# Emergency stop and deconfliction in a red team test

Explainer, read 16 November 2026

**The short answer.** A red team test needs a way to stop and a way to tell the test from a real attack. TIBER-EU lets the control team halt the test at any time, and the Singapore guidelines give the exercise director power to proceed, pause or end it. Read 16 November 2026.

## Who can stop a red team test?

The tested organization's white cell can. TIBER-EU says the control team may at any time order a temporary or complete halt if concerns are raised over damage or potential damage to a system. The EU technical standards let the control team lead suspend the test in exceptional circumstances that risk data, assets or critical functions.

The Singapore guidelines give the exercise director the decision, at every stage, to proceed with an action, pause or terminate the exercise.

## What is deconfliction in a red team test?

Deconfliction is separating the test from real events. The sources read here do not define the word, but CISA's red team advisory uses it: it reports that the team received no deconflictions or confirmation that the organization had caught its activity.

The practice appears under other names. The Singapore guidelines have the provider set up a direct hotline so the exercise director can validate and attribute observed incident notifications to the attacker, and then intervene to diffuse, delay or alter the response.

## What happens if the blue team detects the red team?

The white cell manages the reaction so the test can continue where possible. The EU technical standards ask the control team, with the testers, to propose measures that allow the test to continue while keeping it secret.

TIBER-EU gives uncontrolled escalation as a case for intervention, such as the blue team shutting down critical servers, an incident reported to the supervisor, or a police report filed. The control team lead should pause the test and deal with the escalation while disclosing as little as possible. CORIE's control group gives instructions to staff if the red team is detected.

## What if a serious weakness or a real intruder is found?

Both go to the white cell at once. The Singapore guidelines say that when the attacker finds a high-risk vulnerability, such as arbitrary code execution on an internet-facing system, it informs the working group immediately, which decides whether to remediate at once even if that compromises secrecy.

If the attacker finds evidence of an earlier compromise, the organization should complete the incident response first, even if that means halting or pausing the exercise.

## How is the environment restored after a stop?

Testers clean up. The EU technical standards require command and control deactivation, scope and date kill switches, removal of backdoors and other malware, breach notification where needed, and secure deletion of compromised credentials.

## Related pages

- [White team or white cell: who they are and what they do](/engagement/white-team/)
- [Red team rules of engagement: what they cover and a template](/engagement/red-team-rules-of-engagement/)
- [Red team engagement scoping sheet: 50 questions to answer before testing](/scoping-sheet/)
- [Red team legal authorization: the letter and the law](/engagement/red-team-legal-authorization/)
- [Kill switch, defined](/glossary/kill-switch/)
- [Catch-and-release, defined](/glossary/catch-and-release/)

## Sources

- European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Framework, January 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.tiber_eu_framework_2025~b32eff9a10.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026)
- European Central Bank, TIBER-EU Control Team Guidance, 2025: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annex/ecb.tiber_control_team_2025.en.pdf (read 16 November 2026)
- EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (TLPT technical standards): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1190 (read 16 November 2026)
- Association of Banks in Singapore, Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise Guidelines, September 2024: https://abs.org.sg/docs/library/abs-red-team-adversarial-attack-simulation-exercises-guidelines----september-2024.pdf (read 16 November 2026)
- CISA, advisory AA23-059A, CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks, 28 February 2023: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-059a (read 16 November 2026)
- Council of Financial Regulators, CORIE Framework version 2.0, July 2022: https://www.cfr.gov.au/publications/policy-statements-and-other-reports/2022/revised-corie-framework-rollout/pdf/corie-framework.pdf (read 16 November 2026)

Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://redteamvsblueteam.com/engagement/emergency-stop-and-deconfliction/
