# Red team example: the CISA red team assessment of 2022

Case, read 16 November 2026

**The short answer.** CISA published its own red team assessment in advisory AA23-059A on 28 February 2023. The team gained persistent access to a large critical infrastructure organization, moved between sites and went undetected despite a mature posture. MFA prompts blocked one target. Read 16 November 2026.

## What is an example of a real red team exercise?

CISA's advisory AA23-059A is one of the few public accounts. In 2022 CISA conducted a red team assessment at the request of a large critical infrastructure organization with several geographically separated sites. The team gained persistent access, moved laterally across sites and reached systems adjacent to sensitive business systems.

MFA prompts stopped the team from reaching one sensitive system, and it could not finish its plan for a second within the assessment period. The organization did not detect the activity at any point.

## How was the exercise run?

In two phases. In Phase I the team tried to gain and keep persistent access while avoiding detection. In Phase II it tried to trigger a security response from the organization's people, processes or technology.

The team gained initial access to two workstations at separate sites through spearphishing after open-source research on targets, then used directory data to find standard user accounts with administrative access and ran a second phishing campaign against them.

## What did the report find?

CISA listed key issues that allowed undetected access. Host and network monitoring was insufficient: most Phase II actions drew no response, and the organization failed to detect lateral movement, persistence and command and control. There was little monitoring of endpoint management systems, which the team used to gain root access across the network. A domain account password had not been changed for over a decade.

CISA's actions to take included: establish a baseline of normal network activity and tune tools to detect anomalies, conduct regular assessments of procedures, and enforce phishing-resistant MFA to the greatest extent possible.

## What can a buyer learn from it?

Four things stand out. The assessment ran at the organization's request. Its goal was a set of sensitive business systems. It had two phases, one for stealth and one for provoking a response. And the findings map to ATT&CK so defenders can write detections.

See [the red team report page](/engagement/red-team-report/) for how a report is organized.

## Related pages

- [Red team report: what it must contain, with a template](/engagement/red-team-report/)
- [What does a red team do?](/red-team/what-does-a-red-team-do/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK and adversary emulation plans for red teams](/adversary/mitre-attack-and-emulation-plans/)
- [Emergency stop and deconfliction in a red team test](/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/)
- [Red team frameworks by regulator: TIBER-EU, DORA, CBEST, iCAST, AASE and CORIE](/frameworks/)
- [Blue team: what a blue team does and how it is tested](/blue-team/)
- [Red team debrief: how to turn findings into fixes](/engagement/red-team-debrief/)

## Sources

- CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026)

Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/engagement/red-team-example/
