA threat-led penetration testing | Manager with 5 years in threat intelligence and one more member with 2 years; 3 references; CVs and certifications; indemnity insurance; no blue team or conflicting work | External testers: manager with 5 years and two testers with 2 years each; 5 references; indemnity insurance; internal testers allowed under set conditions, with external testers every third test | Preparation, testing (threat intelligence, then red team test), closure, remediation plan and attestation | At least every 3 years (the authority may raise or lower it); active red team testing at least 12 weeks; red team report within 4 weeks; blue team report and replay within 10 weeks | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | CBEST | Independent company accredited for CBEST; manager holding CREST Certified Threat Intelligence Manager | Independent company accredited for CBEST; manager holding CREST Certified Red Team Manager or Cyber Scheme Red Team Manager | Initiation, threat intelligence, penetration testing, closure | About 9 to 12 months in all; indicative phases of 6, 10, 14 and 4 weeks | [Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide), read 16 Nov 2026 | | iCAST | Not stated in the pages read | Not stated in the pages read | Not stated in the pages read | iCAST completion deadlines by group: end-June 2022 (Group 1), end-March 2023 (Group 2), end-December 2023 (Group 3) | [HKMA circular, CFI 2.0](https://brdr.hkma.gov.hk/eng/doc-ldg/docId/getPdf/20201103-1-EN/20201103-1-EN.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | AASE | Not stated in the pages read | Seek assurance on methodology, data handling, criminal background checks, insurance and indemnity; consider reputation, references and recognized accreditations | Planning, attack preparation, attack execution, exercise closure, post-exercise actions | Recommended at least every 24 months; large firms may run a 4 to 6 month cycle for complex scenarios | [ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024](https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | CORIE | Lead with CREST CCTIM or GIAC GCTI and 3 years of experience; analyst with 1 year; legal and ethical intelligence gathering, including from the dark web | Red team lead with 7 years of red teaming or penetration testing and set certifications; team of at least a lead, a specialist and an exploit development specialist | Preparation, test and closure (six stages), then a replay (purple) exercise | Closure phase typically 5 weeks; overall length depends on the number of scenarios | [CFR, CORIE Framework v2.0](https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | United States: no single regulator-published equivalent found in the sources read | Not stated in the pages read | Not stated in the pages read | CISA describes Phase I (gain and keep persistent access while avoiding detection) and Phase II (try to trigger a security response) | Not stated in the pages read | [CISA advisory AA23-059A](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a), read 16 Nov 2026 | How each framework runs ## What is iCAST in Hong Kong? iCAST is the Intelligence-led Cyber Attack Simulation Testing part of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority's Cyber Resilience Assessment Framework, itself one pillar of the Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative launched in 2016. The HKMA circular of 3 November 2020 introduced version 2.0, effective 1 January 2021. The circular applies iCAST to authorized institutions whose inherent risk level is assessed as medium or high, and sets completion dates by group: end-June 2022 for Group 1, end-March 2023 for Group 2 and end-December 2023 for Group 3. The pages read do not state provider rules or phases, so those cells say so. The HKMA press release says all the banks that responded found iCAST helpful in preparing for cyber attacks. ## Is there a United States equivalent? The sources read for this table show no single regulator-published equivalent in the United States. They do show two items: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 lists red team exercises as a control enhancement (CA-8(2)) that an organization defines for itself, and CISA's advisory AA23-059A reports a red team assessment CISA ran at the request of a critical infrastructure organization. This is a statement about the pages read on 16 November 2026, not a survey of every U.S. regulator. ## Which frameworks could not be read? FEER (Financial Entities Ethical Red-Teaming Framework), Saudi Central Bank: The Saudi Central Bank address for the framework document returned an error page on 16 November 2026, so no field was read and no row is given. It is left out of the table until a source can be read. ## How do these frameworks fit together? For the process common to these frameworks see [the red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/). For what to ask providers see [what to ask a red team provider](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/). **Cite this.** Red Team vs Blue Team, "Red Team Frameworks by Regulator", edition 16 November 2026, https://redteamvsblueteam.com/frameworks/. Data: [CSV](/datasets/red-team-frameworks-by-regulator.csv) and [JSON](/datasets/red-team-frameworks-by-regulator.json). ## Related pages - [Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team](/services/red-team-for-financial-services/) - [Red team process: the phases of an engagement](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [8 dated items on red team frameworks and guidance](/news/) - [Purple team: what it is and who is in the room](/purple-team/) - [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_service_provider_procurement_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554 (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - Hong Kong Monetary Authority, circular "Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative 2.0", 3 November 2020: https://brdr.hkma.gov.hk/eng/doc-ldg/docId/getPdf/20201103-1-EN/20201103-1-EN.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Hong Kong Monetary Authority, press release "HKMA launches Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative 2.0", 3 November 2020: https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2020/11/20201103-4/ (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Monetary Authority of Singapore, Technology Risk Management Guidelines, January 2021: https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/mas/regulations-and-financial-stability/regulatory-and-supervisory-framework/risk-management/trm-guidelines-18-january-2021.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Appendix B: Provider Guide, version 2.0: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-guide-providers.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, media release "Revised CORIE framework and rollout", 29 July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/news/2022/mr-22-03.html (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, control CA-8 Penetration Testing: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/frameworks/ --- # How the red team frameworks table was read Method, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Each framework row was read from the regulator's own document on 16 November 2026: the ECB, EUR-Lex, the Bank of England, the HKMA, the Association of Banks in Singapore with the MAS, and the Australian Council of Financial Regulators. A field appears only if the page said it. Gaps are marked, and one framework could not be read. ## Which documents were read for each row? TIBER-EU: the ECB overview page, the framework document dated January 2025 and the procurement guidance. DORA: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 on EUR-Lex. CBEST: the Bank of England implementation guide, 2024 edition. iCAST: the HKMA circular and press release of 3 November 2020. AASE: the Association of Banks in Singapore guidelines of September 2024 and the MAS Technology Risk Management Guidelines of January 2021. CORIE: the Council of Financial Regulators framework, provider guide and media release. ## How were fields filled in? A field was filled in only from the pages read. Where a page was read and did not give a fact, the cell says "Not stated in the pages read". Where a page gave a summary, the table gives the summary and the page gives the detail. Years are the years stated in the documents. ## What does the table not claim? It does not claim to be a complete list of the world's frameworks. National TIBER implementations such as TIBER-DE or TIBER-FR are not listed separately. The AASE row notes that the detailed method is an industry guideline, with the MAS guidelines referring to it. The United States row is a statement about the pages read. FEER at the Saudi Central Bank is not listed because its document could not be read. ## How often is it updated? Each row carries the date it was read. When a regulator publishes a new edition, the row is read again, the date changes and the change is listed on the [corrections page](/corrections/). **Cite this.** Red Team vs Blue Team, "Red Team Frameworks by Regulator", edition 16 November 2026. Data: [CSV](/datasets/red-team-frameworks-by-regulator.csv), [JSON](/datasets/red-team-frameworks-by-regulator.json). ## Related pages - [How Red Team vs Blue Team sources and writes its pages](/method/) - [How the red team scoping sheet was made](/scoping-sheet/method/) - [Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team](/services/red-team-for-financial-services/) - [25 red team terms, each with a sourced example](/glossary/) - [15 questions about red teams, answered](/faq/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_service_provider_procurement_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554 (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - Hong Kong Monetary Authority, circular "Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative 2.0", 3 November 2020: https://brdr.hkma.gov.hk/eng/doc-ldg/docId/getPdf/20201103-1-EN/20201103-1-EN.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Hong Kong Monetary Authority, press release "HKMA launches Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative 2.0", 3 November 2020: https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2020/11/20201103-4/ (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Monetary Authority of Singapore, Technology Risk Management Guidelines, January 2021: https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/mas/regulations-and-financial-stability/regulatory-and-supervisory-framework/risk-management/trm-guidelines-18-january-2021.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Appendix B: Provider Guide, version 2.0: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-guide-providers.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, media release "Revised CORIE framework and rollout", 29 July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/news/2022/mr-22-03.html (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, control CA-8 Penetration Testing: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/frameworks/method/ --- # Datasets: the scoping sheet and the frameworks table Datasets, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** Two datasets, edition 16 November 2026, under CC BY 4.0: the engagement scoping sheet (50 questions with reasons and sources) and the red team frameworks table (7 rows with provider rules, phases and timing). Each downloads as CSV and JSON. | Dataset | Rows | CSV | JSON | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Red Team Engagement Scoping Sheet | 50 | [csv](/datasets/red-team-scoping-sheet.csv) | [json](/datasets/red-team-scoping-sheet.json) | | Red Team Frameworks by Regulator | 7 | [csv](/datasets/red-team-frameworks-by-regulator.csv) | [json](/datasets/red-team-frameworks-by-regulator.json) | Datasets Each file carries the source address and read date of every row. Reuse is free under CC BY 4.0 with a link to the page. **Cite this.** Red Team vs Blue Team, edition 16 November 2026, https://redteamvsblueteam.com/datasets/. License CC BY 4.0. ## Related pages - [How Red Team vs Blue Team sources and writes its pages](/method/) - [How the red team scoping sheet was made](/scoping-sheet/method/) - [How the red team frameworks table was read](/frameworks/method/) - [8 dated items on red team frameworks and guidance](/news/) - [15 questions about red teams, answered](/faq/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/datasets/ --- # How Red Team vs Blue Team sources and writes its pages Method, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Every fact carries a source address and the date it was read, 16 November 2026 for this edition. Definitions and rules come from the regulator, standards body or agency that issued them. What a firm offers comes from the firm's own page and is labeled as its claim. Nobody is ranked or scored. ## How are facts sourced? Each fact was read from its primary source in this edition: NIST pages and publications, the ECB, EUR-Lex, the Bank of England, the HKMA, the Association of Banks in Singapore, the MAS, the Council of Financial Regulators, CISA, the NCSC and MITRE. A fact whose source could not be loaded was left out. ## How are firms listed? The [services page](/services/who-offers-red-team-services/) lists 11 firms in alphabetical order with the same five fields for each. Each cell states what the firm's own page says, or that nothing was found. Two firms' pages were read on 10 November 2026 for other work and are dated so. Nothing is scored, ranked or rated, and a firm's absence is not a statement about it. ## What was left out? FEER at the Saudi Central Bank could not be read. Tabletop exercises, crisis simulation, cyber ranges and security training, security validation and automated attack simulation tools, threat hunting and AI model red teaming are covered by other sources and not here. No prices are given because none were found in the sources read. ## How are pages written? Pages use plain sentences, American spelling and dated numbers. Each opens with a short answer of 40 to 60 words. Question headings are taken from what people search for, and the sections under them answer in the first two sentences. See the [editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) and [corrections](/corrections/). ## Related pages - [8 dated items on red team frameworks and guidance](/news/) - [About Red Team vs Blue Team](/about/) - [How pages are written, sourced and corrected](/editorial-policy/) - [Corrections are made on the page and listed here](/corrections/) - [How the red team scoping sheet was made](/scoping-sheet/method/) - [How the red team frameworks table was read](/frameworks/method/) - [Datasets: the scoping sheet and the frameworks table](/datasets/) ## Sources - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/method/ --- # Who offers red team services? Services, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** 11 firms are listed alphabetically with the same five fields: red team service, purple team service, frameworks named, outputs stated, and source. Each cell states what the firm's own page says, or "none found" in the pages read. Pages were read on 16 November 2026, two on 10 November 2026. Nobody is ranked or scored. ## Which firms offer red team services? The 11 firms below describe a red team, purple team or adversary simulation service on their own pages. The list is not complete, and a missing firm is not a statement about it. "None found" means the pages read did not say, not that the firm offers nothing. | Firm | Red team service | Purple team service | Frameworks or schemes named | Outputs stated | Source and read date | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Bishop Fox | The Red Team Services page describes a modular "building block" approach in which the firm covertly runs attacks to measure how well the blue team stops them. | The page says the firm supports both red team and purple team approaches. It describes a purple team engagement as collaborative, with attackers and defenders tuning alerts in real time. | Says its engagements align closely with MITRE ATT&CK. Says red teaming can support alignment with DORA threat-led penetration testing expectations and adds that red teaming is not a compliance exercise. | Reporting that documents attack paths, techniques used and objectives achieved, with prioritized findings and recommendations. | [Bishop Fox, Red Team Services page](https://bishopfox.com/services/red-team), read 16 Nov 2026 | | Booz Allen Hamilton | The cybersecurity overview says the firm runs red team exercises, among other work against adversaries (read 10 November 2026). | None found in the pages read | None found in the pages read | None found in the pages read | [Booz Allen Hamilton, cybersecurity overview](https://www.boozallen.com/expertise/cybersecurity.html), read 10 Nov 2026 | | Cisco Talos Incident Response | The services page lists a Purple Team service in which Talos' offensive (red) team challenges the customer's blue team (read 16 November 2026). | The Purple Team page says Talos IR acts as the red team and runs controlled attacks, while its own blue team sits beside the customer's defenders to guide detection and remediation. | The Purple Team page says Talos IR follows the MITRE ATT&CK framework. | A post-analysis report showing which attacks the customer's security investments can and cannot detect. | [Cisco Talos Incident Response, services page](https://talosintelligence.com/incident_response/services), read 10 Nov 2026; [Cisco Talos Incident Response, Purple Team page](https://talosintelligence.com/incident_response/purple_team), read 16 Nov 2026 | | CrowdStrike | The services page lists "Red team services" as a category. A white paper page describes an Adversary Emulation Exercise as a red team exercise that simulates adversary tradecraft in a safe environment. | None found in the pages read | None found in the pages read | The white paper page says such exercises expose deficiencies in the security stack and build team skill. | [CrowdStrike, Services page](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/services/), read 16 Nov 2026; [CrowdStrike, white paper page on the Adversary Emulation Exercise](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/resources/white-papers/crafting-a-battle-tested-team-with-the-crowdstrike-adversary-emulation-exercise/), read 16 Nov 2026 | | IBM X-Force Red | The Offensive Security Services page lists adversary simulation as one of three service lines, described as attack simulations that test detection, containment and response. | None found in the pages read | Says its services support PCI DSS, HIPAA, SOC 2, ISO 27001, GDPR, FedRAMP, DORA and TIBER-EU. | Says it provides auditor-ready documentation and actionable findings. | [IBM X-Force Red, Offensive Security Services page](https://www.ibm.com/services/offensive-security), read 16 Nov 2026 | | Mandiant (Google Cloud) | The Red Team Assessment datasheet describes a "no-holds-barred" attack scenario using non-destructive methods to reach jointly agreed objectives, with tactics seen in recent incident response work. | The offensive security page lists a Purple Team Assessment: testing and coaching to improve a security team's detection and response against realistic attack scenarios. | Says scenarios are aligned with "industry standard ethical red-teaming frameworks" without naming them. | Fact-based risk analyses and recommendations for improving security posture. | [Mandiant, Red Team Assessment datasheet](https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/ds-red-team-operations-en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026; [Mandiant (Google Cloud), offensive security services page](https://cloud.google.com/security/consulting/mandiant-technical-assurance), read 16 Nov 2026 | | NCC Group | The Attack Simulation page lists "Red & Black Teams": covert attack simulations of digital and physical weaknesses using internal and external scenarios that emulate real threat actors. | The same page lists a Purple Team service: exercises that assess an internal cyber team's defensive capacity and improve detection through use of existing telemetry. | Names CBEST, TIBER-EU, iCAST, AASE, CORIE and FEER. A news item says the firm achieved assurance for its Red Team services under the UK NCSC Cyber Adversary Simulation (CyAS) scheme. | None found in the pages read | [NCC Group, Attack Simulation page](https://www.nccgroup.com/technical-assurance/attack-simulation/), read 16 Nov 2026; [NCC Group, news item on NCSC CyAS assurance](https://www.nccgroup.com/newsroom/ncc-group-achieves-ncsc-cyber-adversary-simulation-cyas-assurance-for-red-team-services/), read 16 Nov 2026 | | NetSPI | The Red Team Operations page offers assumed breach, scenario-based testing and threat intelligence-led operations covering people, process, technology and incident response. | The page describes scenario-based testing as a hybrid of penetration testing and purple team-like red team operations. | Names DORA, TIBER-EU, CBEST, CREST, AASE, CORIE, FEER, iCAST, MITRE ATT&CK and NIST, among others. | Analysis, documentation and tailored remediation strategies. | [NetSPI, Red Team Operations page](https://www.netspi.com/netspi-ptaas/red-team-operations/), read 16 Nov 2026 | | Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 | The Offensive Security page describes a red team focused on stealth and evasion that delivers intelligence-driven operations to challenge detection and response. | The page lists Purple Team Exercises in which offensive operators and incident responders work with the customer's SOC in real time. | None found in the pages read | Says every engagement concludes with a roadmap to harden defenses. | [Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Offensive Security page](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42/strengthen-your-defenses/offensive-security-services), read 16 Nov 2026 | | SpecterOps | The Services page describes a red team that simulates how AI-enabled adversaries operate, testing both traditional infrastructure and AI systems. | The Services page lists Purple Team Assessments that evaluate preventative and detective controls using test cases that represent real attack variations. | None found in the pages read | None found in the pages read | [SpecterOps, Services page](https://specterops.io/services/), read 16 Nov 2026 | | Sygnia | The Red Team Assessment page describes stealthy attack simulations on the whole organization or selected domains to test detection and response. | The Purple Teaming page says Sygnia red teamers run attack scenarios while the customer's security staff act as the blue team, guided by Sygnia incident response experts. | Says outcomes are stacked against the MITRE ATT&CK framework. | A prioritized technical findings report, a strategic recommendations roadmap and proofs of concept that allow replication. | [Sygnia, Red Team Assessment page](https://www.sygnia.co/solutions/red-teaming/?utm_source=redteamvsblueteam.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=directory), read 16 Nov 2026; [Sygnia, Purple Teaming page](https://www.sygnia.co/solutions/purple-teaming/?utm_source=redteamvsblueteam.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=directory), read 16 Nov 2026 | Firms in alphabetical order. Same fields for every firm. ## How should you use this list? Use it to compare wording, not quality. Take the same checks to every firm: the [questions to ask a provider](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/), the [scoping sheet](/scoping-sheet/) and the [frameworks table](/frameworks/) if a regulator is involved. Several firms name regulator schemes on their pages, but only the scheme's own register shows whether a firm is accredited for it. ## Related pages - [Red team services: kinds, what is included and who delivers](/services/red-team-services/) - [What to ask a red team provider: twelve questions and why](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/) - [Red team engagement cost: what drives the price](/services/red-team-engagement-cost/) - [Purple team: what it is and who is in the room](/purple-team/) - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) - [Assumed breach red team: starting from inside](/engagement/assumed-breach-red-team/) ## Sources - Bishop Fox, Red Team Services page (the firm's own page): https://bishopfox.com/services/red-team (read 16 November 2026) - Booz Allen Hamilton, cybersecurity overview (the firm's own page): https://www.boozallen.com/expertise/cybersecurity.html (read 10 November 2026) - Cisco Talos Incident Response, services page (the firm's own page): https://talosintelligence.com/incident_response/services (read 10 November 2026) - Cisco Talos Incident Response, Purple Team page (the firm's own page): https://talosintelligence.com/incident_response/purple_team (read 16 November 2026) - CrowdStrike, Services page (the firm's own page): https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/services/ (read 16 November 2026) - CrowdStrike, white paper page on the Adversary Emulation Exercise (the firm's own page): https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/resources/white-papers/crafting-a-battle-tested-team-with-the-crowdstrike-adversary-emulation-exercise/ (read 16 November 2026) - IBM X-Force Red, Offensive Security Services page (the firm's own page): https://www.ibm.com/services/offensive-security (read 16 November 2026) - Mandiant, Red Team Assessment datasheet (the firm's own document): https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/ds-red-team-operations-en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Mandiant (Google Cloud), offensive security services page (the firm's own page): https://cloud.google.com/security/consulting/mandiant-technical-assurance (read 16 November 2026) - NCC Group, Attack Simulation page (the firm's own page): https://www.nccgroup.com/technical-assurance/attack-simulation/ (read 16 November 2026) - NCC Group, news item on NCSC CyAS assurance (the firm's own page): https://www.nccgroup.com/newsroom/ncc-group-achieves-ncsc-cyber-adversary-simulation-cyas-assurance-for-red-team-services/ (read 16 November 2026) - NetSPI, Red Team Operations page (the firm's own page): https://www.netspi.com/netspi-ptaas/red-team-operations/ (read 16 November 2026) - Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Offensive Security page (the firm's own page): https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42/strengthen-your-defenses/offensive-security-services (read 16 November 2026) - SpecterOps, Services page (the firm's own page): https://specterops.io/services/ (read 16 November 2026) - Sygnia, Red Team Assessment page (the firm's own page): https://www.sygnia.co/solutions/red-teaming/ (read 16 November 2026) - Sygnia, Purple Teaming page (the firm's own page): https://www.sygnia.co/solutions/purple-teaming/ (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_service_provider_procurement_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/services/who-offers-red-team-services/ --- # 8 dated items on red team frameworks and guidance News, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** 8 dated items from regulators and agencies that shape red team testing, newest first, from the EU technical standards of February 2025 back to the HKMA circular of November 2020. Each links to the primary source and shows when it was read. ## What has changed in red team frameworks recently? The newest item is the EU technical standards on threat-led penetration testing, adopted on 13 February 2025. They turn the DORA requirement into detailed rules on scope, testers, phases and reporting. TIBER-EU and the Bank of England's CBEST guide were updated in the same period. | Date | Item | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | 13 Feb 2025 | Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 adopted: technical standards for DORA threat-led penetration testing. | [EU Regulation 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190), read 16 Nov 2026 | | Jan 2025 | ECB TIBER-EU framework document dated January 2025; the ECB page says the framework was updated in 2024 to align with the DORA technical standards. | [ECB, TIBER-EU Framework](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | Sep 2024 | Association of Banks in Singapore issues the current edition of the AASE red team guidelines. | [ABS, AASE guidelines, Sept 2024](https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 2024 | Bank of England publishes the 2024 edition of the CBEST Implementation Guide, clarifying roles and adding guidance on remediation and third parties. | [Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 28 Feb 2023 | CISA publishes advisory AA23-059A with findings from its 2022 red team assessment. | [CISA advisory AA23-059A](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 29 Jul 2022 | Council of Financial Regulators releases CORIE framework version 2.0 and a guide for providers after the pilot. | [CFR, media release of 29 July 2022](https://www.cfr.gov.au/news/2022/mr-22-03.html), read 16 Nov 2026 | | Jan 2021 | MAS Technology Risk Management Guidelines, including the adversarial attack simulation exercise section, dated January 2021. | [MAS, Technology Risk Management Guidelines](https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/mas/regulations-and-financial-stability/regulatory-and-supervisory-framework/risk-management/trm-guidelines-18-january-2021.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | | 3 Nov 2020 | HKMA circular introduces Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative 2.0, effective 1 January 2021, with iCAST deadlines by group. | [HKMA circular, CFI 2.0](https://brdr.hkma.gov.hk/eng/doc-ldg/docId/getPdf/20201103-1-EN/20201103-1-EN.pdf), read 16 Nov 2026 | Dated items, newest first ## Related pages - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) - [Red team for financial services: what regulators ask of a red team](/services/red-team-for-financial-services/) - [How Red Team vs Blue Team sources and writes its pages](/method/) - [15 questions about red teams, answered](/faq/) - [How the red team frameworks table was read](/frameworks/method/) ## Sources - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, media release "Revised CORIE framework and rollout", 29 July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/news/2022/mr-22-03.html (read 16 November 2026) - Monetary Authority of Singapore, Technology Risk Management Guidelines, January 2021: https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/mas/regulations-and-financial-stability/regulatory-and-supervisory-framework/risk-management/trm-guidelines-18-january-2021.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Hong Kong Monetary Authority, circular "Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative 2.0", 3 November 2020: https://brdr.hkma.gov.hk/eng/doc-ldg/docId/getPdf/20201103-1-EN/20201103-1-EN.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/news/ --- # 25 red team terms, each with a sourced example Glossary, read 10 November 2026 **In short.** 25 terms from red, blue and purple teaming, from rules of engagement and the white team to leg-ups, flags and attestations. Each has a plain definition and an example quoted from NIST, the ECB, the EU rules, the Singapore guidelines, MITRE or the Australian framework, with the read date. ## What do red team terms mean? These 25 terms are the words a red team engagement uses. Each entry defines the term in plain language and quotes a source. Start with red team, blue team, purple team and white team, then the terms for the rules and reports. - [Adversary emulation](/glossary/adversary-emulation/): Testing that copies the known behavior of a named threat actor, step by step, so defenders can see whether the - [Adversary simulation](/glossary/adversary-simulation/): Testing in which a team models and carries out an attack from threat intelligence about the adversaries likely - [Assumed breach](/glossary/assumed-breach/): A red team design that starts with the attacker already inside, usually with a workstation or account - [Attestation](/glossary/attestation/): A formal statement from the authority that a threat-led test followed the rules - [Blue team](/glossary/blue-team/): The people who defend an organization's systems day to day, such as the security operations center and inciden - [Catch-and-release](/glossary/catch-and-release/): A limited collaborative step in a live test: testers continue a scenario, are detected, and then resume - [Concession](/glossary/concession/): Planned help given to the attackers during an exercise, such as a laptop, an account or information about an a - [Control team](/glossary/control-team/): The tested organization's own small team that runs a threat-led test from its side: it approves changes, manag - [Critical or important function](/glossary/critical-or-important-function/): A business function whose failure would seriously harm the organization or its customers - [Flag](/glossary/flag/): A target the testers must reach to show an attack succeeded, such as access to a data set or the ability to al - [Kill switch](/glossary/kill-switch/): A built-in way to make testing tools stop working outside the agreed scope or date - [Leg-up](/glossary/leg-up/): Help from the tested organization that lets testers continue when they cannot advance on their own, such as an - [Letter of engagement](/glossary/letter-of-engagement/): A short signed document from senior management that authorizes the exercise and says how testers can prove the - [MITRE ATT&CK](/glossary/mitre-attack/): A public catalog of attacker tactics and techniques drawn from real-world observation - [No-fly zone](/glossary/no-fly-zone/): A system, area or function that testers must not touch because the risk of damage is too high - [Penetration test](/glossary/penetration-test/): A scoped security test in which assessors try to breach a system with an attacker's tools to learn which weakn - [Purple team](/glossary/purple-team/): A collaborative exercise, not a separate staff, in which attackers and defenders work together in the open so - [Red team](/glossary/red-team/): A group authorized to act as an attacker against an organization, using the methods a real adversary would use - [Remediation plan](/glossary/remediation-plan/): The tested organization's written plan to fix what the test found - [Replay exercise](/glossary/replay-exercise/): A session after the test in which testers and defenders walk through what each side did, step by step, using b - [Rules of engagement](/glossary/rules-of-engagement/): The written limits and permissions for a test: what may be touched, which methods are allowed, who to call, wh - [Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)](/glossary/ttps/): The way an attacker works: the goals they pursue (tactics), the methods used (techniques) and the exact steps - [Threat intelligence provider](/glossary/threat-intelligence-provider/): A firm that studies who is likely to attack the organization and how, and hands the red team realistic scenari - [Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT)](/glossary/threat-led-penetration-testing/): The EU term for a red team style test on live systems that follows threat intelligence about the entity - [White team](/glossary/white-team/): The small group on the tested side that knows about a covert test and referees it ## Related pages - [15 questions about red teams, answered](/faq/) - [Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers](/red-team/) - [Red team process: the phases of an engagement](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/ --- # Adversary emulation, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Testing that copies the known behavior of a named threat actor, step by step, so defenders can see whether they would catch that actor. A plan written from public threat reports drives it. MITRE's Center for Threat-Informed Defense says "Adversary Emulation mimics the behavior of real world threat actors in a safe and repeatable manner." Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is adversary emulation? Testing that copies the known behavior of a named threat actor, step by step, so defenders can see whether they would catch that actor. A plan written from public threat reports drives it. ## A sourced example MITRE's Center for Threat-Informed Defense says "Adversary Emulation mimics the behavior of real world threat actors in a safe and repeatable manner." ## Related terms - [Adversary simulation](/glossary/adversary-simulation/) - [Assumed breach](/glossary/assumed-breach/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - ctid.mitre.org: https://ctid.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-library/ (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/adversary-emulation/ --- # Adversary simulation, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Testing in which a team models and carries out an attack from threat intelligence about the adversaries likely to target the organization. Some frameworks use the term as another name for a red team exercise. The Australian CORIE framework defines it as "An exercise that uses Threat Intelligence to model and execute an adversary attack simulation. ## What is adversary simulation? Testing in which a team models and carries out an attack from threat intelligence about the adversaries likely to target the organization. Some frameworks use the term as another name for a red team exercise. ## A sourced example The Australian CORIE framework defines it as "An exercise that uses Threat Intelligence to model and execute an adversary attack simulation. Also known as a Red Team Exercise." ## Related terms - [Adversary emulation](/glossary/adversary-emulation/) - [Assumed breach](/glossary/assumed-breach/) - [Attestation](/glossary/attestation/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - cfr.gov.au: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/adversary-simulation/ --- # Assumed breach, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A red team design that starts with the attacker already inside, usually with a workstation or account. It skips the entry stage to spend the time on movement, privileges and detection. Bishop Fox describes it on its red team page as "Starts with internal access already granted. Focuses on lateral movement, privilege escalation, and detection." Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is assumed breach? A red team design that starts with the attacker already inside, usually with a workstation or account. It skips the entry stage to spend the time on movement, privileges and detection. ## A sourced example Bishop Fox describes it on its red team page as "Starts with internal access already granted. Focuses on lateral movement, privilege escalation, and detection." ## Related terms - [Adversary emulation](/glossary/adversary-emulation/) - [Adversary simulation](/glossary/adversary-simulation/) - [Attestation](/glossary/attestation/) - [Blue team](/glossary/blue-team/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - bishopfox.com: https://bishopfox.com/services/red-team (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/assumed-breach/ --- # Attestation, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A formal statement from the authority that a threat-led test followed the rules. It lets other authorities accept the result, which is called mutual recognition. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 says "Authorities shall provide financial entities with an attestation confirming that the test was performed in accordance with the requirements". Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is an attestation? A formal statement from the authority that a threat-led test followed the rules. It lets other authorities accept the result, which is called mutual recognition. ## A sourced example Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 says "Authorities shall provide financial entities with an attestation confirming that the test was performed in accordance with the requirements". ## Related terms - [Adversary simulation](/glossary/adversary-simulation/) - [Assumed breach](/glossary/assumed-breach/) - [Blue team](/glossary/blue-team/) - [Catch-and-release](/glossary/catch-and-release/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - eur-lex.europa.eu: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/attestation/ --- # Blue team, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The people who defend an organization's systems day to day, such as the security operations center and incident responders. In an engagement they are the group whose detection and response is being tested. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What is a blue team? The people who defend an organization's systems day to day, such as the security operations center and incident responders. In an engagement they are the group whose detection and response is being tested. ## A sourced example The NIST glossary, citing CNSSI 4009-2022, defines it as "The group responsible for defending an enterprise's use of information systems by maintaining its security posture against a group of mock attackers (i.e., the Red Team)." ## Related terms - [Assumed breach](/glossary/assumed-breach/) - [Attestation](/glossary/attestation/) - [Catch-and-release](/glossary/catch-and-release/) - [Concession](/glossary/concession/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - csrc.nist.gov: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/blue_team (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/blue-team/ --- # Catch-and-release, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A limited collaborative step in a live test: testers continue a scenario, are detected, and then resume. It is used only when the test could not otherwise go on. The EU technical standards describe it as "where testers attempt to continue the scenarios, get detected and then resume the testing". Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is catch-and-release? A limited collaborative step in a live test: testers continue a scenario, are detected, and then resume. It is used only when the test could not otherwise go on. ## A sourced example The EU technical standards describe it as "where testers attempt to continue the scenarios, get detected and then resume the testing". ## Related terms - [Attestation](/glossary/attestation/) - [Blue team](/glossary/blue-team/) - [Concession](/glossary/concession/) - [Control team](/glossary/control-team/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - eur-lex.europa.eu: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/catch-and-release/ --- # Concession, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Planned help given to the attackers during an exercise, such as a laptop, an account or information about an asset. It saves time but must be recorded. The Singapore guidelines say "Concessions are a method of deliberately altering the course of the exercise by providing explicit, agreed assistance to the attacking team to achieve the goals of the simulation." ## What is a concession? Planned help given to the attackers during an exercise, such as a laptop, an account or information about an asset. It saves time but must be recorded. ## A sourced example The Singapore guidelines say "Concessions are a method of deliberately altering the course of the exercise by providing explicit, agreed assistance to the attacking team to achieve the goals of the simulation." ## Related terms - [Blue team](/glossary/blue-team/) - [Catch-and-release](/glossary/catch-and-release/) - [Control team](/glossary/control-team/) - [Critical or important function](/glossary/critical-or-important-function/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - abs.org.sg: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/concession/ --- # Control team, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The tested organization's own small team that runs a threat-led test from its side: it approves changes, manages risk, provides help to the testers and keeps the test secret from the blue team. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What is a control team? The tested organization's own small team that runs a threat-led test from its side: it approves changes, manages risk, provides help to the testers and keeps the test secret from the blue team. ## A sourced example Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 defines it as "the team composed of staff of the tested financial entity and, where relevant in consideration of the scope of the TLPT, staff of its third-party service providers and any other party, who manages the test". ## Related terms - [Catch-and-release](/glossary/catch-and-release/) - [Concession](/glossary/concession/) - [Critical or important function](/glossary/critical-or-important-function/) - [Flag](/glossary/flag/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - eur-lex.europa.eu: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/control-team/ --- # Critical or important function, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A business function whose failure would seriously harm the organization or its customers. In threat-led tests these functions, and the systems behind them, decide what the testers aim at. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What is a critical or important function? A business function whose failure would seriously harm the organization or its customers. In threat-led tests these functions, and the systems behind them, decide what the testers aim at. ## A sourced example The ECB scope guidance quotes DORA: "a function, the disruption of which would materially impair the financial performance of a financial entity, or the soundness or continuity of its services and activities". ## Related terms - [Concession](/glossary/concession/) - [Control team](/glossary/control-team/) - [Flag](/glossary/flag/) - [Kill switch](/glossary/kill-switch/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - ecb.europa.eu: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_scope_specification_document_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/critical-or-important-function/ --- # Flag, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A target the testers must reach to show an attack succeeded, such as access to a data set or the ability to alter a record. Each flag is linked to confidentiality, integrity or availability. The ECB scope guidance says "For each flag, the category of compromise (confidentiality, integrity, availability) that causes a threat to the CIFs shall be defined." ## What is a flag? A target the testers must reach to show an attack succeeded, such as access to a data set or the ability to alter a record. Each flag is linked to confidentiality, integrity or availability. ## A sourced example The ECB scope guidance says "For each flag, the category of compromise (confidentiality, integrity, availability) that causes a threat to the CIFs shall be defined." ## Related terms - [Control team](/glossary/control-team/) - [Critical or important function](/glossary/critical-or-important-function/) - [Kill switch](/glossary/kill-switch/) - [Leg-up](/glossary/leg-up/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - ecb.europa.eu: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_scope_specification_document_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/flag/ --- # Kill switch, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A built-in way to make testing tools stop working outside the agreed scope or date. Testers use it, with other clean-up steps, so nothing stays active after the test. The EU technical standards list restoration steps for testers that include "command and control deactivation" and "scope and date kill switches". Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is a kill switch? A built-in way to make testing tools stop working outside the agreed scope or date. Testers use it, with other clean-up steps, so nothing stays active after the test. ## A sourced example The EU technical standards list restoration steps for testers that include "command and control deactivation" and "scope and date kill switches". ## Related terms - [Critical or important function](/glossary/critical-or-important-function/) - [Flag](/glossary/flag/) - [Leg-up](/glossary/leg-up/) - [Letter of engagement](/glossary/letter-of-engagement/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - eur-lex.europa.eu: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/kill-switch/ --- # Leg-up, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Help from the tested organization that lets testers continue when they cannot advance on their own, such as an account or network access. Each leg-up is logged so the report is honest about it. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. ## What is a leg-up? Help from the tested organization that lets testers continue when they cannot advance on their own, such as an account or network access. Each leg-up is logged so the report is honest about it. ## A sourced example The ECB report guidance defines it as "the assistance or information provided by the CT to the RTT to allow the RTT continue the execution of an attack path where they are not able to advance on their own". ## Related terms - [Flag](/glossary/flag/) - [Kill switch](/glossary/kill-switch/) - [Letter of engagement](/glossary/letter-of-engagement/) - [MITRE ATT&CK](/glossary/mitre-attack/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - ecb.europa.eu: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_report_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/leg-up/ --- # Letter of engagement, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A short signed document from senior management that authorizes the exercise and says how testers can prove their authority if staff or police stop them. The Singapore guidelines say a letter of engagement documents the exercise that the institution commissions, sanctions and authorizes, and "should be signed by the sponsoring executive or senior management". Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is a letter of engagement? A short signed document from senior management that authorizes the exercise and says how testers can prove their authority if staff or police stop them. ## A sourced example The Singapore guidelines say a letter of engagement documents the exercise that the institution commissions, sanctions and authorizes, and "should be signed by the sponsoring executive or senior management". ## Related terms - [Kill switch](/glossary/kill-switch/) - [Leg-up](/glossary/leg-up/) - [MITRE ATT&CK](/glossary/mitre-attack/) - [No-fly zone](/glossary/no-fly-zone/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - abs.org.sg: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/letter-of-engagement/ --- # MITRE ATT&CK, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A public catalog of attacker tactics and techniques drawn from real-world observation. Red teams plan with it, and reports use it to show which techniques were used and which were detected. MITRE describes it as "a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations." Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is MITRE ATT&CK? A public catalog of attacker tactics and techniques drawn from real-world observation. Red teams plan with it, and reports use it to show which techniques were used and which were detected. ## A sourced example MITRE describes it as "a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations." ## Related terms - [Leg-up](/glossary/leg-up/) - [Letter of engagement](/glossary/letter-of-engagement/) - [No-fly zone](/glossary/no-fly-zone/) - [Penetration test](/glossary/penetration-test/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - attack.mitre.org: https://attack.mitre.org/ (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/mitre-attack/ --- # No-fly zone, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A system, area or function that testers must not touch because the risk of damage is too high. It is written into the scope and listed in the report. The Singapore guidelines say certain functions, assets or areas "can be designated as 'no-fly zones' due to excessive risk involved with testing." Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is a no-fly zone? A system, area or function that testers must not touch because the risk of damage is too high. It is written into the scope and listed in the report. ## A sourced example The Singapore guidelines say certain functions, assets or areas "can be designated as 'no-fly zones' due to excessive risk involved with testing." ## Related terms - [Letter of engagement](/glossary/letter-of-engagement/) - [MITRE ATT&CK](/glossary/mitre-attack/) - [Penetration test](/glossary/penetration-test/) - [Purple team](/glossary/purple-team/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - abs.org.sg: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/no-fly-zone/ --- # Penetration test, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A scoped security test in which assessors try to breach a system with an attacker's tools to learn which weaknesses can be used. It is usually known to the staff and limited to named assets. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. ## What is a penetration test? A scoped security test in which assessors try to breach a system with an attacker's tools to learn which weaknesses can be used. It is usually known to the staff and limited to named assets. ## A sourced example The UK NCSC defines it as "A method for gaining assurance in the security of an IT system by attempting to breach some or all of that system's security, using the same tools and techniques as an adversary might." ## Related terms - [MITRE ATT&CK](/glossary/mitre-attack/) - [No-fly zone](/glossary/no-fly-zone/) - [Purple team](/glossary/purple-team/) - [Red team](/glossary/red-team/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - ncsc.gov.uk: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/penetration-testing (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/penetration-test/ --- # Purple team, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A collaborative exercise, not a separate staff, in which attackers and defenders work together in the open so that detections get tested and fixed as the techniques run. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What is a purple team? A collaborative exercise, not a separate staff, in which attackers and defenders work together in the open so that detections get tested and fixed as the techniques run. ## A sourced example The Association of Banks in Singapore guidelines say "A Purple Team Exercise is a collaborative and structured cybersecurity assessment that brings together both the defensive ('blue team') and offensive ('red team') elements to work closely together." ## Related terms - [No-fly zone](/glossary/no-fly-zone/) - [Penetration test](/glossary/penetration-test/) - [Red team](/glossary/red-team/) - [Remediation plan](/glossary/remediation-plan/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - abs.org.sg: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/purple-team/ --- # Red team, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A group authorized to act as an attacker against an organization, using the methods a real adversary would use, to show what an attack could do and what the defenders can stop. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What is a red team? A group authorized to act as an attacker against an organization, using the methods a real adversary would use, to show what an attack could do and what the defenders can stop. ## A sourced example The NIST glossary, citing CNSSI 4009-2022, defines it as "A group of people authorized and organized to emulate a potential adversary's attack or exploitation capabilities against an enterprise's security posture." ## Related terms - [Penetration test](/glossary/penetration-test/) - [Purple team](/glossary/purple-team/) - [Remediation plan](/glossary/remediation-plan/) - [Replay exercise](/glossary/replay-exercise/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - csrc.nist.gov: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/red_team (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/red-team/ --- # Remediation plan, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The tested organization's written plan to fix what the test found. For each finding it names the weakness, the fix, the priority, the owner and the expected date. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What is a remediation plan? The tested organization's written plan to fix what the test found. For each finding it names the weakness, the fix, the priority, the owner and the expected date. ## A sourced example Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 says "The remediation plan referred in paragraph 1 shall include, for each finding occurred in the framework of the TLPT" a description of the shortcomings, the measures, a root cause analysis and the responsible staff. ## Related terms - [Purple team](/glossary/purple-team/) - [Red team](/glossary/red-team/) - [Replay exercise](/glossary/replay-exercise/) - [Rules of engagement](/glossary/rules-of-engagement/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - eur-lex.europa.eu: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/remediation-plan/ --- # Replay exercise, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A session after the test in which testers and defenders walk through what each side did, step by step, using both reports. It sets up the purple team session that follows. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 says "the blue team and the testers shall replay the offensive and defensive actions performed during the TLPT". Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is a replay exercise? A session after the test in which testers and defenders walk through what each side did, step by step, using both reports. It sets up the purple team session that follows. ## A sourced example Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 says "the blue team and the testers shall replay the offensive and defensive actions performed during the TLPT". ## Related terms - [Red team](/glossary/red-team/) - [Remediation plan](/glossary/remediation-plan/) - [Rules of engagement](/glossary/rules-of-engagement/) - [Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)](/glossary/ttps/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - eur-lex.europa.eu: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/replay-exercise/ --- # Rules of engagement, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The written limits and permissions for a test: what may be touched, which methods are allowed, who to call, when to stop and who signs. They give testers authority to act without asking each time. The NIST glossary, citing SP 800-115, says the rules are "Detailed guidelines and constraints regarding the execution of information security testing." ## What are rules of engagement? The written limits and permissions for a test: what may be touched, which methods are allowed, who to call, when to stop and who signs. They give testers authority to act without asking each time. ## A sourced example The NIST glossary, citing SP 800-115, says the rules are "Detailed guidelines and constraints regarding the execution of information security testing." ## Related terms - [Remediation plan](/glossary/remediation-plan/) - [Replay exercise](/glossary/replay-exercise/) - [Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)](/glossary/ttps/) - [Threat intelligence provider](/glossary/threat-intelligence-provider/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - csrc.nist.gov: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/rules_of_engagement (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/rules-of-engagement/ --- # Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The way an attacker works: the goals they pursue (tactics), the methods used (techniques) and the exact steps and tools (procedures). Red teams copy them and defenders write detections for them. The ECB says TIBER-EU "mimics the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of real-life threat actors" using bespoke threat intelligence. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What are tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)? The way an attacker works: the goals they pursue (tactics), the methods used (techniques) and the exact steps and tools (procedures). Red teams copy them and defenders write detections for them. ## A sourced example The ECB says TIBER-EU "mimics the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of real-life threat actors" using bespoke threat intelligence. ## Related terms - [Replay exercise](/glossary/replay-exercise/) - [Rules of engagement](/glossary/rules-of-engagement/) - [Threat intelligence provider](/glossary/threat-intelligence-provider/) - [Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT)](/glossary/threat-led-penetration-testing/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - ecb.europa.eu: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/ttps/ --- # Threat intelligence provider, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A firm that studies who is likely to attack the organization and how, and hands the red team realistic scenarios. In several frameworks it must be a different team from the red team. The Bank of England says "TISP is an independent company, hired by the firm/FMI to plan and execute a threat intelligence analysis of the firm/FMI." ## What is a threat intelligence provider? A firm that studies who is likely to attack the organization and how, and hands the red team realistic scenarios. In several frameworks it must be a different team from the red team. ## A sourced example The Bank of England says "TISP is an independent company, hired by the firm/FMI to plan and execute a threat intelligence analysis of the firm/FMI." ## Related terms - [Rules of engagement](/glossary/rules-of-engagement/) - [Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)](/glossary/ttps/) - [Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT)](/glossary/threat-led-penetration-testing/) - [White team](/glossary/white-team/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - bankofengland.co.uk: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/threat-intelligence-provider/ --- # Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT), defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The EU term for a red team style test on live systems that follows threat intelligence about the entity. It is required of identified financial entities at least every three years. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What is threat-led penetration testing (TLPT)? The EU term for a red team style test on live systems that follows threat intelligence about the entity. It is required of identified financial entities at least every three years. ## A sourced example Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 says "Each threat-led penetration test shall cover several or all critical or important functions of a financial entity, and shall be performed on live production systems supporting such functions." ## Related terms - [Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)](/glossary/ttps/) - [Threat intelligence provider](/glossary/threat-intelligence-provider/) - [White team](/glossary/white-team/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - eur-lex.europa.eu: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/threat-led-penetration-testing/ --- # White team, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The small group on the tested side that knows about a covert test and referees it. Other frameworks call it the control team, control group or exercise working group. The NIST glossary, citing CNSSI 4009-2022, says "The White Team acts as observers during the Red Team activity and ensures the scope of testing does not exceed a pre-defined threshold." ## What is a white team? The small group on the tested side that knows about a covert test and referees it. Other frameworks call it the control team, control group or exercise working group. ## A sourced example The NIST glossary, citing CNSSI 4009-2022, says "The White Team acts as observers during the Red Team activity and ensures the scope of testing does not exceed a pre-defined threshold." ## Related terms - [Threat intelligence provider](/glossary/threat-intelligence-provider/) - [Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT)](/glossary/threat-led-penetration-testing/) ## Related pages - [All red team terms](/glossary/) - [Red team](/red-team/) - [The red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/) - [FAQ](/faq/) ## Sources - csrc.nist.gov: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/white_team (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/glossary/white-team/ --- # 15 questions about red teams, answered FAQ, read 10 November 2026 **In short.** 15 short answers on what red, blue and purple teams do, how a red team differs from a penetration test, rules of engagement, the white team, frequency and what to ask a provider. Each is drawn from NIST, the ECB, the EU rules, the Singapore guidelines or CISA, with the read date on the pages it links to. ## What are the most common questions about red teams? The questions below come from what people search for: the difference between the teams, between a red team and a penetration test, what a red team does, rules of engagement, the white team, how long and how often, and what to ask a provider. **What is the difference between a red team and a blue team?** A red team plays the attacker and a blue team defends. NIST describes the red team as a group authorized to emulate an adversary's attack against an enterprise, and the blue team as the group defending its systems against mock attackers. A white team referees. See the [red team vs blue team page](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team/). **What is a purple team?** A purple team is not a separate staff. It is a collaborative exercise in which red and blue work together so that detections are tested and improved as techniques run. The Singapore guidelines describe it as a structured assessment that brings both sides together. See the [purple team page](/purple-team/). **What is the difference between a red team and a penetration test?** A penetration test looks for as many weaknesses as possible in a limited scope, usually with staff aware. A red team test pursues a goal across people, process and technology, covertly. The Singapore guidelines set out the contrast in a table. See [red team vs penetration testing](/compare/red-team-vs-penetration-testing/). **What does a red team do?** A red team plans and runs a simulated attack on an organization to reach agreed objectives, then reports what worked, what was detected and what to fix. CISA describes its red team as emulating cyber threat actors to assess detection and response. See [what a red team does](/red-team/what-does-a-red-team-do/). **Is adversary simulation the same as adversary emulation?** Not always. Emulation copies the known behavior of a named threat actor from public reports. The CORIE framework uses adversary simulation as another name for a red team exercise driven by threat intelligence. See [adversary simulation vs emulation](/compare/adversary-simulation-vs-emulation/). **What is a red team assessment?** It is the buyer's name for a purchased red team engagement: an agreed objective, a covert attack by a provider, and a report. Mandiant, for example, describes a no-holds-barred attack scenario using non-destructive methods against jointly agreed objectives. See [the red team assessment page](/services/red-team-assessment/). **What are rules of engagement in a red team test?** They are the written limits and permissions for the test: scope, exclusions, allowed methods, contacts, halt criteria and signatures. NIST SP 800-115 supplies a template. See [rules of engagement](/engagement/red-team-rules-of-engagement/). **What is the white team or white cell?** It is the small group on the tested side that knows about the covert test and referees it. NIST calls it the white team. TIBER-EU calls it the control team, CBEST and CORIE call it the control group, and the Singapore guidelines use exercise working group. See [the white team page](/engagement/white-team/). **How long does a red team engagement take?** It depends on the framework and scope. The EU technical standards require at least 12 weeks of active testing. CBEST gives about 14 weeks for its testing phase and 9 to 12 months overall. See [the red team process](/engagement/red-team-process/). **How often should a red team exercise be run?** TIBER-EU says three-year intervals are the norm. DORA requires threat-led testing at least every three years for identified entities. The Singapore guidelines recommend at least every 24 months, with a risk-based choice. See [the frameworks table](/frameworks/). **Is a red team test pass or fail?** Under TIBER-EU it is not. The ECB says the outcome is not a pass or fail but a view of strengths and weaknesses, with a focus on learning. See [what to expect from the report](/engagement/red-team-report/). **What should a red team report contain?** TIBER-EU requires the flags reached and not reached, attack paths, techniques used, deviations from the plan, leg-ups granted, known blue team actions, findings with root causes and a remediation priority. See [the red team report page](/engagement/red-team-report/). **Is a red team test legal?** It is lawful only with authorization. The Singapore guidelines describe a letter of engagement signed by senior management, and TIBER-EU says a legal analysis should be done because some activities, such as gathering employee account data, need care. See [legal authorization](/engagement/red-team-legal-authorization/). **Do financial firms have to do red team testing?** In the EU, identified financial entities must carry out threat-led penetration testing at least every three years under DORA. Other regimes, such as CBEST and CORIE, select firms by regulator. See [red team for financial services](/services/red-team-for-financial-services/). **What should I ask a red team provider?** Ask for references, team experience, insurance, conflicts of interest, how high-risk actions are approved and what the report contains. TIBER-EU and the Singapore guidelines list such checks. See [what to ask a provider](/services/what-to-ask-a-red-team-provider/). ## Related pages - [Home: red team vs blue team](/) - [8 dated items on red team frameworks and guidance](/news/) - [Red team: what a red team is and what it delivers](/red-team/) - [Red team vs blue team: roles, goals and how they meet](/compare/red-team-vs-blue-team/) - [Red team services: kinds, what is included and who delivers](/services/red-team-services/) - [25 red team terms, each with a sourced example](/glossary/) - [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/) ## Sources - NIST CSRC Glossary, red team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/red_team (read 16 November 2026) - NIST CSRC Glossary, blue team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/blue_team (read 16 November 2026) - Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - NCSC (UK), Penetration testing: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/penetration-testing (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026) - MITRE Center for Threat-Informed Defense, Adversary Emulation Library: https://ctid.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-library/ (read 16 November 2026) - Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Mandiant, Red Team Assessment datasheet (the firm's own document): https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/ds-red-team-operations-en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-115.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - NIST CSRC Glossary, rules of engagement: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/rules_of_engagement (read 16 November 2026) - NIST CSRC Glossary, white team: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/white_team (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, What is TIBER-EU?: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html (read 16 November 2026) - Bank of England, CBEST Implementation Guide, 2024 edition: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/operational-resilience-of-the-financial-sector/cbest-threat-intelligence-led-assessments-implementation-guide (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554 (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Red Team Test Report Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_red_team_test_report_guidance_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Guidance for Service Provider Procurement, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_eu_service_provider_procurement_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/faq/ --- # About Red Team vs Blue Team About, read 10 November 2026 **In short.** Red Team vs Blue Team is a reference site on human red teams, blue teams and purple teams: what each does, how an engagement runs, how it differs from a penetration test, and how to scope one and question a provider. Every fact carries its source address and the date it was read. The site is written for security leaders, risk and compliance staff and procurement teams who have to commission, supervise or understand a red team engagement, and for practitioners who want the official definitions in one place. Two original works sit at its center: an engagement scoping sheet, printable and downloadable, and a table of threat-led red team frameworks as published by the regulators themselves. Both are free to reuse under CC BY 4.0, and both have a method page. The publisher is Red Team vs Blue Team. Questions and corrections go to editor@redteamvsblueteam.com. See the [editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) and the [site method](/method/). ## Related pages - [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) - [Corrections](/corrections/) - [Contact](/contact/) - [Privacy](/privacy/) - [Terms](/terms/) - [Site method](/method/) - [Home: red team vs blue team](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/about/ --- # How pages are written, sourced and corrected Editorial policy, read 10 November 2026 **In short.** Every fact on this site carries a source address and the date it was read. Framework and legal statements come from the regulator, the standards body or the agency that issued them. Where a source could not be read, the fact is left out and the gap is listed on the method page. Sources, in order of preference: the text of the rule or the framework; the issuing agency's guidance; and firms' own pages for what they say they offer, labeled as the firm's claim. The site ranks nobody. Firms on the [services page](/services/who-offers-red-team-services/) are listed alphabetically, with the same fields for each, and nothing there is scored or rated. Pages carry a review date. When a source changes, the affected pages are read again and the date is updated. See the [corrections page](/corrections/). ## Related pages - [About](/about/) - [Corrections](/corrections/) - [Contact](/contact/) - [Privacy](/privacy/) - [Terms](/terms/) - [Site method](/method/) - [Home: red team vs blue team](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/editorial-policy/ --- # Corrections are made on the page and listed here Corrections, read 10 November 2026 **In short.** To correct a page, send its address, the statement you dispute and a source that shows the right fact. A correction changes a fact only where a source supports the change, and each one is dated on this page. No corrections have been made to the edition of 16 November 2026. Send corrections to editor@redteamvsblueteam.com. Firms may correct facts about themselves under the same rule: send the page of your own site that states the fact. Frameworks change. When a regulator updates a document, the affected pages are read again. See the [editorial policy](/editorial-policy/). ## Related pages - [About](/about/) - [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) - [Contact](/contact/) - [Privacy](/privacy/) - [Terms](/terms/) - [Site method](/method/) - [Home: red team vs blue team](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/corrections/ --- # Write to the editors Contact, read 10 November 2026 **In short.** The editors read every message sent to editor@redteamvsblueteam.com. For a correction, give the page address, the statement and a source. For a question on scoping or a framework, say which page you read. There is no telephone line and no advertising desk. Address: editor@redteamvsblueteam.com. Messages are used only to answer them and to make corrections. See the [privacy page](/privacy/) and the [corrections page](/corrections/). ## Related pages - [About](/about/) - [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) - [Corrections](/corrections/) - [Privacy](/privacy/) - [Terms](/terms/) - [Site method](/method/) - [Home: red team vs blue team](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/contact/ --- # Privacy Privacy, read 10 November 2026 **In short.** Reading a page or downloading the scoping sheet and datasets on this site needs no account and no personal details. The host keeps standard request logs, such as address, time, page and user agent, for security and for total page counts. Messages to the editors are used only to reply. The downloads need no sign-up and no email address. See the [terms](/terms/) and the [contact page](/contact/). ## Related pages - [About](/about/) - [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) - [Corrections](/corrections/) - [Contact](/contact/) - [Terms](/terms/) - [Site method](/method/) - [Home: red team vs blue team](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/privacy/ --- # Terms of use Terms, read 10 November 2026 **In short.** Text and datasets on this site may be copied, adapted and reused under CC BY 4.0 with a link to the page. The scoping sheet is a starting point and is not legal advice. Facts are as published by their sources on the dates shown. Confirm authorization and law with counsel before any test. Names of agencies, frameworks and firms belong to their owners and are used to identify them. See the [editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) and the [privacy page](/privacy/). ## Related pages - [About](/about/) - [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) - [Corrections](/corrections/) - [Contact](/contact/) - [Privacy](/privacy/) - [Site method](/method/) - [Home: red team vs blue team](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/terms/